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ABSTRACT 
Conventionally, the conduct of foreign relations (including international economic relations) 
by nation-states has been the exclusive preserve of the central tier of government (i.e. ‘central 
exclusivity’ in foreign relations). However, the peculiarities of federal systems have posed a 
serious challenge to this conventional position. This is because federalism is based on 
principles which require shared powers between multiple levels of government. As such, 
Sub-Federal Governments (SFGs) have been known to affect the operation of international 
norms in federal systems.  
Furthermore, the international system is constantly evolving due to geopolitical changes, 
most notably globalisation. These changes in the international system have facilitated an 
increased participation of SFGs in international relations and as a consequence brought into 
question the continued relevance of conventional norms pertaining to foreign relations in 
international law.  
With regards to Nigeria, and in the specific context of international economic relations, 
empirical evidence shows that since the start of the 4
th
 democratic Republic in 1999, SFGs in 
Nigeria are increasingly accessing international markets and engaging in activities which 
have direct and/or indirect impact on Nigeria’s international economic relations. This trend 
contradicts the constitutional position in Nigeria, where the extant theoretical framework 
underpinning Nigeria’s international economic participation gives plenary powers for foreign 
relations to the Federal Government (FG). In light of this contradiction, this thesis examines 
the divergence between theory and reality in Nigeria’s international economic relations.  
This thesis puts forward a proposition that the functional reality of international economic 
interactions in the current dispensation necessitates a re-assessment of the existing framework 
underpinning the relationship between domestic (federal) and international regimes in 
international economic relations. In the context of Nigeria, this thesis concludes that the 
changing dynamics of international economic relations necessitates a shift from central 
exclusivity to a cooperative federalism model.  
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PREFACE 
 
The law is stated up to May 2014.
1 
 
Chapter One: General Introduction. 
1.1 Federalism and Foreign Relations.  
For over a century, there has been controversy over the relationship between federalism 
and foreign relations.
1
 Conventionally, foreign relations are regarded as an area which 
necessitates singleness of purpose, while federalism as a system of government is 
premised on the concept of shared and/or divided competences among multiple levels of 
government.
2
 As a consequence of this divergence in the conceptualisation of foreign 
relations and federalism, a federal system is faced with challenges when allocating 
foreign affairs competences in its constitution. A major issue considered is whether 
foreign relations competence should be entirely borne by the central government or 
divided between the central government and federating units.
3
 
A number of theoretical positions address this constitutional challenge identified above. 
There is the orthodox view which situates foreign affairs powers exclusively with the 
central government. For the purpose of this investigation this orthodox view will be 
termed ‘central exclusivity.’4 ‘Central exclusivity’ is a constitutional arrangement where 
the central level of government in a federal system has plenary powers i.e. exclusive 
jurisdiction on matters of foreign policy.
5
 Central exclusivity is found in the foreign 
                                                 
1
 See Ivan Bernier, International Legal Aspects of Federalism (Longman 1973) 1-6; KC Wheare, Federal 
Government (4th ed OUP 1963) 183- 186. 
2
 Bernier (n 1) 10-11; Ben Nwabueze, The Presidential Constitution of Nigeria (Hurst & Company 1982) 
37.  
3
 See RA Akindele and Oyeleye Oyediran, ‘Federalism and Foreign Policy in Nigeria’ (1985) 41 Intl J 
600, 602; Matthew S Mingus, ‘Transnationalism and Sub-National Paradiplomacy: Are Governance 
Networks Perforating Sovereignty?’ (2006) 29 (8) Intl J Public Admin 577, 578. 
4
 This terminology has been adopted from the work of Spiro. See Peter J Spiro, ‘Federalism and 
Immigration: Models and Trends’ (2001) 53 (167) Intl Soc Sci J 67, 71. This concept is also refered to 
as as ‘foreign affairs exceptionalism.’ See Matthew Schafer ‘Federal States in the Broader World’ 
(2001)27 CAN-US LJ 35, 36.   
5
 Spiro (2001) (n 4) 71.  
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affairs regime of most nation-states (cutting across different systems of government) in 
the international system. In this thesis, the focus will be on central exclusivity in the 
context of a federal system. Using the US as an example, it will be argued in the course 
of this thesis how and why a system can be classified as central exclusive. Also the 
foreign affairs system in Nigeria will be examined to ascertain if the extant sytem for 
international economic relations is central exclusive. Proponents of this school argue 
that shared foreign affairs competence between a central government and sub-federal 
governments (SFGs) has the potential to undermine the credibility of the nation-state in 
international circles.
6
 
Alternate theoretical viewpoints to central exclusivity can be broadly categorised as 
‘revisionist.’7 Revisionism encompasses theories which seek to modify previously 
accepted norms or historical accounts.
8
 In the context of foreign affairs federalism, 
revisionist scholars question the conventional norm of central exclusivity in international 
relations. They instead advocate shared (concurrent) competence between central 
governments and SFGs on matters of foreign policy.
9
 Spiro,
10
 a leading proponent of the 
                                                 
6
 Holmes v. Jennison 39 US 570 (1840) para 557; Edward T Hayes, ‘Changing Notions of Sovereignty 
and Federalism in the International Economic System: A Reassessment of WTO Regulation of Federal 
States and the Regional and Local Governments within their Territories’ (2004) 25(1) Nw J Intl L & Bus 
1, 20; Schafer (n 4) 37-39. 
7
 The concept of revisionism originated from the writings of Eduard Bernstein in the 19
th
 century. See 
Eduard Bernstein, ‘Der Revisionismus in der Socialdemokratie’ Translated from German to English by 
Henry Tudor and JM Tudor (eds), Marxism and Social Democracy: The Revisionist Debate 1896-1898 
(CUP 1988). Revisionism was a reference to Bernstein’s challenge of the conventional Marxism doctrines 
in relation to capitalism. ‘… [I]t was based not just on the perspective of an individual but on an emerging 
body of opinion linked to a movement that split from orthodox Marxism.’ Sebastian Balfour, ‘The 
Concept of Historical Revisionism: Spain since the 1930s’ (2008) 21 (3) Intl J Iberian Stud 179, 181. 
Subsequently, this concept has been utilised as an umbrella term for any critical re-examination of 
conventional theories and historical accounts of world affairs. For in-depth discussions on the origin, 
scope and application of revisionism see generally, David W Morgan, ‘The Father of Revisionism 
Revisited: Eduard Bernstein’ (1979) 51 (3) JMH 525; Sheila Fitzpatrick, ‘Revisionism in Retrospect: A 
Personal View’ (2008) 67 (3) Slavic Review 682.  
 
8
 Balfour (n 7) 181-183; Schafer (n 6) 36. 
9
 See generally, Peter J Spiro, ‘Foreign Relations Federalism’ (1999)70 U Colo L Rev 1223; Jack L 
Goldsmith, ‘Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs and Federalism’ (1997) 83 (8) Va L Rev 1617; Curtis A 
Bradley, ‘A New American Foreign Affairs Law?’ (1999) 70 U Colo L Rev 1089. 
10
 Spiro (1999) (n 9). 
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revisionist school of foreign affairs federalism, argued that ‘…making states [in the US] 
directly accountable to the international community …would likely further the 
incorporation of international law in the United States.’11 Goldsmith (also speaking in 
the context of the US) argued that the enumerated provisions giving foreign relation 
powers to the US federal government does not ‘impose new limitations on the states or 
purport to bar states from participating in all foreign relations-related functions.’12  
Situated mid-way between central exclusivity and pure revisionism is the theory of 
cooperative federalism.
13
 Cooperative federalism entails a process of federal relations 
where different levels of government work together as complementary parts in a shared 
legal sphere.
14
 This could mean joint participation by each level of government in the 
formation and/or implementation of policies; which is achieved either through formal or 
informal channels.
15
 Although cooperative federalism seeks revision of the conventional 
norm, it can be distinguished from mainstream revisionist theories. This is because 
cooperative federalism seeks the integration of relevant actors into an existing 
framework, rather than advocating the operation of a parallel framework for such actors. 
In essence, core foreign affairs revisionists seek concurrent competence, while 
cooperative federalists seek complementary competence.  
From the preliminary observations above, it is argued that the validity of these 
theoretical perspectives is significantly tied to changing geo-political patterns of the 
international system and historical antecedents of the federalism process. Revisionists 
such as Spiro,
16
 Goldsmith,
17
 Bradley
18
 and Conlan and others
19
 rely on changes in the 
                                                 
11
 ibid 1225 - 1226.
 
 
12
 Goldsmith (n 9) 1643 - 1644 
13
 Robert Schütze, From Dual to Cooperative Federalism: The Changing Structure of European Law 
(OUP 2009)116. 
14
 ibid 347. See also Christopher K Bader, ‘A Dynamic Defense of Cooperative Federalism’ (2014) 35 
Whittier L Rev (Forthcoming) 4 <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2189920> accessed 31 July 2013. 
15
 infra Chapter five, section 5.4. 
16
 Spiro (1999) (n 11) 1267. 
17
 Goldsmith (n 12) 1644. 
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geopolitical circumstances of international relations as a basis for their claims that SFGs 
should be allowed to participate in international relations. Conversely, central 
exclusivists such as Schafer argue against the participation of US SFGs in foreign policy 
on the premise that a dormant foreign affairs doctrine in favour of the central 
government in the US is supported by historical antecedents in the constitutional 
development of the US which made it imperative for the central government to exercise 
plenary foreign affairs powers.
20
 Finally, cooperative federalists such as Bader argue that 
a cooperative approach to international relations is a compromise which has evolved as a 
practical and flexible response to the changing geo-political patterns in the international 
system.
21
  
In view of the emphasis identified above, it is pertinent to explain the significance of 
changing geopolitical circumstances to the conceptualisation of foreign relations in 
federal systems. Specifically, globalisation is identified in this thesis as a key facilitator 
of these changes referred to. Globalisation has re-shaped the dynamics of international 
relations, especially as it pertains to the concept of sovereignty and accepted practices of 
international law in the 21
st
 century.
22
 For example, globalisation has led to an increase 
in the structural differentiation of goods and assets which has spread across traditional 
political borders and economic sectors.
23
 This in turn has resulted in transnational and 
multinational changes, which have a major impact on outcomes in the determination of 
                                                                                                                                                
18
 Bradley (n 9) 1105. 
19
 Timothy J Conlan and others, ‘Taking on the World: The International Activities of American State 
Legislatures’ (2004) 34 (3) Publius 183. 
20
 Schafer (n 8) 41.  
21
 Bader (n 14) 6.  
22
 See Hayes (n 6) 20. See also Guy Lachapelle and Stéphane Paquin (eds), Mastering Globalisation: New 
Sub-States’ Governance and Strategies (Roultage 2005); JH Jackson, ‘Sovereignty-Modern: A New 
Approach to an Outdated Concept’ (2003) 97 Am J Intl L 782; Peter Van Den Bossche, The law and 
Policy of the World Trade Organisation (2nd edn, CUP 2008). 
23
 See UNESCO Management of Social Transformations (MOST) Phase I Globalisation Study < 
http://www.unesco.org/most/globalisation/Introduction.htm> accessed 01 September 2013. 
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subject matters (such as environment, trade and world regulation).
24
 Another noticeable 
impact of globalisation on international relations is in the area of governance 
structures.
25
 Globalisation has challenged the sovereignty status quo of Westphlian 
statehood by disaggregating traditional governance structures and encouraging the 
emergence of new ones (global and sub-national).
26
 As a consequence, the suitability of 
conventional sovereignty based theories underpinning the interaction between federal 
systems and international norms is now questionable.
27
   
1.1.1  The Relationship between Federalism and International Economic 
Relations.  
The observations above apply to the conduct of international economic relations. Like 
other aspects of international relations, the conduct of international economic relations 
in the Westphalian era of Statehood, has been conventionally situated within the 
exclusive competency of central governments in most federal systems.
28
 However, due 
to changing dynamics brought about by globalisation it is arguable that a new 
dispensation of international economic relations has emerged. This new dispensation has 
found expression in a fluctuating relationship between multilateralism and regionalism 
which are the two principal international platforms for the regulation of international 
trade.
29
  
                                                 
24
 Michael Keating, ‘Regions and International Affairs: Motives, Opportunities and Strategies’ (1999) 9(1) 
Reg & Fed Stud 1. 
25
 Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘The Real New World Order’ (1997) 76 (5) Foreign Affairs 183, 184; Jessica 
Matthews, ‘Power Shift’ (1997) 76 (1) Foreign Affairs 50. 
26
 Slaughter (n 25). 
27
 Jackson (2003) (n 22); Hayes (n 22).  
28
 Bernier (n 2) 1- 6; Hayes (n 27) 20. 
29
 See Klaus Armingeon and others, ‘The Constitutionalisation of International Trade Law’ in Thomas 
Cottier and Panagiotis Delimatsis (eds), The Prospects of International Trade Regulation: From 
Fragmentation to Coherence (CUP 2011) 69-102.   
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Historically, regionalism was first in time as a recognised platform for the participation 
of nation-states in international trade.
30
 However, with the introduction of the 
multilateral trade system in the aftermath of the Second World War, regionalism was 
subsumed under the rubric of the multilateral system by virtue of art XXIV GATT 1947. 
Interestingly, since the early 1990s, regionalism has re-emerged as a contending trade 
policy platform of choice amongst most trading nations of the world.
31
 This has led to 
growing concerns on how this shift within the exogenous interaction of the international 
trade regulatory regimes impacts on the participation of federal systems in international 
economic relations.
32
  
In this thesis, the impact of globalisation, leading to the aforementioned changes in the 
dynamics of the international economic system is viewed as basis for the new 
dispensation of international economic interactions. From this perspective, the new 
dispensation is characterised by an expansion of multilateralism into spheres hitherto 
within the exclusive competence of national governments and the resurgence of a new 
wave of regionalism which is dynamic in nature and expansive in scope.
33
 More 
specifically, the focus in this thesis is on the ‘contraction’ effect which has been brought 
about by the expansion of international norms.
34
 Due to globalisation, international 
economic interaction has become more localised in terms of its scope and actors.
35
 This 
                                                 
30
 See WTO 2011 Report, The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements: From Co-Existence to 
Coherence (WTO Publications 2011) 49; Frederick M Abbott, ‘A New Dominant Trade Species 
Emerges: Is Bilateralism a Threat?’ [2007] JIEL 571, 572. 
31
 According to the WTO as of 15 May 2011, some 489 RTAs, counting goods and services notifications 
separately, have been notified to the GATT/WTO. Of these, 358 RTAs were notified under art XXIV of 
the GATT 1947 or GATT 1994; 36 under the Enabling Clause; and 95 under art V of the GATS. As at 
that same date, 297 agreements were in force. See AL Stoler, ‘Preferential Trade Agreements and the 
Role and Goals of the World Trade Organization’ (Conference on Free Trade Agreements in the Asia-
Pacific Region:  Implications for Australia, Perth, July 2004). 
32
 Hayes (n 28) 1. 
33
 See generally Christopher J Kukucha, The Provinces and Canadian Foreign Trade Policy (UBC Press 
2008); Keating (n 24) 1. 
34
 ‘Contraction effect’ is used in the context of shrinking foreign affairs powers of central governments in 
federal systems, due to the intrusiveness of the expanding scope of international economic regimes.  
35
 Emily Chiang, ‘Think Locally, Act Globally? Dormant Federal Common Law Pre-emption of State and 
Local Activities Affecting Foreign Affairs’ (2003)53 Syracuse L Rev 923, 924-25. See also Matthew 
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is because globalisation affords opportunities for new actors (SFGs and non-state actors) 
to engage in cross-border economic interactions.
36
 
In light of the changes in the international economic system, the orthodox constitutional 
doctrine of central exclusivity in international relations has increasingly come under 
scrutiny. Hayes argues that the dynamics of a new international economic system re-
shaped by globalisation requires:  ‘…a more universal concept than the traditional 
parochial notion of sovereignty.’37 Realising that there is a change in the protocol for 
interacting in the international economic system, a number of federal systems including 
Canada, Belgium, India, Argentina and the US out of necessity and/or pragmatism are 
adapting to the emerging changes, albeit to varying degrees.
38
 However, this theoretical 
shift is still not a universally accepted position in all federal systems. For example, the 
focus in this thesis is to ascertain if the system for international economic relations in 
Nigeria (the selected case study of this thesis) still aligns with the status quo of central 
exclusivity in spite of changes in the dynamics of the international system.  
1.2 A Case Study of Nigeria.  
1.2.1 Background. 
The Federal Republic of Nigeria, with an area of 923,768 square kilometres and an 
estimated population of 177,155,754 (July 2014 estimate) is the most populous black 
nation in Sub –Saharan Africa.39  Nigeria’s federal system of government dates back to 
1954, when Britain introduced a quasi-federal constitution to the then colony of 
                                                                                                                                                
Sparke, ‘From Geopolitics to Geoeconomics: Transnational State Effects in the Borderlands’ (1998) 3 
(2) Geopolitics 62. 
36
 Slaughter (n 26) 194-195. 
37
 Hayes (n 32) 8. 
38
 The experience of these federal systems mentioned above will be analysed in the course of this thesis.  
39
 The Central Intelligence Agency <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/ni.html> accessed 8 April 2014. 
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Nigeria.
40
 After gaining independence in 1960, Nigeria maintained a federal system of 
government. However, the practice of federalism in Nigeria has been affected by years 
of military interregna which have adversely affected the practice of true federal 
principles under the extant 1999 Constitution.
41
  
With reference to her foreign economic policy, Nigeria is a member of the multilateral 
system of the WTO. She is also involved in a few bilateral and preferential trading 
agreements which include Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) initiatives with the 
US - the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and the EU- ACP 
Lome/Cotonou Agreement; a regional Customs Union under the Enabling Clause - the 
Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS) Agreement and a number of 
bilateral investment treaties.
42
 
1.2.2 Statement of the Problem. 
The choice of Nigeria as a case study was informed by preliminary observations of the 
researcher which indicated that since the start of the 4
th
 democratic republic in 1999 
there have been increased levels of participation by Nigeria’s SFGs on the international 
scene. SFGs in Nigeria are actively engaging with international actors in order to attract 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and to obtain international funding for their 
development projects.
43
 Cross Rivers state
44
 and Abia state
45
 among others have signed 
                                                 
40
 See WO Wali, ‘The Development of Federalism in Nigeria: A Historical Perspective’ in Aaron 
Tsado Gana and Samuel G Egwu (eds), Federalism in Africa: Framing the National Question, Vol 1 
(Africa Research and Publications 2003) 74 – 75. 
41
 ibid. The peculiarities of federalism in Nigeria are discussed in-depth in chapter four of this thesis. 
42
 For a list of Nigeria’s Bilateral Investment Treaties as at June 2013, see 
<http://unctad.org/Sections/dite_pcbb/docs/bits_nigeria.pdf>   accessed 21 March 2014.   
43
 In relation to international financial interactions of SFGs, statistics from the Nigerian Debt Management 
Office (DMO) show a steady increase in state borrowing via the domestic bond market and ‘on-lent’ 
loans obtained from multilateral sources such as the African Development Bank (ADB), the World 
Bank, or the Islamic Development Bank. Between 2005 and 2012, the contribution of SFGs to Nigeria’s 
external debt stock increased from 20.99% to 36.53%. See generally, The Nigerian Debt Management 
Office (DMO) Annual Reports 2005 – 2012 <http://www.dmo.gov.ng/arrep.php> accessed 31 July 
2013. See also Habeeb I Pindiga and Nuruddeen M Abdallah, ‘Nigeria: N1.5 Trillion Debts Weigh 
Down States’ Daily Trust (Nigeria, 16 July 2013) <http://allafrica.com/stories/201307171072.html> 
accessed 31 July 2013.  
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Memoranda of Understandings (MoUs) and/or entered into bilateral agreements with 
foreign actors. Interestingly, the international partners engaged by Nigerian SFGs 
include national governments, counterpart SFGs and multinational corporations’ i.e. 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) which wield strong state influence.
46
 There is also 
evidence of SFGs in Nigeria expanding their institutional capacity for international 
investment promotion purposes. For example, in 2008, Cross Rivers state introduced the 
Cross Rivers State One Stop Investment Centre (OSIC) to cater for the specific needs of 
foreign investors in the state. This state agency runs parallel to a similar OSIC at the 
central level. Also, in 2013, Bayelsa state introduced an investment corporation - the 
Bayelsa Development and Investment Corporation (BDIC) which has opened foreign 
investment offices in strategic locations including New York, London, Dubai and South 
Africa.
47
  
These international arrangements involving Nigeria’s SFGs are not covered by the 
Vienna Convention on The Law of Treaties, because SFGs are not recognised as 
traditional subjects of international law.
48
 Also, the increase in the participation of SFGs 
in Nigeria’s international economic relations is not supported by the extant constitutional 
and institutional framework in Nigeria. However, it points to a growing trend which has 
                                                                                                                                                
44
 In 2011 Cross Rivers state and a Canadian firm, Canadian Pacific Consultant Services, 
CPCS Transcorp, signed an MoU for the development of a transportation master plan in the state. See 
Johnbosco Agbakwuru, ‘C/River, Canadian Firm Sign Pact on Transportation’ Vanguard Newspaper 
(Lagos, 31 August 2011) <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/08/criver-canadian-firm-sign-pact-on-
transportation/#sthash.PKF7BuMi.dpuf> accessed 31 July 2013.  
45
 It has been reported that Abia state has sought bilateral investment opportunities with Thailand. See 
‘Abia to Partner with Thailand on Investment’ The Daily Post (Lagos, 08 February 2013) 
<http://dailypost.com.ng/2013/02/08/abia-to-partner-with-thailand-on-investment/> accessed 31 July 
2013.  
46
 See UNCTAD, Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development (UN Publications 2013) for 
an in-depth analysis on the evolving role of SOEs in international trade and investment. 
47
 Bayelsa Development and Investment Corporation (BDIC) <http://www.bdic.com.ng/about.html> 
accessed 02 June 2014. 
48
 Schütze (n 14) 116. 
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significant implications on the Nigerian federal process in particular and the 
federalism/international relations discourse in general.
49
  
In view of the evidence highlighted identified above, adequate attention has not been 
given in the literature on federalism and international economic relations to this 
emerging trend in Nigeria. For example, a comprehensive study of the changing 
constitutional and institutional role of SFGs in foreign interactions of federal systems 
was conducted in 2007 by the Forum of Federations.
50
 This study selected 12 federal 
systems for appraisal.
51
 The findings of the study increased the awareness about the 
dynamics of a new dimension in the federalism-foreign relations discourse. However, 
Nigeria was not considered for appraisal and till now no substantive study has been 
carried out about the developments in Nigeria.  
Prior to this investigation, scholarship from the 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s by leading 
authorities on Nigeria’s federalism had recognised the capacity of Nigeria’s SFGs to 
affect international economic relations.
52
 However, the focus of these writings was on 
the justifications for excluding SFGs from Nigeria’s international relations. For 
example, Nwabueze argued in 1981 that it was right for SFGs to be excluded from 
Nigeria’s foreign policy arena because the leadership of the FG was needed to articulate 
a coherent foreign policy for Nigeria.
53
 Gambari also identified these trends in Nigeria’s 
                                                 
49
 See chapter four, section 4.7.2 (165 – 167) for more evidence of international activities of Nigeria’s 
SFGs.  
50
 The Forum of Federations is an international governance organization founded by Canada and funded 
by nine other partner governments – Australia, Brazil, Ethiopia, Germany, India, Mexico, Nigeria, 
Pakistan and Switzerland. See <http://www.forumfed.org/en/about/index.php> accessed 17 May 2014. 
51
 This study was part of a series themed ‘A Global Dialogue on Federalism.’ The countries selected for 
appraisal on the topic of foreign relations were Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, 
India, Malaysia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, and the United States. See Hans Michelmann (ed), A 
Global Dialogue on Federalism: Foreign Relations in Federal Countries, Vol 5 (McGill-Queen's 
University Press 2006). 
52
 See generally Nwabueze (n 2); Ibrahim A Gambari, ‘Federalism and the Management of External 
Relations in Nigeria: Lessons from the Past and Challenges for the Future’ (1990) 21(4) Publius 113; J 
Isawa Elaigwu, ‘Federalism, Regionalisation and Globalisation Africa’ (1998) 1 The Federalist 72 
<http://www.thefederalist.eu/site/index.php?option=com_content&view=art&id=219&lang=en&Itemid=2
7> accessed 26 May 2014. 
53
 Nwabueze (n 52) 53-63. 
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international relations and predicted an increase in activities of SFGs in the 90s. He 
expressed the view that:  
…limited, coordinated activity for states in well identified areas of external 
relations is perhaps unavoidable, if not also desirable. [But that the] 
challenge is how to make that happen without compromising the national 
government's constitutional pre-eminence in foreign affairs.
54
 
In 1998, Elaigwu recognised the changing dynamics of international economic 
interactions in federal systems in Africa due to globalisation and recommended a 
federally-derived compromise ‘to manage the tensions between supranational self-
determination and national self-determination, which takes cognisance of sub-national 
demands for self-determination [in federal systems].’55 However, his findings focused 
on problems inherent in his recommended solution rather than on how this solution was 
of practical application in any specific federal systems in Africa. In the early 2000s, 
scholarship by academics such as Inamete, Briggs and Afeikhena considered the 
changing constitutional and institutional dynamics of Nigeria’s international trade 
interactions. However, their focus was on a shift in emphasis from government control 
to control by the Organised Private Sector (OPS).
56
 As such, there is no substantive 
study which has picked up on the most recent episodes of Nigeria’s SFGs interacting on 
the international scene. 
This thesis seeks to fill this gap in the literature on international economic relations in 
federal systems by investigating the Nigerian experience. Considering the empirical 
evidence which has been highlighted in this section, an investigation on Nigeria is useful 
                                                 
54
 Gambari (n 52) 122-124. 
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 Elaigwu (n 52). 
56
 See generally Ufot Bassey Inamete, Foreign Policy Decision-Making in Nigeria (Associated Press 
2001); Jerome Afeikhena, ‘Strengthening Research and Analytical Support for Trade Policy-Making in 
African Countries: The case for Nigeria’ in Elias T Ayuk and Mohamed Ali Marouani (eds), The Policy 
Paradox in Africa: Strengthening Links between Economic Research and Policymaking (Africa World 
Press 2007); Inye Nathan Briggs, Nigeria: Mainstreaming Trade Policy into National Development’ 
(2007) African Trade Policy Centre (ATPC) Work in Progress No 52 3 
<http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/publications/52.pdf>    accessed 10 September 2010. 
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for broadening the comparative discourse about the changing constitutional and 
institutional dynamics of international economic relations in federal systems.  
1.3 Aim, Research Questions and Hypotheses.  
This thesis seeks to investigate whether central exclusivity has outlived its usefulness as 
a viable theory underpinning the international economic interaction of Nigeria in a 
globalised dispensation of international economic relations. If so, this thesis will also 
consider the viability of cooperative federalism as a suitable alternative for managing 
Nigeria’s international economic interactions in a globalised era of international 
economic relations.  
In view of this aims stated above, the following broad research questions have been 
formulated: 
1. What is the nature of the relationship between international norms and federal 
systems? 
2. What is the evidence that international economic relations has evolved to 
accommodate new actors? 
3.  How are the changing dynamics of international economic relations impacting 
on the internal configuration (constitutional and institutional) of federal systems?  
4. What are the implications of the changing constitutional and institutional 
competence of federal systems on the theory underpinning their participation in 
international economic relations?  
5. What factors have shaped the configuration of Nigeria’s federal system? 
6. How have the peculiarities of Nigeria’s federal system impacted on her 
international economic relations?  
7. How effective is Nigeria’s trade regime in view of the changing patterns of 
international economic interactions?  
In order to answer the above questions, the following hypotheses have been formulated:  
13 
 
1. There is a new dispensation of international economic relations which is 
characterised by an expansion of international norms into disciplines which 
were hitherto within the exclusive competence of nation-states.  
2. The expanding scope of international economic norms has both an ‘outward’ and 
‘inward’ effect on international and domestic regimes.  
3. On the domestic front, there is a link between evolving international norms and 
the constitutional configuration of Nigeria (a practicing federal state). This link is 
predicated on the proposition that the ‘inward’ effect of expanding international 
norms has: 
a. Blurred the rigid lines of sovereign demarcation between Nigeria other 
actors in the international system; 
b. Fragmented the domestic policy arena for international economic 
participation in Nigeria by opening up opportunities for her SFGs to 
access the international scene. 
4. As a consequence of hypothesis 3, there is a divergence between theory and 
functional reality in Nigeria’s extant international economic relations regime. 57  
5. Cooperative federalism is a more appropriate alternative to central exclusivity for 
Nigeria’s international economic interactions under the current dispensation of 
expanding international norms.
 
 
To investigate this phenomenon, the main evidence which will be focused on in this 
thesis is the changing patterns of international economic relations as exemplified by the 
relationship between multilateralism in international trade/investment, regionalism in 
international trade/investment and federal systems.  Where appropriate, evidence of 
changing patterns of interactions in other aspects of international economic relations 
                                                 
57
 ‘Functional reality’ in the context of this investigation means the relationship between the changing 
international economic system and the concomitant patterns of interaction which currently exist in 
Nigeria’s federal system and then what they ought to be ideally in view of changing institutional dynamics 
in the world economic system.   
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such as international finance and international competition will be considered in this 
thesis. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
From the diagrammatic representation above, there are three relationships which are 
central in this investigation. RELATIONSHIP A represents the interaction between 
multilateralism and regionalism in international trade/investment. RELATIONSHIP B 
represents the relationship between federal systems and the two international regimes. 
RELATIONSHIP C represents the expanding constitutional and institutional 
competence of SFGs within federal systems which is evidenced by their increased 
interactions with the two international regimes.  
A 
Domestic Regimes 
 
International Regime  
 
B 
C 
Multilateralism in 
international trade 
and investment 
Federal System 
 
Regionalism in 
international 
trade and 
investment 
International Regime  
 
B 
C 
Central 
Government 
  SFGs 
15 
 
The analysis in this thesis will be focusing on ascertaining if the changing dynamics of 
RELATIONSHIP A is facilitating the expansion of SFGs competences in international 
economic relations under RELATIONSHIP C.  
1.4 The Research Strategy. 
To test the hypotheses, a number of theoretical and methodological approaches have 
been adopted in this thesis.  
1.4.1 The Socio-Legal Strategy adopted in the Thesis. 
A socio-legal study seeks to locate legal phenomena within the context of other social 
practices which constitute its immediate environment; it is concerned with giving the 
law a social context.
58   
This approach is generally multidisciplinary.
59
 
Being socio-legal, the research design and methodology of this thesis is a combination 
of doctrinal analysis of the relevant black letter laws of the legal regimes under 
consideration and a qualitative investigation in the form of qualitative key informant 
interviews with policy makers both in the public and private sector in Nigeria. The 
qualitative investigation aims to complement the black letter law analysis of the research 
by providing a realistic insight into the nature of Nigeria’s international participation 
mechanism.  The sources of information consulted in this thesis were wider than would 
have been necessary had the research been conducted solely with a black letter law 
methodology.
60
  
A benefit of adopting a socio-legal strategy for this study is that it gave the researcher 
flexibility with regard to the sources of data utilised. For example, the research was able 
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to draw on the richness of multidisciplinary perspectives which have addressed this 
phenomenon relating to federalism and international economic norms.   
1.4.2 The Reasons for Adopting a Qualitative Approach. 
Qualitative studies encompass a broad range of data collection methods which include: 
observation, documentary analysis and interviews.
61
 According to Denzin and Lincoln, 
‘Qualitative research involves an interpretative, naturalistic approach to the world. This 
means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to 
make sense of, or to interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to 
them.’62 
The data used for the case study was obtained from different sources. Documentary 
evidence was the most utilised source of information. This consisted of primary and 
secondary data, including legislation, parliamentary reports and case law relating to 
international economic law, federalism and foreign relations in Nigeria. Another source 
of data was media reports including newspapers, magazines and other commentaries 
which were collected over a period spanning from October, 2010 to September, 2013. 
The use of qualitative interviews formed the third source of data. The use of these 
multiple sources of data for triangulation helped validate and enhance the reliability of 
the findings. This is in consonance with the suggestion by Yin, who advocates for this 
on the basis of the ethical need to confirm the validity of the data and process.
63
 
Before the qualitative data was obtained, the researcher carried out an initial textual 
examination of the primary sources (legislation, parliamentary reports and case law) 
relating to international economic participation, federalism and foreign relations in 
Nigeria. This was followed by an analysis of secondary literature (journal articles and 
commentaries) where available. After this initial analysis, the qualitative interviews 
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were undertaken because there was the need to ground the theoretical analysis within the 
context of actual events unfolding in Nigeria. Currie supports this approach stating that 
‘A commitment to qualitative research demonstrates a desire to examine social 
phenomenon in an in-depth and rich fashion…’64 For example, the data collected from 
the interviews showed that the role of SFGs as actors in the Nigerian international 
economic policy formulation process is underestimated because they (SFGs) are not 
regarded by policy makers (at the federal level) as the principal actors in the export 
chain. This information would not have been obtained if a purely desk research strategy 
was adopted.   
1.4.3  The Use of a Case Study. 
The use of a case study is an integral part of the research strategy. It is said to be 
appropriate, just like in the present study, where one needs to understand some particular 
problems or situations in greater detail and where one can identify cases rich in 
information.
65
  
Understanding the peculiarities of the Nigerian experience would also be instrumental to 
understanding how federalism and foreign relations interact in an ever changing 
international scene.
66
 For example, from the findings in this case study, broader 
generalisations would be made about the role and importance of SFGs as institutional 
stakeholders in the international economic relations of federal systems.  
The criticisms and limitations of case studies have been taken into consideration in this 
thesis. For example, a criticism against the use of the case study methodology is that it 
lacks scientific rigour which makes it deficient for making scientific generalisation.
67
 
Stake counters the lack of generalisation criticism by claiming that case studies ‘are 
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epistemologically in harmony with the readers’ experience and is to that person a natural 
basis for generalisation.’68 Yin also argues that the ‘Purpose of a case study is to 
generalise to theoretical propositions, not to population as in statistical research’.69  
1.4.4 The use of International Political Economy (IPE) Literature.  
The main focus of this thesis is constitutional, but applicable parallels which can be 
gleaned from the theoretical perspectives of the IPE literature will be considered. This is 
because there is interconnectivity between the constitutional and IPE dimensions of the 
activities of SFGs in the area of foreign relations. In the context of this investigation, a 
common denominator is traceable, which is the changing landscape of international 
relations.   
Some useful theories from the IPE literature which have influenced the investigation in 
this thesis include Robert Putman’s ‘two level game’ theory which analyses the 
intersection between domestic and international regimes and its impact on the policy 
choices made at both the domestic and international levels.
70
 Putman focuses on the 
impact of domestic ‘win sets’ and the opportunities and constraints which these factors 
have on international negotiations.
71
 The limitation of this theory in the context of this 
thesis is its ‘state centric’ approach which does not fully engage with the role of SFGs as 
one of such legitimate domestic actors.
72
 Putman’s approach only considers how 
centralised nation-state preferences in international bargaining reflect international and 
domestic considerations.
73
 Furthermore, the approach does not focus on the influence 
which international regimes have on the emergence of new policy actors such as SFGs 
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within a domestic regime. It has however been useful to this study because it recognises 
the connection between domestic and international regimes. 
Gourevitch’s ‘second image reversed’ approach is another related theory which 
addresses the influence of domestic considerations e.g. bureaucratic factors and 
transnational actors, in the internal/external relationship between a nation-state and 
international regimes.
74
  This approach focuses on allocation of powers in either a 
‘weak’ or ‘strong’ nation-state vis-a-vis the international regime. This theory only takes 
into consideration the contribution of domestic actors such as SFGs in international 
economic relations as members of parliament or lobbyists and pressure groups, etc. This 
does not capture the specific context of domestic actors directly accessing the 
international scene to achieve specific international economic objectives. However, it 
will play a useful part in identifying how SFGs have used indirect channels to enlarge 
their scope of participation in international economic relations.
75
 
Other related theories in the IPE literature which have aided the general 
conceptualisation in this thesis include the ‘double movement’ theory, which is a neo-
liberal approach developed by Polanyi
76
 and expounded upon by Ruggie
77
 as ‘embedded 
liberalism’.78 This approach takes into consideration the influence of a broad range of 
domestic institutional, sectorial, and societal actors in the implementation of neo-liberal 
tenets of international cooperation. Polanyi and Ruggie argue that these factors act as 
checks within a domestic regime to ensure stability and security from the negative 
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impacts of external neo-liberal regimes.
79
  This approach is useful to this investigation to 
the extent that it focuses on the influence of the changes in a domestic regime on the 
international regime.
80
 However, this thesis is not restricted to how domestic actors 
facilitate the coping mechanism of a nation-state against the impact of neo-liberal trade 
rules. Instead the analysis centres more on the impact of these neo-liberal trade rules on 
the constitutional and institutional capacity of these domestic actors. 
Another theoretical dimension in the IPE literature which has been useful is the theories 
on ‘trans – sovereign linkage’ such as, ‘paradiplomacy’ and ‘perforated sovereignty’. 
These theories focus on the forays of SFGs into the international plane from a 
diplomatic and political angle.
81
 The limitation of these theories in the context of this 
thesis is the fact that it is more focused on the political (rather than the constitutional 
process) which leads to the manifestation of SFGs in the international plane.
82
  
These theories have however, influenced the researcher’s understanding of the 
phenomenon in a broader context outside the law and have contributed to a lucid 
conceptualisation of the context adopted in this thesis. The IPE literature has aided in 
achieving a more rounded understanding of the interface between federalism and foreign 
relations, especially as it relates to the role of SFGs in the international economic 
interaction of federal systems.  
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1.4.5  Other Alternate Explanations for the emerging Phenomenon in Nigeria’s 
International Economic Relations 
The constitutional issues to be investigated in this thesis in relation to Nigeria’s 
changing patterns of international economic relations is by no means the only 
perspective that exists. There are other variables which contribute to nigeria’s changing 
patterns of international economic interactions. Notably, Nigeria’s institutional capacity 
to foster a vibrant foreign policy regime has been affected by corruption, weak 
parliamentary processes, weak adherenace to the rule of law, tribalism, nepotism and 
political instablity to mention a few. Some of these issues will be analysed subsequently, 
but they are not the main emphasis of this investigation.   
1.4.6 The Adoption of Working Criteria of an Ideal Regulatory Framework as a 
Basis for Critiquing the Nigerian International Economic Relations Regime. 
Another important aspect of the research strategy is the adoption of working criteria to 
critique the extant constitutional and institutional framework for international economic 
participation in Nigeria. These criteria are drawn from the recurring themes which are 
used in international economic law literature for evaluating the effectiveness of policy 
frameworks in developing countries. They are based on regulatory recommendations 
developed by international specialist organisations such as the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO), from which a 
minimum standard of an ideal international economic relations framework can be 
inferred.
83
 These criteria are not exhaustive of what a sound policy framework ought to 
adhere to, but they have been selected as a minimum basis of what a good framework 
should include. The selected criteria are: ‘integration’, ‘flexibility’, ‘coherence’, 
‘predictability’, ‘accountability’, ‘transparency’ and ‘stability’. These concepts have 
been selected based on their recurrence within the international economic law discourse 
as minimal requirements for sound policy framework. They are useful for critiquing the 
                                                 
83
 See chapter four, section 4.6. 
22 
 
fundamental basis upon which Nigeria’s institutional capacity for international economic 
relations is currently positioned.  
1.4.7 The Comparative Element of the Thesis. 
This thesis is not a comparative analysis of similar models to the selected case study. 
However, there will be reliance on trends from other federal countries such as the US, 
Canada, India, China and Belgium which have manifested either a de facto perforation 
of their sovereignty (e.g. China); or progressed towards a cooperative federalism model 
in relation to international economic policy (e.g. Canada and US); or have given formal 
constitutional recognition to the autonomy of component units within a country to chart 
a limited course on the international scene (e.g. Belgium).  
The major emphasis will be on federalism models from the US, Canada and Belgium. 
The US was selected because the Nigerian federal system is modelled after the 
presidential system of the US which makes it a good yardstick for evaluating the foreign 
affairs powers in Nigeria. Canada and Belgium have been selected because they present 
two dissimilar models of cooperative federalism which is the alternate theory under 
consideration in this thesis. Canada has a flexible cooperative model while Belgium has 
a formal cooperative model. Appraising both models provides a balanced assessment of 
the usefulness of cooperative federalism in international economic relations.  
1.5      The Research Process: Planning, Undertaking and Analysis. 
1.5.1  Identifying Respondents. 
In choosing respondents for the interviews, purposive sampling was employed. The 
advantage of this method is that it is easier for the interviewer to select samples which 
suit the needs of the study.
84
 The inclusion criteria utilised for picking the participants 
were: 
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1. The relevance of the potential participant’s expertise on foreign economic policy 
formulation in Nigeria i.e.  
  a.) expertise on the constitutional framework for foreign economic policy 
formulation in Nigeria 
b.) expertise on the linkages between the FG and SFGs for foreign economic 
policy formulation in Nigeria.  
2.  The relevance of the potential participant’s expertise on the internal/external 
interaction between Nigeria, the international trade system. 
3.  Public officials from Nigerian SFGs with tangible experience of the 
constitutional challenges of achieving the economic objectives of their states 
through foreign interactions. 
The number of participants was decided based on the considerations that: 
1.  The nature of key informant interviews necessitates that the participants selected 
should have first-hand knowledge about the subject matter of the research and 
the number of individuals with such detailed insight into the foreign economic 
policy formulation process in Nigeria is limited.  
2.  The reliance on data from the qualitative investigation is complementary rather 
than the main focus of the research strategy; a limited number of participants 
were sufficient to achieve the objectives in the thesis. 
1.5.2   Planning the Interview. 
Key Informant Interviews were selected for use. Key informant interviewing takes a 
form much like a dialogue between informant and interviewer.
85
 Questions are open-
ended and in this investigation they were employed in the form of semi-structured 
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interviews to triangulate the primary and secondary data which were earlier obtained. A 
semi-structured interview is a qualitative method of inquiry which combines a pre-
determined set of open questions with a flexible and fluid structure which gives the 
opportunity for the interviewer to explore particular themes or responses further.
86
 Semi-
structured interviews allow respondents to discuss issues which may not have been 
considered initially by the interviewer.
87
  
1.5.3 Designing the Interview Questions. 
In structuring the interview questions, major questions were developed into the form of a 
general statement, which was then followed by a sequence of sub-questions for further 
probing. The literature which had been studied earlier provided a guideline for 
formulating the interview questions. The interview questions were designed based on the 
objective of ascertaining the level of participation by SFGs in Nigeria’s international 
economic relations (mainly trade and investment aspects). The questions were designed 
to both elicit specific answers and to open up opportunities for the participants to give 
broader views on the general subject matter.
88
 
1.5.4 Conducting the Interviews. 
The researcher conducted the interviews in Nigeria during the summer (June – July) of 
2012. A total number of seven respondents participated in the interviews. The location 
for the interviews was Nigeria (Abuja, Lagos and Benin City). The researcher is familiar 
with the geo - political system of Nigeria and this helped in the planning of the logistics 
for the interviews. In Abuja, four respondents participated in a focused group interview; 
they were all policy makers with the Federal Ministry of Trade and Investment.  Merton 
and others define a ‘focused group interview’ as ‘a qualitative method in which 
researchers interactively question a group of participants in order to test theory-driven 
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hypotheses.’89 Grim, relying on the work of Merton identifies five key characteristics of 
focused group interviews. These are: participant involvement in a shared concrete 
situation (shared experience), the group interviews are conducted until no new 
information is obtained (topic saturation), there should be content analysis that leads to 
hypotheses (hypothesis testing), there is use of an interview guide to test the hypotheses 
(question route) and the focus is on the subjective experiences of the participants 
(subjective experiences).
90
  
The focus group interview conducted in Abuja satisfies these criteria because the 
participants were all policy makers involved in the actual process of policy formulation 
and implementation in Nigeria. Their experience was shared and concrete enough to 
substantiate the value of the data obtained from the discussions. Also, topic saturation 
was achieved as the discussions were exhaustive of the outline prepared by the 
researcher.  
Content analysis was actualised because the data obtained from the discussions was 
useful for developing and reviwing the hypotheses which have been adopted in this 
thesis. There was an interview guide to test the hypotheses formed before the interviews 
and this helped to direct the ‘question route’ during the discussions. Finally, the focus 
was on the subjective experiences of the participants. It was based on their expertise and 
experience with regard to foreign economic policy formulation and international 
relations in Nigeria.  
An interview was conducted in Lagos with one participant – a policy maker with the 
State Ministry of Trade and Commerce. In Benin, two interviews were conducted with 
an academic consultant responsible for the drafting of the NTPD 2002 and a policy 
maker with the State Ministry of Trade and Commerce.  
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Notes were taken during the interviews rather than tape recordings. This was because the 
respondents during the first interview (in Abuja) said that a direct authorisation was 
required from the Minister of Trade and Investment before they could allow tape 
recordings. Considering the time and effort that had already gone into securing an 
audience, it was imperative to re-strategise. Subsequently, the researcher continued with 
this approach, because it was observed during the first interview in Abuja that note-
taking encouraged a relaxed atmosphere during the interview. The disadvantage of 
taking notes was the inability to record events verbatim. However, the less formal 
atmosphere made the respondents more forthcoming with information.  
The interviews were conducted in the official premises of the participants. It is believed 
that conducting the interviews in the premises of the participants may lead to an 
increased level of disclosure from the participants, as they are more relaxed.
91
 The 
researcher was mindful that interviews might increase the chances of bias either due to 
the poor phrasing of questions or the deliberate attempts by the participants to mislead or 
try to defend their positions on a particular issue since interviewees have their own 
personal subjective worldviews and opinions.
92
 The possibility of bias was however 
mitigated by the fact that respondents from both the public and private sector were 
interviewed with the researcher distilling the information from an objective standpoint.  
1.5.5   Challenges Experienced. 
Time was a major constraint during the interview process; it disrupted the interviewing 
schedule and led to a change of interviewing tactics. For example, the researcher initially 
set out to interview one participant at a time. However, the researcher had to conduct a 
focus group interview in Abuja. It became necessary to alter plans, because gaining 
access to the participants proved to be difficult, especially in Lagos and Abuja. The 
Legal Adviser of the Federal Ministry of Trade and Investment (FMTI) who was the 
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‘gate keeper’ and facilitator of the interview in Abuja had to put in considerable effort 
and resources before securing a meeting with the Director for Trade. A personal 
relationship with the Legal Adviser of the FMTI proved to be an indispensable asset 
which facilitated access to the desired participants. The Director then instructed four of 
his subordinates to attend to the researcher at the same time. Considering that it took two 
days, a lot of phone calls and personal favours to even get an audience with the 
participants, the researcher decided to change interviewing tactics and hold a focus 
group interview with the four respondents.  
1.5.6 Analysing the Qualitative Data. 
Miles describes qualitative data as an ‘attractive nuisance.’93 This is because it is a 
laborious and time consuming exercise to transcribe data collected from interviews. In 
addition to the challenging process of transcribing, interpretation and analysis is also a 
‘problem’ because there is ‘no accepted set of defined conventions available to 
researchers who set out to analyse qualitative data.’94 This makes the process very 
subjective and as a consequence, ‘it is the researcher’s interpretation of data that shape 
the emergent codes, theory and all round analysis.’95 
In this research, transcribing was aided by the fact that notes were used during the 
interviews. The researcher started working on the notes immediately after each interview 
was conducted, so as to aid recollection of information that was not written down during 
the interviews. This method raises the issue of ‘interviewer bias’ which comes from the 
‘deficiencies of the human analyst’.96 According to Currie, this includes ‘The tendencies 
to ignore information which conflicts with themes and ideas already held, and to give 
less attention to information which is more difficult to access.’97 These tendencies are a 
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significant issue in the context of this research because of the manner in which the 
information was recorded. The researcher sought to mitigate this deficiency by 
developing the notes immediately after each interview session was completed. Also, the 
researcher being aware of the tendencies mentioned above ensured that no emphatic 
assertions are made or inferred from the opinions of the participants. Considering the 
limited reliance on the qualitative data, these tendencies do not diminish the value of the 
data because they have achieved their primary purpose, which is to complement the 
doctrinal analysis.  
1.5.7 Ethical Considerations. 
This research was conducted in compliance with the University of Liverpool Ethics 
Policy. The researcher went through the ethical approval process before commencing the 
field work in June 2012. The only major ethical consideration during the ethical 
approval process was the issue of security for the researcher. This was due to political 
instability in Nigeria as a result of terrorist attacks by insurgent groups. As a 
consequence, the researcher had to maintain a high level of security consciousness 
during the trip. With regard to the interview process, the researcher maintained the 
appropriate standards of ethics necessary for a study of this nature. The researcher was 
very open with interviewees, explaining the reason for the interview and how the data 
obtained was going to be used.  
1.6 Limitations of Study. 
In relation to the interactions between the multilateral and regional trade systems, the 
scope of this thesis will be limited to identifying the existence of a complexity inherent 
in the international trade regulatory regime due to fluctuating relationship between both 
regimes. This thesis will not attempt to provide a solution which addresses the complex 
relationship between multilateralism and regionalism. Rather, the thesis will only 
consider the impact of this evolving relationship on the emergence of a new dispensation 
of international economic relations.  
In relation to the internal constitutional interaction between SFGs and the central 
government within a federal system (Nigeria in this case), reference to ‘SFGs’ is limited 
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to just state governments. This thesis excludes the role of local governments and non - 
state actors within Nigeria’s international foreign economic policy framework. Although 
these actors would be acknowledged in the thesis as a significant contributor to the 
foreign economic policy process, their existence and importance is not crucial to 
achieving the objectives of this thesis and their inclusion would detract attention from 
the actual focus of the thesis.  
1.7 Structure of Thesis. 
The thesis is divided into 7 chapters including this introduction chapter. The aim of this 
preliminary chapter is to introduce the background to the research, explain the reasons 
for embarking on the research and to discuss the objectives of this thesis. This chapter 
also seeks to explain the research strategy and methodology adopted in testing the 
hypotheses. This chapter also clarifies the scope and limitations of the thesis.  
Chapter Two is titled: An overview of the relationship between federal systems and the 
international economic regulatory system in the specific context of trade (multilateral 
and regional trade regimes).  
The chapter introduces the relationship between federal systems of government and 
international norms. Focusing on international trade as a sector of international 
economic relations, this chapter identifies compatibility issues in the relationship 
between the international economic norms and federal systems.  
Chapter three is titled: The dynamics of a new dispensation in international economic 
relations. 
The objective of chapter three is to demonstrate how evolving patterns of interaction in 
international trade and foreign direct investment have shaped a new dispensation of 
international economic interactions which affects the distribution of powers in federal 
systems.  
The central argument in this chapter is that geopolitical changes have redefined the 
dynamics of international economic regimes which in turn is facilitating the proliferation 
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of new actors in the international economic process. This chapter will set out the 
distinguishing characteristics of this new dispensation and its impact on participation of 
federal systems in international economic relations. 
Chapter four is titled: The evolution of Nigeria’s constitutional and institutional 
framework for international foreign economic interactions (1960 –2013). 
The chapter has two aims. First, it traces the evolution of the constitutional and 
institutional framework for Nigeria’s international economic relations from 1960 – 2013 
within the context of the evolution of Nigeria’s federal system of government. The 
emphasis is on the distribution of foreign affairs powers between the Federal 
Government and the SFGs. The chapter focuses on two distinct eras – civilian and 
military rule - in the development of Nigeria’s federal system. The chapter analyses how 
these two political regimes have shaped the constitutional and institutional patterns of 
Nigeria’s international economic interactions. The second aim of this chapter is to 
critique the extant framework by relying on the working criteria adopted from the 
recommendations of specialised international agencies.  
Chapter five is titled: A theoretical basis for the role of SFGs in Nigeria’s international 
economic interactions: An appraisal of two constitutional viewpoints (central exclusivity 
and cooperative federalism). 
This chapter builds on the analysis in chapters three and four. The objective of this 
chapter is to analyse the advantages and disadvantages of two theories underpinning the 
conduct of foreign relations in federal systems. The existing status quo (central 
exclusivity) and an alternative option of cooperative federalism are appraised from a 
constitutional federalism perspective. The aim of the analysis in this chapter is to 
identify which viewpoint is best suited to cater for the evolving role of SFGs in 
Nigeria’s international economic interactions.  
Chapter six is titled: Justifying a cooperative approach for the management of 
international economic relations in Nigeria. 
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The objective in this chapter is to assess the workability of a cooperative federalism 
model in Nigeria. In this chapter, arguments are proffered to justify the utilisation of a 
cooperative federalism model as constitutional and institutional framework for Nigeria’s 
international economic interactions in light of the changing patterns in the international 
system. 
Chapter seven is the discussion of the findings and contributions of the thesis and the 
final conclusion.  
1.8 Conclusion.  
This thesis seeks to emphasise the need for Nigeria to re-assess her institutional 
participation in international economic relations because the international system has 
evolved to a point which now favours countries which have dared to be bold and 
dynamic in their endogenous constitutional configuration. This thesis will also draw 
attention to the need for a pragmatic approach to the conceptualisation of the emerging 
trend in Nigeria. This is because it is believed that each country’s ability to re-invent its 
international economic policy stance must remain flexible and fit the peculiarities of that 
country’s economic and political configuration. This thesis will draw parallels from 
other federal jurisdictions to ascertain if that there is significant economic advantage to 
be gained from pursuing enhanced cooperation between the FG and SFGs in Nigeria’s 
international economic relations. 
In the broader context of the federalism/international relations discourse, the findings of 
this thesis will seek to complement the existing literature which focuses on the interface 
between federalism and foreign relations. More specifically, it will address this interface 
as it relates to international economic interactions of federal systems. It is anticipated 
that this will aid in conceptualising the relevance of the constitutional process within a 
federal system to the changing patterns of interactions under the current dispensation of 
international relations. This thesis will also seek to contribute to the literature which 
focuses on the impact of the evolving relationship between multilateralism and 
regionalism on the dynamics of the international economic order. 
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Also there is a growing prominence of neo-liberal tenets in international economic 
literature which advocates that international economic relations should be purely 
dictated by market forces.
98
 However, this thesis will seek to highlight that irrespective 
of the market oriented dimension of international economic relations, the role of 
government institutions is still crucial to a holistic conceptualisation of the international 
economic order.
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Chapter Two: An Overview of the Relationship between Federal Systems and 
International Economic Norms: The Multilateral and Regional Trade Systems as a 
Case Study. 
2.1 Introduction. 
The aim of the chapter is to demonstrate how in the historical development of 
international economic norms, the participation of federal systems has created a special 
challenge due to the propensity of SFGs in federal systems to affect international 
economic relations.  
This chapter contributes to the overarching argument of the thesis by laying a foundation 
for further consideration in subsequent chapters of the relationship between international 
economic regimes and the domestic constitutional regimes for international economic 
policy participation in Nigeria; a practicing federal system.  
The chapter is divided into three sections. Section one introduces federalism as a 
process. In this section, salient attributes of federalism which determine the scope of 
international economic powers allocated to each level of government in a federal system 
are identified. Section two introduces multilateralism as a platform for the regulation of 
international trade. In this section, the relationship between federalism and the 
multilateral trade system is considered. The aim is to identify the compatibility issues 
inherent in this relationship. Section three introduces regionalism as a platform for the 
regulation of international trade. Like the previous section, the aim is also to identify the 
compatibility issues inherent in this relationship. 
2.2 Federalism: Origin.  
The origin of federalism as a political system of government can be traced back to 
ancient Greek civilisation.
1
 Between the 4
th
 and 2
nd
 centuries BC, political relations in 
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ancient Greece were characterised by the formation of political alliances between 
independent Greek states.
2
 These unions were formed with the aim of pursuing common 
goals such as resisting oppressors or conquering common enemies.
3
 A prominent 
example of such an alliance was the ‘Archaic League,’ a coalition of Greek states which 
was formed in the 3rd and 2nd century BC to resist the aggression of Macedonia; a 
northern Greek state.
4
 A significant attribute of these alliances was that the individual 
identities of the states were not submerged within the new alliances.
5
  
Over time, the concept of federalism evolved as a political system with prominent 
expressions of federalism springing up in the present day Switzerland and the US in 
1291
6
 and 1774 respectively.
7
 These two federal systems subsist to date and have 
become landmark examples which epitomise federalism as a system of government. 
Currently, federalism is practiced by over 25 states in the international system.
8
 
2.2.1 Federalism as a Process. 
A popular meaning of Federalism is found in its description as a political system where 
power is divided between a minimum of two levels of government under a treaty 
(foedus) which prescribes and delineates the scope of powers to be exercised by each 
level of government.
9
 There are other dimensions to understanding the concept of 
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federalism which the description above does not capture. Birch
10
 supports this view 
stating that the meaning of federalism in any particular study ‘Is defined by the student 
in a manner which is determined by the approach which he wishes to make to his 
material.’11 He identifies four different approaches to an understanding of federalism 
introduced by federalism scholars. These are Wheare’s12 institutional approach, 
Freidrich’s13 dynamic process approach, Livingston’s 14 social organic approach and 
Riker’s15 bargain approach. The existence of different approaches does not suppose that 
one is more appropriate than the other. Rather, each approach is just a different 
dimension to the same multifaceted concept of federalism. However as a starting point, 
this differentiation in approach is useful in this thesis because the primary focus in this 
chapter will be the dynamic process approach to understanding federalism. This 
dimension is useful for understanding the evolving role of SFGs in international 
economic relations.  
Friedrich
16
 views federalism as a process rather than a design because it represents a 
method by which ‘a number of separate political communities enter into arrangements 
for working out solutions, adopting joint policies; making joint decisions on joint 
problems and conversely the process by which a unitary political community becomes 
differentiated into [a] federally engaged whole.’17 Watts18 holds a similar view arguing 
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that federalism is ‘not an abstract ideological model to which political society is to be 
brought into conformity, but rather a way or process of bringing people together through 
practical arrangements intended to meet both common and diverse preferences of 
people.’19 
The significance of these definitions to this thesis is twofold. First, it means that the 
federal process is ideally meant to encourage joint participation and shared responsibility 
for the issues which are common to the parties in the federal arrangement. Second, it 
supposes that the issues which necessitate joint participation in the federal process are 
never static and as a consequence the political and constitutional response to the 
evolving issues faced by the components to a federal setup must evolve accordingly.
20
  
These points are central to the arguments of this thesis because they support a 
proposition that the changes in the constitutional and institutional interaction between 
federal systems and international economic regimes are a necessary response associated 
with the evolving federal process. Friedrich’s definition also identifies ‘joint 
participation’ as a default position synonymous with the federal process.  
The focus on federalism as a process is also significant to this investigation because the 
salient qualities inherent in the process make federal systems more susceptible than a 
non – federal system to exogenous influences.21 The susceptibility of federal systems to 
external influences (e.g. an expanding international economic relations) is due to the 
power configuration within federal systems which is delicately balanced between the 
different tiers of government; they are always eager to expand or exert more 
constitutional powers within the federal arrangement so as to promote and protect their 
interests.
22
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2.2.2 The Evolving Role of SFGs in the Federal Process. 
Based on the premise established in the preceding section, it can be argued from a realist 
stand point that most federal systems are born out of a compromise arrangement 
between geographically contiguous settlements seeking a strategic alliance so as to 
benefit from their strength which arises when the parties pool their resources together.
23
 
Furthermore, the parties to a federal arrangement may be of unequal strengths. While 
some parties to a federal arrangement may be economically strong enough to stand on 
their own, some others may be dependent on the strength of the union for survival. This 
raises two propositions: First, the stronger components presumably accede to a federal 
union on the premise that there will be elasticity in the federal arrangement which is 
characterised by some degree of autonomy exercised by the federating units.
24
 Second, 
the weaker components in a federal arrangement are interested in a harmonious 
arrangement to the extent that the federation serves their best interests.  
The underlying motives of the parties to a federal arrangement play a significant role in 
determining the level of autonomy demanded by the component units. In effect, the 
participating components within a federal system have a tendency to push the 
boundaries of the constitutional arrangement to suit their self – interests. On the other 
hand, the central government in a federal system usually seeks to balance or curtail these 
tendencies by gravitating towards a unified stance when expedient or on certain issues 
which are considered vital to the survival of the union. This may be achieved by carving 
out more federal oversight and regulation of sensitive activities or subject areas such as 
defence and foreign policy. 
The implications of different bargaining strengths described above create a peculiar 
dynamic in the federal relationship whereby the central government acts as a counter-
balance to the powers exercisable by the SFGs. More importantly, it is argued that the 
existence of these underlying circumstances in the federal process shifts the emphasis 
from a horizontal treaty between equal state parties to a vertical treaty between a federal 
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government and its component states; which are held either loosely or tightly together 
depending on the extent of powers apportioned either way.  
This fluctuating power balance determines the nature and scope of competences 
available to SFGs in international interactions at every given point in time in the 
evolution of a federal system. This is unique to each federal system and it creates a cycle 
which is constantly evolving in response to the external and internal realities of the 
social, political and economic life of each federal system.  
Arising from the arguments above, it will be argued in the course of this thesis that the 
plenary or dominant powers enjoyed by central governments in relation to foreign policy 
are not an immutable position inherent in a federal process, but rather a compromise 
which central governments have carved out over time in the evolution of the federal 
process.  
Having established this foundation, the rest of this chapter will focus on the relationship 
between federal systems and international trade regimes (a subsect of international 
economic relations). The aim from here on is to establish the relationship between the 
regimes and examine the challenges which the peculiarities of the federal process pose 
to the operation of these international economic regimes in federal systems. 
2.3  The Multilateral Trade System.  
Since the inception of the multilateral trade framework in the aftermath of the Second 
World War (WW2), the tenets of multilateralism particularly under the auspices of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/ World Trade Organisation (GATT/WTO), 
have had a tremendous impact on international trade relations serving as a veritable 
platform for the integration of the world economy. Multilateralism is relevant to the 
discourse in this thesis because the evolution of multilateralism in international trade is a 
significant factor which has affected the international economic participation of federal 
systems.  
Generally, multilateralism in international relations has centred on cooperation amongst 
nation-states and a consequential ceding of some sovereign powers by nation-states to 
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international organisations thereby enabling the attainment of objectives for which they 
had been introduced.
25
 The transition towards global-level governance and the increase 
in prominence of international organisations such as the WTO has been resisted by the 
nation-states. However, the inevitability of the shift in focus from nation-state centred 
practice to shared competence between nation-states and international organisations is 
evident from the outlook of international relations in the 21
st
 century.
26
  
More specifically, multilateralism is important to this discourse because it is argued that 
multilateralism in international trade has led to a relocation of regulatory powers from 
the nation-state towards globalised and localised levels.
27
 In the context of a federal 
system, it will be argued in chapter three that the downward movement of power has 
encouraged the participation of SFGs in international relations.  
The pertinent question which then springs to mind is how has multilateralism coped with 
the peculiarities of the federal process as described in section 2.2?  
The aim in this section of the chapter is to introduce the concept of multilateralism in 
international trade and its relationship with federal systems. In the course of this 
analysis, the impact of multilateralism on the participation of SFGs in international trade 
will be examined in light of the extant federal compliance provision (art XXIV: 12) of 
the GATT to ascertain how the multilateral trade system has tackled the peculiar 
constitutional configuration within federal systems. 
2.3.1 Multilateralism in International Trade. 
Prior to WW2, the majority of international trade relations were regulated under the 
rubric of regional, bilateral and at best plurilateral agreements.
28
 In the aftermath of 
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WW2, multilateralism was given a prominent expression in the general scheme of 
international relations and international trade in particular.
29 
 
Notable feats achieved under the multilateral trade forum include the introduction of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and two other economic institutions – 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
30
 The GATT was meant to 
be an interim arrangement pending the entry into force of the International Trade 
Organisation (ITO) Charter, at which point GATT would simple disappear.
31
 The ITO did 
not materialise at that time but the contracting parties out of necessity were forced to self 
- regulate the GATT irrespective of the botched ITO plans.
32
  
The economic rationale for the multilateral trade system is based on the theory of 
‘comparative advantage’ as developed by the classical economist David Ricardo 
(Ricardo built his theory of comparative advantage on Adam Smith’s ‘absolute advantage’ 
theory). The theory of comparative advantage was further developed by Heckscher, 
Ohlin and Samuelson who argued that countries have different factor endowments of 
labour, land and capital inputs.
33
 They asserted that countries will specialise in 
and export those products which use intensively the factors of production with which 
they are most endowed.
34
 This theory states that every country should focus its 
economic production in the areas where it has its greatest comparative advantage i.e. 
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where it has a margin of superiority in the production of a good or service, while 
depending on international trade with other countries for the products where it has less 
comparative advantage i.e. where the opportunity cost of production is lower.
35
 
Another significant attribute which made the multilateral trade system appealing for the 
regulation of the international trade relations is the adoption of reciprocity, and non – 
discrimination amongst nations in their trade relations. These two principles are 
encapsulated in the concepts of Most Favoured Nation (MFN) and National Treatment 
(NT). The MFN principle proposes that countries must extend the same trade terms and 
preferences amongst all its trading partners without discrimination.
36
 The NT principle 
on the other hand is founded on the concept that a country accords the same treatment 
and preferences it gives to its domestic industries to foreign industries operating within 
its jurisdiction. This only applies once a product, service or item of intellectual property 
has entered the market.
37
   
The GATT became one of the single most important trade agreements of its time as it 
introduced a new dimension to international economic relations with its liberal trade 
theories. From 1947 to 1994, the GATT remained self-regulatory with a number of 
negotiation rounds taking place between 1947 and 1994. The GATT contracting parties 
also used ad hoc committees to run the GATT 1947 and to settle disputes between 
contracting parties.
38
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2.3.2 The WTO and the Multilateral Trade System. 
The interrelationship between states and international organisations and the ability of the 
latter to distinguish and/or carve a niche for themselves with regards to their powers and 
functions has been a fundamental stimulant for the wide acceptance of multilateralism 
over the years.  Analysing the contribution of the WTO to the rise of multilateralism 
provides a template from which parallels can be drawn when analysing the participation 
of SFGs in international economic relations. Specifically, the efforts of the WTO to 
liberate itself from the control of its nation-state members is a good example of how the 
dynamics of international economic relations is changing from a nation-state centred 
focus to a more encompassing process which now accommodates new actors such as 
international organisations at the international level and SFGs at the local level.  
The WTO was formally established in 1995 under the instrument of an agreement which 
was negotiated and signed during the Uruguay round of multilateral trade negotiations. 
The WTO was established to take up the running of the functions and objectives of the 
GATT 1947.
39
 The negotiations during the Uruguay round were significant in 
themselves because they led to the expansion of the scope and functions of the 
multilateral trade system. The introduction of agreements on previously uncharted areas 
such as trade in services, trade in intellectual property rights and government 
procurement increased the dynamism of the multilateral trade system under the auspices 
of the then newly introduced WTO.  
Furthermore the introduction of the WTO in 1995 was a fundamental step in the process 
of distinguishing the multilateral trade system from its participants- the nation-states. 
Prior to the inception of the WTO, the GATT system was predominantly dictated by its 
nation-state members.
40
 An expression of this difference in the two regimes is found in 
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the juxtaposition of the dispute settlement mechanism under the GATT system against 
that of the WTO system.
41
  
The efforts of the WTO to liberate it from the nation-states and forge an independent 
existence in international trade regulation have been extensively researched as the 
constitutionalism of the WTO. Cass traces the origin of the constitutionalism debate in 
international trade law to the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations which led to the introduction of the WTO.
42
 
Faux examines the significant attributes which point to the emergence of a constitutional 
order in international trade norms.
43
 According to him: 
The language of, the WTO, like the language of NAFTA, is "constitutional" 
It sets up supranational governance with powers to override what had 
previously been the province of sovereign states.... [B]oth NAFTA and the 
WTO perform the traditional role of constitutions. They entrench certain 
inviolate principles or norms that are above the reach of any national 
legislature to alter; set limits on the behaviour of governments; define rights 
of citizenship; establish a judicial system to interpret its own texts in the case 
of conflicts; and provide for the enforcement of the court's decision. 
Dillon is not in support of constitutionalism in international regimes such as the WTO 
because she believes that ‘The constitutionalisation of the world trade system has 
elevated it in legal thinking and given it a false aura of permanency and immutability.’44 
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She further argues that the danger in this constitutional elevation of the world trade 
system of the WTO is due to the misplaced focus by legal academics on ‘…the technical 
aspects of trade disputes rather than on the critical issue of the normative nature and 
effects of the system on those most affected-Workers.’45  
Cass is also sceptical of the claims to a constitutional order in international trade law. 
She argues thus: ‘…the WTO is not constitutionalised, and nor, according to any current 
meanings of the term, should it be.’46 She does not deny the evidence which points 
towards a constitutional order, but she believes that that ‘constitutionalisation of the 
WTO should be seen as an imperfect process rather than as a “fait accompli.”’47 She 
further admits that ‘thinking about WTO constitutionalisation is normatively necessary 
in view of the inadequacies of the ‘received account’ of national constitutionalism in a 
globally interdependent world.
48
 This point will be revisited in chapter three. 
In view of the historical evolution and theories underpinning the multilateral trade 
system, an area which has posed a challenge to the tenets of the international trade 
system is the involvement of federal systems in the international trade process. The next 
section of this thesis will consider the compatibility issues in the relationship between 
federalism and multilateralism in international trade. 
2.4   The Multilateral Trade System and Compliance in Federal Systems. 
Generally, the relationship between federalism and international law has been fraught 
with inconsistencies. Brenier rightly describes the nature of this relationship as one of 
‘attraction-repulsion.’49 Historically, international law responded to the appearance of 
federal states by ignoring their constitutional peculiarities and sought to treat them like 
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other sovereign states.
50
 In line with this approach, the general rule which has existed in 
international law for the better part of Westphalian statehood is that federal systems have 
a responsibility to ensure that the acts or omissions of their SFGs do not infringe on 
international law obligations which the state is subject to.
51
 This responsibility is not 
negated even in situations where the internal law of a federal system does not give the 
central government powers to compel its SFGs.
52
 This customary international law 
obligation applies as the default rule unless a contrary intention is evidenced in the text 
of an international treaty.
53
 In some instances, international treaties have ‘opt out’ 
clauses negotiated into them.
54
 This can operate by way of federal state clauses
55
 which 
make it possible for federal systems to expressly escape liability if their SFGs do not 
comply with the requirements of a treaty in areas where they have constitutional 
competence to act.
56
 Hayes opines that the first question to ask when examining 
international regulation of federal nation/states is whether the treaty language evidences 
an intention to ‘opt out’ of the default rule of nation/state responsibility for SFGs.57 If 
this is not stated in the treaty, then the general rule applies.
58
 
Interestingly, although customary international law imposes this default obligation on 
federal systems, there is no general customary international law rule which stipulates 
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what measure(s), if any, central governments must take to seek compliance of its SFGs 
at the local level.
59
 In the context of international trade, GATT practice has filled the gap 
left by the absence of a general customary international law which stipulates the measure 
(s) to be taken to ensure compliance of federal systems with international trade norms. 
The GATT practice will be considered in the next section.  
2.4.1 History of GATT Measures to Ensure Compliance of Federal Systems. 
Brenier points out that at the inception of multilateral cooperation in international 
relations, the scope of international law was widening and the emerging international 
instruments during this period started taking into consideration the peculiar problems 
posed by federal systems.
60
 Thus, the potential conflict arising from the possibility that 
SFGs in federal systems could act at cross purposes with the treaty obligations of the 
federal system was foreseen during the negotiation process for the new multilateral trade 
order in the aftermath of WW2.
61
 During the 1946 GATT and ITO preparatory session 
within the UN, the challenge posed by federal systems to compliance with the proposed 
GATT was apparent because a number of proposals were put forward by negotiating 
parties such as Australia and the US, seeking to ensure that compliance by federal 
systems was guaranteed.
62
 
Hayes reports that: 
in response to these concerns, the [UN] technical subcommittee 
recommended the addition of a clause to the National Treatment article [of 
the proposed GATT] requiring contracting parties to take ‘all measures’ 
open to them to ensure that taxes and other regulations by subsidiary 
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governments within their territories did not impair the objectives of the 
national treatment article.
63
   
The reference to ‘all measures’ in the proposal of the technical committee was later 
modified ‘to require each government to “take such reasonable measures as may be 
available to it” to ensure observance by subsidiary governments.’64 Furthermore, the 
‘federal clause’ was addnote to a general miscellaneous article presumably in view of 
the fact that the issue of federal compliance with the proposed multilateral trade 
agreement affected not only the National Treatment provision but also other substantive 
provisions of the then proposed GATT.
65
  
2.4.2 The Current Position on Federal Compliance under the GATT/WTO 
System: Article XXIV: 12. 
The current position on federal compliance with the WTO/GATT system is expressed in 
art XXIV: 12.  It provides that ‘Each contracting party shall take such reasonable 
measures as may be available to it to ensure observance of the provisions of this 
Agreement by the regional and local governments and authorities within its territories.’66 
Jackson and Hayes identify that ‘the language of art XXIV: 12 descended directly from 
language in the draft ITO Charter.'
67
In addition to art XXIV: 12, there are similar 
provisions across the GATT/WTO agreements which are modelled after art XXIV: 12.
68
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2.4.3 The Ambiguities in the Application of Article XXIV: 12. 
The issues relating to the application and effect of federal systems’ compliance with 
GATT/WTO agreements expressed during the negotiation process of the GATT in 1946 
did not disappear even with the final agreed version of art XXIV: 12 which was inserted 
in the GATT 1947. Rather, the historical evolution of this federal compliance clause was 
marked by unresolved ambiguities regarding the extent and scope of the obligations 
imposed on federal nation/states to secure compliance by their SFGs.
69
  
For example, during the GATT years of the multilateral trade system there were 
interpretations which suggested that the effect and scope of ‘reasonable measures’ under 
art XXIV: 12 were not intended to be compelling or mandatory on the contracting 
parties to the GATT.
70
 One interpretation suggested by Jackson was that art XXIV: 12 
did not apply to measures of SFGs which are constitutionally beyond the powers of the 
central government. As such, the central government was not in breach of its 
international obligations if an SFG in the exercise of such powers contravened an 
international obligation as long as the central government did everything within its 
power to ensure local observance of GATT.
71
 Another interpretation suggested by 
Jackson was to the effect that the provision of art XXIV: 12 ‘was not intended to apply 
as a matter of law against local subdivisions at all, and even when the central 
government has legal power to require local observance of GATT it is not obligated 
under GATT to do so but merely to take reasonable measures.’72  
During the Uruguay Round which cumulated in the introduction of the WTO, 
negotiating parties sought to clarify the inherent ambiguities in art XXIV: 12 by 
adopting an Understanding on the Interpretation of art XXIV of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994. The key point in the Understanding concerning the 
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scope of federal compliance under art XXIV: 12 is that ‘Each Member is fully 
responsible under the GATT for the observance of all provisions of the GATT 1994, and 
shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to it to ensure such observance 
by regional and local governments and authorities within its territory.'
73
 The 
Understanding also stipulated that the provisions of the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU) ‘may be invoked in respect of measures affecting its observance 
by regional or local governments or authorities within the territory of a Member.’74  
Hayes argues that inasmuch as the ‘Understanding on art XXIV: 12 clarifies the 
responsibility of all GATT/WTO federal nation/states for the non-conforming behavior 
of their component units under the GATT/WTO, it leaves open the question of what 
constitutes ‘reasonable measures’ to seek compliance.’75 According to him, ‘This is a 
particularly important question to consider in areas that fall within exclusive regional or 
local authority.’76 Therefore he is of the view that ‘despite the Uruguay Round 
Understanding on art XXIV: 12, the extent of federal nation/state obligations under art 
XXIV: 12 remain unclear and what constitutes “reasonable measures” to ensure local 
observance remains ambiguous.’77 
This thesis will now consider a number of GATT/WTO cases which have addressed this 
issue of federal compliance under art XXIV: 12 to ascertain the extent to which they 
were able to clarify the ambiguities identified above and particularly highlighted by 
Hayes. 
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2.4.4 GATT Panel Interpretations of Article XXIV: 12. 
Case one: Canada-Measures Affecting the Sale of Gold Coins. 
The meaning and scope of art XXIV: 12 was first interpreted by a Dispute Settlement 
Panel during the GATT era in the case of Canada-Measures Affecting the Sale of Gold 
Coins.
78
 A summary of the facts are as follows: 
South Africa (SA) took Canada before the GATT dispute settlement panel claiming that 
a 1983 retail sales tax enacted by the Province of Ontario, Canada on gold coins violated 
art II and III of the GATT and that Canada failed to carry out its obligations under art 
XXIV: 12 which required Canada to ensure that its provinces complied with the 
provisions of the GATT 1947.
79
 SA claimed nullification and impairment of the benefits 
of the Tokyo Round concession due to the measures of the province of Ontario.
80
 A 
significant constraint on Canada was that the subject matter of raising revenue though 
taxation was a provincial prerogative but responsibility for the regulation of trade and 
commerce in currency and coinage was within the exclusive authority of the Canadian 
Federal Parliament.
81
 
The dispute settlement Panel first held that ‘The Ontario sales tax measure violated 
GATT art 111:2 by subjecting the products of SA to an internal tax in excess of those 
applied to like domestic products.'
82
 The Panel also examined how art XXIV:12 
impacted Canada's obligations under art 111:2 stating that the basic purpose of art 
XXIV: 12 ‘was to qualify the basic obligation to ensure the observance of the General 
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Agreement by regional and local government authorities in the case of contracting 
parties with a federal structure.’83  
In relation to the controversial issue of the extent of measures taken towards ensuring 
sub-national compliance by the Canadian central government, the Panel stated that ‘The 
basic question was whether art XXIV: 12 applies [to] (a) all measures taken at the 
regional or local level or (b) only to those measures which the federal government 
cannot control because they fall outside its jurisdiction under the constitutional 
distribution of competence.'
84
 In response to these questions, the Panel stated that 
‘Article XXIV: 12 applied only to those measures taken at the regional or local level 
which the federal government cannot control because they fall outside its jurisdiction 
under the constitutional distribution of competence.’85  
Furthermore, the Panel highlighted how the interpretation given to art XXIV: 12 had the 
potential of creating an imbalance in the obligation requirements of federal and unitary 
states.
86
 The Panel argued that only an interpretation of art XXIV: 12 which does not 
limit the applicability of the provisions of the General Agreement but merely limits the 
obligations of federal States to secure their implementation would achieve a balance 
between federal and non-federal states.
87
  
In the specific context of the dispute between the two parties in this case, the Panel 
considered whether Canada fulfilled its obligation to take ‘such reasonable measures as 
may be available to it’ to ensure Ontario's observance of art 111:2.88 SA had argued that 
Canada could have referred the matter to the Canadian Supreme Court and its failure to 
do so amounted to a violation of its obligations to take ‘reasonable measures’ under art 
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XXIV: 12.
89
 Canada countered this argument stating that ‘art XXIV: 12 reserved to each 
contracting party the right to determine on its own whether a measure was reasonable.’90 
Canada's argument was rejected by the Panel which ruled that in ascertaining which 
measures were reasonable within the meaning of art XXIV: 12 for securing the 
observance of the provisions of the General Agreement, ‘The consequences of the non-
observance by the local government for trade relations with other contracting parties are 
to be weighed against the domestic difficulties of securing observance.’91 The Panel 
considered the negative trade implications of the Ontario measure against the domestic 
difficulty which Canada faced in securing observance of art 111: 2 by Ontario and held 
that it could not determine whether Canada referring the issue to the Supreme Court 
would have in the circumstances constituted a reasonable measure.
92
  
In its final recommendation, the Panel held that Canada was to compensate SA for lost 
competitive opportunities due to the Ontario measure and further recommended that 
Canada continue to take ‘such reasonable measures as are available’ to secure 
observance by Ontario.
93
 The decision of the Panel was never adopted but the Canada 
Gold Coins case was significant for exposing the complications inherent in the 
application of XXIV: 12 to federal systems.  
Case two: Canada-Import, Distribution and Sale of Certain Alcoholic Drinks by 
Provincial Marketing Agencies 
The second GATT Panel case which considered art XXIV: 12 was the Canada-Import, 
Distribution and Sale of Certain Alcoholic Drinks by Provincial Marketing Agencies
94
 
which involved the US and Canada. The US claimed in this case that certain practices of 
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provincial liquor boards in Canada violated GATT art 111.18. The US' complaint 
focused on the higher price mark-ups applied to imported beer compared with domestic 
beer and the allowance for private delivery and direct sales systems for domestic 
brewers, while imported brewers were forced to distribute through the provincial liquor 
boards.
95
 In regard to art XXIV: 12, the US argued that Canada had not taken 
‘reasonable measures’ to ensure observance of art 111: 4 by provincial liquor boards 
because the Canadian Parliament had omitted to utilise its power to impose discipline on 
the liquor boards.
96
 In response to this claim, Canada argued that ‘the determination of 
what is ‘reasonable and available’ under art XXIV: 12 must take into account the 
domestic legal and political situation and ultimately should be judged by the contracting 
party itself.’97 The Panel rejected this argument stating that ‘The GATT and not the 
contracting parties would be the ultimate judge of whether reasonable measures had 
been taken.’98 The Panel noted that for Canada to be regarded as having taken 
‘reasonable measures’ it would have to ‘show that it had made a serious, persistent and 
convincing effort
99
 to secure compliance by the provincial liquor boards with the 
provisions of the General Agreement.'
100
 In this instance, the Panel held that Canada had 
failed to satisfy this threshold.
101
  
Case three: United States (US): Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages  
The next case which concerned the interpretation of art XXIV: 12 is the US: Measures 
Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages.
102
 In this case involving the same two parties as 
                                                 
95
 ibid 19-21ff, 25-28. 
96
 ibid 185. 
97
 ibid 52. 
98
 Hayes (n 92) 28. 
99
 Hayes (n 98) Emphasis added. 
100
 Canada-Import, Distribution (n 97). 
101
 ibid 53. 
102
 DS23/R-39S/206 (March 16 1992) [hereinafter Alcoholic and Malt Beverages]. 
54 
 
above, ‘Canada requested a GATT Panel to address excise taxes levied on imported beer 
and wine by US federal and state officials.'
103
 Canada argued that the US federal 
government and eighteen states maintained lower tax rates or tax credits for in-state and 
domestic brewers.
104
 Canada claimed that this was a violation of GATT art 111:2 ‘The 
Panel found that the federal and state taxes violated the NT under GATT art 111:2.’105 
Interestingly, the US reversed its line of arguments which it used in the previous 
Canada-Import case stating that ‘Article XXIV: 12 could be invoked by countries with 
federal constitutional systems as a limitation on their duty to bring local laws into 
compliance with GATT.’106 Canada countered this argument stating that the US had ‘an 
obligation to compel local observance of the GATT, relying in part on one scholar's 
view that the US constitutional system allows the federal government to preempt state 
law and therefore compel state adherence to GATT.’107 The Panel agreed with Canada’s 
position stating that there was no constitutional impediment to forcing state compliance. 
It further noted that ‘Under US constitutional law GATT law is part of US federal law 
and being based on the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, overrides, as a general 
matter, inconsistent state law.’108 
In relation to reasonable measures, the Panel ruled that the US had failed to present 
evidence that reasonable measures were unavailable to it in this case.
109
  
Summarising the effect of the GATT jurisprudence on the scope and meaning of 
‘reasonable measures’ under Article XXIV: 12, Hayes argues that ‘other than the 
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reference in Canada-Import to ‘serious, persistent, and convincing effort’ no GATT 
Panel has discussed what constitutes a "reasonable measure" under Article XXIV: 12.’110 
This view is supported in this thesis because the cases have added more confusion than 
clarity. For example, the Canada-Import case built on the principles of the Canada-Gold 
Coins case by addressing the issues of which yardstick was to be used for ascertaining 
when ‘reasonable measures’ was sufficient and who was responsible for determining 
these yardsticks. Hayes gives credit to the panels for adopting a ‘serious, persistent and 
convincing effort’ test as a satisfactory threshold. However, the significance of the 
reference to this threshold identified by Hayes as a credit to the Panel’s efforts is as 
elusive as the concept of ‘reasonable measures’ itself. This is because it is a threshold 
which borders on a subjective evaluation by the GATT Panel in determining what 
should be deemed ‘serious’, ‘persistent’ and ‘convincing.’ This makes the yardstick for 
ascertaining reasonable measures taken in each case open to the possibility of varied 
interpretations. A federal state which was deemed to be condoning a perceived non-
compliance measure from its SFGs  could have had no clear indication until it is dragged 
before the GATT Panel what and the extent of the steps it could have taken to satisfy the 
‘serious’, ‘persistent’ and ‘convincing’ effort threshold.  
Furthermore, at the time these disputes were considered (from the mid-80s to the early 
90s), the patterns of international tradewere already changing significantly to 
accommodate the activities of SFGs in a globalised process of international economic 
relations. Hence, the threshold of what constitutes ‘serious’, ‘persistent’ and 
‘convincing’ was fast becoming blurry and thus an increasingly impossible burden for 
federal states. 
 2.5  Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) and Compliance in Federal Systems. 
The reference to the nomenclature Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) in international 
trade literature is as contentious as the very concept they represent. Many commentators 
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have disagreed with this terminology.
111
 According to Mansfield and Milner, ‘A region 
is often defined as a group of countries located in the same geographically specified 
area. Exactly which areas constitute regions however remains controversial.’112 On the 
issue of the relationship between economic flows and policy choices amongst the 
participants in such species of trade agreements, commentators have made distinctions 
between ‘regionalism’ and ‘regionalisation.’ Mansfield and Milner relying on the 
distinction set forth by Fishlow and Haggard, are of the view that regionalisation refers 
to the regional concentration of economic flows while regionalism is a political process 
characterised by economic policy cooperation and coordination among countries.
113
 
Also, Katzenstein is of the view that ‘Regionalisation describes the geographic 
manifestation of international or global economic processes, while Regionalism refers to 
the political structures that both reflect and shape the strategies of governments, business 
corporations and a variety of non-governmental organisations and social movements’114 
2.5.1 RTAs in International Trade. 
Interestingly, RTAs are not new to the international economic scene. According to the 
WTO World Trade Report, ‘Empires were one of the earliest means of securing trade 
interests. Powerful states – from the Romans to the Ottomans, to the British – used 
influence and force to create colonial empires or “spheres of influence” that gave their 
traders and manufacturers secure access to foreign markets, often on an exclusive 
basis.’115  However, since the inception of the multilateral trade system in 1947, they 
have been regulated under the rubric of the Multilateral Trade Agreements.
116
 In the 
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Westphalian era of international relations, the complexity of RTAs increased within the 
context of the prevailing political and economic circumstances in the development of the 
international system at every point in time.  
As pointed out earlier in this chapter, the international economic order has in the recent 
past witnessed an exponential increase in the use of RTAs. Ruggiero, a Former Director-
General of the WTO, identifies the aftermath of the Uruguay Round of multilateral 
negotiations as the inception of this trend. He states that: 
...at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round negotiations, multilateralism 
appeared triumphant as the WTO moved decisively away from the old 
GATT’s image as a Rich Man’s Club toward universal membership.  Ten 
years later, only three of WTO’s 147 member governments are not part of 
any regional or preferential trade agreement and only one of these – at last 
count – was not involved in a negotiation aimed at creating an FTA.117 
It is evident from the above quote by Ruggiero and recent statistics from the World 
Trade Organisation - which puts the number of RTAs in operation by 2011 at 297 - that 
the use of RTAs is a phenomenon which is increasing in geometric proportions and as a 
consequence has serious implications on the regulation of international trade.
118
  
The factors which drive the RTA practice of countries are pluralised and more 
importantly, are very potent in determining their trade policy directions. In theory, 
economic considerations are usually perceived as the main objective of RTAs. However, 
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the reality of the situation shows that there are other factors at play. These factors 
include inter alia economic and political-economic/national security considerations.
119
 
RTAs are by nature predominantly economic constructs. The participants to these trade 
agreements usually seek to achieve an objective(s) related to the integration of a specific 
sector or all sectors of the respective economies of the participants to the RTAs. Corttier 
and Foltea are of the view that ‘The economic rationale for concluding preferential 
agreements includes the search for larger markets and for deeper integration, in 
particular among neighbouring countries.’120 Thus, the formation of a Custom Union 
(CU) or a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in economic terms entails the removal of 
barriers to trade between the participants of these arrangements. Flowing from this, a 
major rationale why countries enter into an RTA in economic terms is because 
theoretically they are meant to be welfare enhancing for the participants to the 
arrangement.  
Also, RTAs were recommended at the inception of the GATT system in 1947 because it 
was envisaged that they would serve as building blocks for the multilateral process.
121
 
However, recent literature and studies have cast doubts on the welfare implications of 
RTAs and their ability of to act as building blocks to the multilateral system. Some 
commentators have argued that RTAs – especially the new styled aggressive FTAs - 
constitute stumbling blocks to the multilateral trade system.
122
 Others have argued that 
RTAs are acting as anticipated under the WTO agreements because they are aiding the 
expansion of liberalisation tenets in subject areas –such as competition policy - which 
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have proved difficult to achieve under the multilateral trade system.
123
 In relation to the 
welfare creation attributes of RTAs, Do and Watson are of the view that the proliferation 
of RTAs does not yet seem to have created a world trade system dominated by trade 
diversion.
124
 Whichever way the debate has gone, one undisputed fact is that the current 
resurgence of the use of RTAs in international trade in terms of its economic 
implications has had momentous and serious implications for the international trade 
system which make it obvious that it would take more than economic factors to have 
kept the RTA resurgence burning.  
Due to the uncertainty surrounding the economic benefits of RTAs as a platform for 
international trade, it has become obvious that some collateral albeit important political 
factors play a fundamental role in promoting RTAs to countries within the international 
system.
125
 However, considering that RTAs are primarily economic agreements, their 
formation is never directly attributed to political considerations – hence the term 
political economy – which supposes that political factors act as indirect stimulants for 
participation in RTAs.  
National security is also subsumed under this heading because although national security 
has taken on a new dimension, especially since the increased terrorist attacks on the US 
and her allies; it is still a political issue which like other mainstream political 
considerations has become a significant inspiration for RTA formation. Damro explains 
this point, stating that countries enter into RTAs in a bid to achieve security objectives 
via the economic construct of RTAs.
126
 He points out that while economic objectives are 
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the central reason for signing an RTA, a country could attain an equally important 
political objective of achieving security within the designated RTA participating area for 
the participants to the agreement. This is due to the expectations that an RTA will 
stimulate confidence especially in regions where the need for confidence security wise is 
urgently needed. According to Darmo, regions which have histories of conflict and lack 
of erstwhile cooperation may look to economic cooperation as a means of initiating a 
relationship which can ease the security tension in such a region. He cites the European 
Union (EU) as an example of an RTA which was formed in such a manner.
127
 
Similar to the position between the multilateral trade regime and federal systems, RTAs 
have become increasingly important in the federalism-international trade discourse 
because of their growing prominence in recent years. The objective in this section of the 
chapter is to identify how the use of RTAs in international trade impacts the 
participation of federal systems in the international economic system.  
The next section will focus on the relationship between federal systems and RTAs so as 
to establish the extent to which the activities of SFGs are compatible with them (RTAs). 
2.6 RTAs and Compliance in Federal Systems. 
The compatibility issues discussed in the previous section on multilateralism are also 
present in the relationship between RTAs and federal systems. More importantly, with 
the exponential increase in the use of RTAs as a platform for international trade 
participation, it has become pertinent to examine how RTAs have responded to the 
participation of federal systems in international trade.  
There are numerous RTAs in existence and the contents of each RTA vary depending on 
the scope of the agreement and the parties involved. Thus, it is difficult to identify one 
single RTA which fully captures the compatibility issues between federal systems and 
RTAs. This section will focus on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
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as an example just to demonstrate these issues relating to federal systems and RTAs. The 
choice of NAFTA is informed by the fact that it was the first of its kind to involve 
developing and developed countries; it also involved three federal systems. Finally, it 
has been the subject of important investment disputes which demonstrate the growing 
impact of SFGs on the operation of international economic norms in federal systems.  
Art 105 contains the federal compliance clause of NAFTA. It provides that ‘[T]he 
Parties shall ensure that all necessary measures are taken in order to give effect to the 
provisions of this Agreement, including their observance, except as otherwise provided 
in this Agreement, by state and provincial governments.’128 This provision originated 
from art 103 of the US-Canada Free Trade Agreement ("CFTA").
129
 
Art 105 is also similar in wording to the GATT art XXIV: 12, but a significant 
difference is the shift in emphasis from ‘shall take such reasonable measures as may be 
available to it’ to ‘shall ensure that all necessary measures are taken in order to give 
effect to the provisions of this Agreement.’ The language of NAFTA is stricter than the 
GATT in its requirement for federal systems. According to Vengroff and Rich, citing 
Dupras, ‘This language implies that Canada is obligated to perform and that unless the 
Canadian government could implement each and every provision in NAFTA, it would 
be in default and could be subject to an application for dispute settlement.’130  
Hayes argues that in contrast to the GATT, ‘the "all necessary measures" language in 
NAFTA Article 105 …eliminates the ambiguities of the "reasonable measures" language 
in GATT Article XXIV: 12.’131 According to him, ‘the "all necessary measures" 
language can reasonably be interpreted to impose a requirement on federal states to do 
whatever it takes within its constitutional authority to ensure state compliance.’132 The 
                                                 
128
 Emphasis added.  
129
 Hayes (n 110) 31. 
130
 Vengroff and Rich (n 21) 11- 12. 
131
 Hayes (n 129) 31. 
132
 ibid 31. 
62 
 
reference to ‘whatever it takes’ by Hayes is not as definitive on the matter as it sounds. 
This is because in reality ‘whatever it takes’ is difficult to achieve. As Hayes later points 
out, when central governments are faced with negative fallouts due to the activities of 
their regions, rather than follow a hard line to ensure compliance of its regions as 
stipulated under art 105, they may rather seek political compromise or take the option of 
paying monetary compensation to aggrieved trading partners as an alternative policy 
action. This approach has become necessary because the role of SFGs in the 
implementation of international economic agreements is increasing due to the 
encroachment of expanding international trade and investment issues into their 
constitutional domain.
133
 As such, pursuing a hardline stance has the potential to foster 
more dissident action by SFGs especially if they regard the action of the central 
government against their international activities as a suppression of their constitutional 
freedom and/or economic development objectives.  
Furthermore, actualising a ‘whatever it takes’ approach of art 105 in reality is dependent 
on how clearly constitutionally delineated international trade and investment powers are 
between levels of government in a federal system. In the case of federal systems with 
loose constitutional demarcations such as Canada, it will be difficult to achieve a 
comprehensive compliance rate with NAFTA as stipulated under art 105 because the 
constitutional designation on foreign policy in Canada is ambivalent.  This constitutional 
uncertainty (especially when the issues in question fall within the constitutional 
competence of the Canadian provinces) is enough to justify an excuse on the part of 
Canada that it is not always possible to achieve compliance of all its SFGs in line with 
requirements of art 105. However, in federal systems with clear constitutional 
demarcations on foreign trade policy such as in the US, it is more difficult for the central 
government to justify the actions of its SFGs which impede on its obligation to ensure 
compliance with NAFTA.  
The position in Nigeria –the case study – is more aligned with the US example. These 
circumstances highlighted above do not include situations where SFGs are acting within 
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jurisdictional grey areas or actually encroaching into the exclusively designated areas for 
the central governments.
134
 These emerging situations will be addressed in the next 
chapter, where the dynamics of a new dispensation of international economic relations 
will be examined. 
Though there are no GATT/WTO cases in this area, but there are a number of foreign 
investment cases which have directly or indirectly considered the scope of art 105 of 
NAFTA. One of these cases will be considered in the next section to highlight how 
federal compliance clauses in RTAs affect federal systems. 
Metalclad Corporation v The United Mexican States
135
  
This was a foreign investment dispute which arose out of the activities of a US company 
- Metalclad Corporation in the Municipality of Guadalcazar located in the Mexican State 
of San Luis Potosi (SLP). Metalclad alleged that the Respondent (Mexico) through its 
regional government had interfered with its investment - the development and operation 
of a hazardous waste landfill. The Government of Mexico had issued federal 
construction and operating permits for the landfill prior to Metalclad’s purchase of 
COTERIN (the Mexican company which obtained the original permit to build the waste 
landfill) and the Government of SLP likewise issued a state operating permit which 
implied its political support for the landfill project.
136
 However, the Municipality of 
Guadalcazar became a stumbling block to Metalclad’s investment when it demanded 
that Metalclad obtain an additional municipal permit before the construction of waste 
landfill could commence. Metalclad claimed that this interference was a violation of a 
number of Chapter Eleven investment provisions of NAFTA. The main focus was on 
Art 1105 which requires each party to NAFTA to ‘accord to investments of investors of 
another Party treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and 
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equitable treatment and full protection and security.’137 However, a prominent question 
which arose in this dispute was whether Mexico was internationally responsible for the 
acts of its regions (SLP and Guadalcazar) pursuant to art 105.
138
 The International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Panel held that Mexico had 
violated its obligation under art 1105 and international law because Metalclad’s 
investment was not accorded fair and equitable treatment due to the interference of the 
regional governments.
139
 The Panel argued that Guadalcazar’s insistence on a permit 
being obtained by Metalclad was an impediment to the objectives of NAFTA which is to 
promote and increase cross-border investment opportunities and ensure the successful 
implementation of investment initiatives.
140
 
The Panel stated that Metalclad had proceeded with its investment on the strength of the 
assurance that obtaining federal and state permits was a sufficient requirement to 
proceed with the investment.  Thus, the Panel held that the subsequent interference by 
the Municipality of Guadalcazar with Metalclad’s investment was a failure on the part of 
Mexico which had a responsibility ‘to ensure a transparent and predictable framework 
for Metalclad’s business planning and investment.’141 The Panel also stated that the 
failure of Mexico to guarantee the adherence of its internal law with the requirements of 
NAFTA, art 1105(1) was supported by the ‘governing principle that internal law (such 
as the Municipality’s permit requirements) does not justify failure to perform a 
treaty...’142 
From the forgoing, it can be argued that the participation of Mexico’s SFGs in the 
operation of NAFTA’s foreign investment regime was interpreted as being contrary to 
the provisions of art 1105 and in effect art 105. However, this decision is not definitive 
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on the issue of federal compliance with regional trade agreements because the 
circumstances of this case may have been different if Guadalcazar had not proved 
difficult in granting a permit to Metalclad. In essence, it is not clear if the Panel in this 
case was generally adverse to the jurisdiction of the Mexican Municipality to grant 
permits as a contravention of NAFTA and international law or whether it was only 
concerned about the adverse consequences which arose when the Municipality refused 
to grant a permit in this instance. The former view can be interpreted to mean that art 
105 NAFTA is not adverse to SFGs  having powers to affect the international 
investment regime under NAFTA as long as these powers are exercised in a manner 
which does not act as an impediment to the overall objectives of NAFTA especially 
under art 1105. The latter view supports an argument that art 105 NAFTA is adverse to 
any form of power wielded by SFGs which has the potential to affect investment under 
NAFTA. This interpretation will suppose that art 105 does not encourage the ability of 
SFGs to exercise any powers in the international trade and investment sphere.  Thus, the 
decision in Metalclad can be viewed as an instance which is instructive for 
demonstrating the consequences of SFGs acting in a manner which is adverse to the 
objectives of the central government in the operation of an RTA. From this perspective, 
this case highlights the potential problems which are associated with the involvement of 
SFGs in international economic agreements.    
In the context of the relationship between federal systems and international trade 
regimes, this case demonstrates that the ‘all necessary measures’ approach under art 105 
does not discountenance the capacity of SFGs to challenge the effect of international 
economic agreements which have direct implications on their areas of constitutional 
competence. It also demonstrates the stricter threshold for validity applied to the 
activities of SFGs under NAFTA. However, it nonetheless demonstrates that art 105 has 
not fared any better than the GATT XXIV: 12 in providing a definitive objective 
criterion for ensuring a level playing field between federal systems and unitary systems 
in international trade relations. 
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2.7 Conclusion. 
As an introductory chapter, the arguments presented were aimed at establishing a 
foundational premise in the thesis which will be expanded upon in subsequent chapters.  
In this chapter, it has been argued that Federalism can be viewed as a process which is 
constantly evolving to accommodate changing dynamics in the relationship between the 
components of the federal relationship. It was also argued that SFGs and the central 
governments in a federal process are constantly jostling for competence on an array of 
issues which are of common interest to the federal union. Furthermore, it was 
established that foreign policy (including international economic relations) is an area 
where the central government in federal systems have traditionally enjoyed plenary 
powers to the exclusion of SFGs in the federal process. It was pointed out in this chapter 
that international law has traditionally accorded little recognition to SFGs in the 
interaction of states in the international system. This similar pattern was identified in 
international economic regimes such as the multilateral and regional trade systems. To 
demonstrate this point, the GATT/WTO and RTA legal provisions and case law which 
portray an adverse attitude to the interference of SFGs in international economic 
relations were considered.  
In summary, this chapter considered the interaction of federal systems with international 
trade norms with a view to highlighting the compatibility issues inherent in this 
relationship. The aim was to demonstrate the challenges which the peculiarities of the 
federal process pose to the application of these international economic regimes in federal 
systems. To this end, this chapter examined the different approaches adopted under the 
multilateral and regional trade systems in order to ensure compliance of SFGs in federal 
systems with international trade norms. From the analysis, it is evident that the federal 
compliance approach adopted under GATT and NAFTA places federal systems in a 
peculiar position in international economic relations. This peculiar position is reflected 
in the ambiguous wording of the federal compliance provisions under GATT and 
NAFTA and the ensuing case law. This adverse position towards the participation of 
SFGs in international economic relations will be examined in detail in the course of this 
thesis with Nigeria as the selected case study.  
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Chapter Three: The Dynamics of a New Dispensation in International 
Economic Relations. 
3.1 Introduction.  
The previous chapter focused on the relationship between federal systems and 
international economic norms, using the international trade regulatory regimes – 
multilateralism and regionalism, as the main basis for this analysis. It was outlined in 
chapter two how the mechanism for compliance of federal systems under these two 
trade regimes has evolved in response to the peculiar characteristics of the federal 
process.
1
 Chapter two was concluded with a finding that the federal compliance 
approaches adopted under international trade agreements such as GATT and NAFTA 
are adverse to the participation of SFGs in the international trade process. This 
position is reflected in the ambiguous wording of the federal compliance provisions 
under GATT, NAFTA and the ensuing case law.  
The objective in this chapter is to establish how changing geopolitical circumstances 
in international relations coupled with an evolving relationship between 
multilateralism and regionalism have impacted on the institutional structure for 
international economic relations.  
3.1.1 The Scope of the Chapter. 
With the increased proliferation of RTAs since the early 1990s, the focus of most 
investigations on multilateralism and regionalism has been on the impact of the ‘new 
regionalism’ on the multilateral trade system.2 For example, the view from the 
UNCTAD is that ‘In terms of the international trading system, the concern is that the 
proliferation of RTAs may lead to erosion and possible fragmentation of the 
multilateral trading system into some kind of federal system composed of semi-
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autonomous “stumbling” trading blocs.’3 This study considers a different perspective 
to the issue, which is, how the relationship between the ‘new regionalism’ and the 
multilateral trade system affects the institutional configuration of federal systems in 
relation to international trade participation. This important question provides the 
background context within which the allocation of constitutional powers between 
central governments and SFGs on matters of international economic relations is 
considered in this thesis.  
Different discussion points have emerged from the evolving relationship between 
multilateralism and regionalism in the international trade system. Extensive research 
has been carried out with a focus on the impact of regionalism either as a stepping 
stone or a hindrance to the multilateral system.
4
 Other scholars have focused on the 
ways in which coherence can be achieved between the two competing systems of 
international trade.
5
 Another dimension to the scholarship has centred on the 
emergence or otherwise of a constitutional order in the international trade system.
6
 
This chapter will address this point, albeit in a limited sense. Specifically, awareness 
about some of the arguments for and against the existence of a constitutional order in 
the international trade system will be useful in this chapter, because it is significant 
evidence which outlines distinct characteristics of the current dispensation of 
international economic relations.  
The scope of the arguments in this chapter will be focused on highlighting the 
evidence which points to the emergence of a new dispensation of international 
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economic relations which has a ‘contraction effect’ on the allocation of powers in 
federal systems in their participation in the world economy. ‘Contraction effect’ is 
used in the context of the shrinking foreign affairs powers of the central government 
due to the intrusiveness of the expanding scope of international economic regimes.
7
 
It is argued that due to the characteristics of the international economic system in the 
current dispensation, the role of central governments as the embodiment of the 
sovereign status of nation-states on matters of international economic relations is 
diminishing.
8
   
The issues which will be considered in this chapter include: 
1. Globalisation as a facilitator of changing patterns in the relationship between 
multilateralism and regionalism in international trade 
2. The effect of the new wave of regionalism on the dynamics of international 
trade participation 
3. The distinguishing characteristics of the current dispensation of international 
economic relations.  
There is a broader context of evolution in the international system which has 
facilitated the changes occurring in the international economic system. For example, 
it is pertinent to recognise globalisation as a major geopolitical change which has 
redefined international relations in the 21st century. Globalisation has served as a 
facilitator for an expansion in the scope of international economic norms and the 
consequential incursion of these norms into the domestic policy arena of federal 
systems.  
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3.2.1 Globalisation as a Facilitator of the Current Dispensation of 
International Economic Relations.  
Globalisation can be described as a process of expansion in the interactions between 
peoples in all spheres of human endeavour due to a contraction of geographical 
boundaries in international relations. It is a significant phenomenon which has re-
shaped the dynamics of the international system because it has facilitated a reduction 
in the barriers to transnational relations between actors located in different 
jurisdictions.
9
 
The precise origin of globalisation is difficult to pin point, but it is a concept which 
has dominated the international relations discourse for most part of the post–
industrial revolution era. Eslake
10
  is of the opinion that globalisation as a process 
could be traced further down in history because ‘It [globalisation as a process] is 
simply the logical extension of the tendency towards increasing specialization and 
trade which has been going on since humans first appeared on the surface of the 
earth.’11  The manifestation of globalisation in the modern era of international 
relations is mainly attributed to advancements in science and technology and its 
impact on the acquisition and dissemination of information.
12
  
Most definitions of globalisation focus on the correlation between advancements in 
the means of economic production and the emergence of new structures and 
processes of interaction in international relations. For example, the UNESO 
Management of Social Transformations (MOST) Programme which focuses on the 
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relationship between globalisation and governance defines globalisation as ‘…as a 
set of economic, social, technological, political and cultural structures and processes 
arising from the changing character of the production, consumption and trade of 
goods and assets that comprise the base of the international political economy.’13 
Furthermore, Penguin Dictionary of Economics defines globalisation as ‘The 
geographical dispersion of industrial and services activities (for example, research 
and development, sourcing of inputs, production and distribution) and the cross-
border networking of companies (for example through joint ventures and the sharing 
of assets)’14 These two definitions focus on the relationship between the emerging 
structures and the changing character of key aspects of international relations such as 
economic production and trade. These definitions do not represent the full spectrum 
of the concept of globalisation because there are other explanations for the emerging 
structures and processes which are not related to economic factors. Eslake argues that 
definitions of globalisation which focus on economic factors as the sole determinant 
of ‘geographic dispersion’ and ‘cross-border networking’ being experienced in the 
globalisation era are narrow conceptualisations of the globalisation process.
15
 
According to him, ‘geographical dispersion’ has also been experienced by (for 
example) sporting and cultural activities as well as industrial or services activities.
16
 
‘Cross-border networking’ has involved not just companies but educational 
institutions, governments and non-government organizations and ideas and fashions 
have been important agents of ‘geographical dispersion.’17  
This shows the multifaceted dimension of globalisation and how difficult it is to 
attain a definition or understanding which totally encompasses all its dimensions.
18
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However, in the words of Pascal Le Merrer, ‘Our view of globalisation is very much 
influenced by the angle from which we approach it.’19 So, in the context of this 
investigation which focuses on the effect of the evolving relationship between 
multilateralism and regionalism on the institutional participation of federal setups in 
international trade, these definitions of globalisation proffered above are useful. They 
highlight the significant role which the economic dimension of globalisation has 
played in the emergence of new political economy structures in international 
economic relations. In essence, economic considerations are not the only aspect of 
globalisation, but they are a significant aspect which is relevant to the objectives of 
this thesis.  
It is also useful to point out that in a period of international relations which has been 
largely influenced by a capitalist political economy philosophy; globalisation is 
usually associated with neo-liberal tenets which do not support the interference of 
government in the functioning of the market. Kotz points out that under a neo-liberal 
framework of globalisation, ‘The state is assigned a very limited economic role: 
defining property rights, enforcing contracts, and regulating the money supply,’20 
Even ‘state intervention to correct market failures is viewed with suspicion on the 
ground that such intervention is likely to create more problems than it solves.’21 This 
perception of globalisation brings into question the need for studying institutional 
forms of regulation in the globalisation - international economic relation nexus.  
However, the view in this thesis is that a study of the dynamics of institutional 
interactions in a global economic dispensation is justified because a laissez faire 
conceptualisation of international economic relations in a globalised era is not a 
universally accepted position; even amongst neo-liberal scholars. For example, 
moderate neo-liberals do not share the same stringent views against government 
intervention as the radical neo-liberal scholars. Moderate neo-liberals believe that 
globalisation leads to extensive cross-border flows of trade and investment which do 
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not eliminate positive and negative externalities, or the need for state interventions in 
response to them.
22
  
This moderate view is supported in this thesis because it shows that even in a laissez 
faire dominated era of international economic relations; government regulation of 
markets is not an obsolete consideration.
23
 It has even been argued that the failure of 
some areas of the international economic system such as the international financial 
system (which experienced a recession in 2008) is a consequence of inadequate 
regulation of the financial markets in the first place.
24
 Thus, studying patterns of 
institutional regulation in the process of globalisation is still an important 
consideration for rationalising the changing landscape of international economic 
relations.
25
  
In the area of international trade participation and regulation, the process of 
globalisation has revolutionised the process and methods of conducting international 
trade. In the context of the multilateral and regional trade system, the expansion in 
global interaction has opened up more opportunities for participation in international 
trade. This in turn has necessitated international cooperation and regulation of the 
expanding scope of international trade relations under the auspices of the WTO and 
more recently RTAs.  For example, the expansion in the scope of the WTO’s 
competence into new disciplines such as services can be tied to a relaxation of the 
barriers to mobility of labour.
26
 The internationalisation of the provision of services 
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has made services a prominent feature of international economic interaction, 
necessitating international regulation under regimes such as the WTO.  On the 
regionalism front, a plausible explanation for the increase in cross regional RTAs is 
that globalisation has reduced the insistence on geographical demarcation as a 
yardstick for economic integration, making it possible for cross - border economic 
arrangements.
27
  
Of particular importance to this thesis is the ‘contraction’ effect associated with the 
globalisation of international economic relations. For example, with the expansion of 
international trade interactions in a globalised world, international cooperation has 
become more localised in terms of its scope and actors. According to Keating,
28
  
Globalisation and the rise of transnational regimes, especially regional 
trading areas, have eroded the distinction between domestic and foreign 
affairs and by the same token have transformed the division of 
responsibilities between state and sub-national governments.
29
 
This is arguably a reason for the expanded scope of international economic norms 
because globalisation has not just opened up opportunities for extended international 
economic interactions but has also fragmented the domestic policy arena by 
diversifying the platforms for participation and regulation of economic relations at 
the local level. This view is supported by the UNESCO MOST study on the 
governance – globalisation nexus which was carried out between 1997 and 2003.30 It 
was highlighted in this study that one noticeable impact of globalisation on 
governance structures is the increasing structural differentiation of goods and assets 
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which has spread across traditional political borders and economic sectors. This has 
resulted in transnational and multinational changes, which have a major impact on 
outcomes in determining issue-areas (for instance, environment, trade and world 
regulation).
31
 Furthermore, the study highlighted that the transnational impact of 
international trade interaction may induce global and local actors to be more 
independent from a traditionally exclusive nation-state decision-making process.
32
 
This means that in addition to the popular view that globalisation has facilitated an 
outward expansion towards international cooperation, the possibility of an inward 
contraction effect which encourages localised participation and regulation is also 
plausible. Hayes, drawing on Slaughter’s ‘disaggregation of the state’ theory, 
supports this inward contraction effect theory.
33
 According to him: 
In contrast to the "upward" transfer of sovereign authority from nation-
states to international institutions, the "disaggregated state" theory 
focuses on the "downward" transfer of power from the nation-state to 
regional and local governments. As nation-states become more 
interconnected and interdependent, centralized international relations 
dependent upon central government control decline. This in turn leads to 
a dilution of central government responsibility and a fundamental shift in 
the institutional structure of the global system, forcing a re-examination 
of old constitutional and international norms in light of the new 
circumstances.
34
 
This view has been greeted with mixed reactions. For example, Warner and Gerbasi 
do not support the view that globalisation has led to a rescaling of political and 
economic power from the nation–state downward to state and local governments, 
through the process of decentralisation.
35
 Instead they propose a counter-view that 
globalisation and the intrusion of international regimes into the domestic arena of the 
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nation – state has actually led to an erosion of governmental authority ‘at the sub-
national level, while the national level is being reformed to accommodate global 
economic interests.’36 They argue that ‘A new governance nexus is forming [which 
is] composed of international agreements [international organisations], nation states 
and private corporations which enhances the primacy of national over sub-national 
governance scales.’37 
The arguments of Warner and Gerbasi do not however refute the proposition that 
SFGs are affected by the changing dynamics of international economic relations in 
an era of globalisation. They in fact accede to the reality that under the current 
dispensation of international economic relations, SFGs are now ‘encouraged to 
directly engage global corporations in promoting economic development and public 
service delivery’. They are only handicapped because they ‘do not have a formal role 
in crafting the rules that govern these relationships.’38 Interestingly, Warner and 
Gerbasi concede that irrespective of these challenges to the authority of SFGs, ‘It is 
at the sub-national level where the contradictions between global competitiveness 
and public welfare will appear.’39 This indicates that globalisation has played a 
significant role in altering the dynamics of international economic relations in a 
manner which directly impacts on the internal distribution of governmental authority 
between levels of government in a nation-state.  
It is argued that this relationship between international economic relations and 
governance structures in a nation-state is not constrained even by constitutional 
exclusion of SFGs as Warner and Gerbasi suggest. The view offered in this thesis is 
that the formal restrictions faced by SFGs are a mirage because in reality SFGs now 
have opportunities to express themselves on the international scene through side 
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tracks and cracks in the existing framework.
40
 Kresl’s views are instructive in this 
regard.
41
 He argues that:  
National governments have had the mandate to negotiate trade 
liberalisation and have quite naturally emphasised the aggregated 
positive results, but for the agreements to be politically acceptable, 
attention had to be drawn to the wishes and concerns of SNG [SFGs].
42
  
Kresl also draws attention to the reality that even if SFGs  do not have formal 
recognition in the negotiation of international economic agreements, ‘Once the 
agreements [are] implemented, SNG [find] themselves functioning in essentially new 
economic spaces, with new possibilities for action independent of the national 
government.’43 He further argues that it has:  
become clear to many practitioners and elected officials in SNG 
throughout Canada, the US and Europe that it is decisions on their part, 
perhaps more than on the part of officials at the national level that will 
be crucial for the future economic vitality and development of their urban 
economies.
44
  
Thus, he argues that the formal restrictions on SNGs are no longer in effective 
barriers to their participation in the international market.
45
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Another interesting point raised by Warner and Gerbasi which is important to this 
discourse is the argument that international trade agreements such as NAFTA 
‘attempt to homogenise legal standards as a means of limiting the flexibility of 
government at the municipal, state and local levels.’46 On the issue of the 
harmonisation, it is submitted that although harmonisation is a significant attribute of 
the new dispensation of international economic relations, it is arguable that it does 
not limit the participation of SFGs. This is because harmonisation which ignores 
diversity at the lower levels of government (where implementation actually takes 
place) will struggle to be effective. This view is supported by Kresl in his analysis of 
the impact of the Single European Act (SEA) on the configuration of powers in EU 
member states. He argues that ‘[T]he processes of harmonisation and standardisation 
will themselves generate demands for stronger third tier governments…’47 because 
‘the EU’s policy forays into areas such as environment, transportation, competition 
and vocational training for which third tier entities have traditionally had 
responsibilities, necessitates their cooperation for harmonisation to be effective.’48 
Using services as an example, the enhancement in the mobility of labour due to the 
global constriction of geographical boundaries raises concerns which require 
harmonised efforts but does not contest the role to be played by stakeholders at a 
regional, national and sub-national level.  At the national level, an influx of service 
providers could lead to population explosion which puts a strain on the economy of 
the recipient country. It could also lead to competition between local and foreign 
service providers, which might either boost or kill off the local industry in the 
recipient country. These issues at the national level in turn necessitate cooperation 
between countries at a regional level because trans-boundary spill over effects could 
arise if there is slack regulation amongst geographically contiguous countries. At the 
sub-national level, regulation has also become vital because it is at this level that the 
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real impact of these transnational policies on services is experienced.  This level of 
government is the closest level of governance to the grassroots and their involvement 
is becoming more important in the multi-layered regulation of services. The 
consequence of this is that globalisation has necessitated international, regional, 
national and sub-national regulation in these new areas.
49
  
There is also a link between the end of the Cold War and the globalisation process 
which was discussed in the previous section. According to Hayes, 
…there is no question that the post-cold war world has undergone a 
fundamental shift of traditional power structures with lasting implications 
on the autonomy of regional and local governments throughout the 
world. As technology and communication costs decrease and the world 
becomes increasingly interdependent, the ability of regional and local 
actors to engage and impact foreign affairs and commerce increases 
exponentially. Indeed, where most localities used to have sporadic 
contact with foreign governments, they now have routine contacts and 
well-established relationships.
50
 
The summary of the arguments in this section is that globalisation has facilitated the 
expansion in the scope of international economic regimes which has made these 
regimes interrupt the domestic policy arena in nation-states, including at the level 
where SFGs have competence.  
The purpose of these sections has been to examine how changes in geopolitical 
circumstances of international relations are the foundational premise which has 
facilitated the expansion of international economic norms. This in turn has created an 
intrusion into the domestic policy arena of federal systems and as a consequence, a 
‘contraction effect’ has occurred which causes a disaggregation of the nation-state in 
relation to international economic participation. In the next section, the contributions 
of the resurgent regionalism to the evolution of these new dynamics in international 
economic relations will be considered. 
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3.3 The Effect of the ‘New Wave’ of Regionalism on the Dynamics of 
International Trade Participation. 
In chapter two, the resurgence of regionalism was analysed and some of the 
significant characteristics of the new wave of RTAs which were identified include: 
its wide coverage and scope, its aggressive approach, the diminishing emphasis on 
geographical contiguity as a yardstick for economic integration, its dynamic structure 
and the variations in nomenclature.
51
 The most pressing question which has arisen 
from the arrival of the new wave of regionalism has been its effect on the multilateral 
system of the WTO and on world trade in general.  
There is the view that ‘Regional integration initiatives have influenced the 
multilateral system in a number of ways, particularly in the establishment of rules in 
areas not yet covered by the WTO or in making clarifications about the operation of 
WTO rules.’52 In the context of this investigation, it is argued that the relationship 
between the new regionalism and the multilateral trade system has had a significant 
impact on the dynamics of international economic relations; especially in relation to 
the permissible actors.  
3.3.1 A Shift in the Hierarchy of Norms in the International Trade System. 
One way in which the new wave of regionalism has upset the balance of the 
international trade system by challanging the political hierarchy of norms which was 
established after WW2.
53
 This reversal is not legal in nature because the WTO still 
remains the regulatory framework for the formation of RTAs. However, there is a 
noticeable shift in priority between the WTO and RTAs which has a significant 
impact on the current outlook of international economic relations.  
At the inception of the multilateral trade system after WW2, the regulation of RTAs 
was placed under the rubric of the GATT multilateral framework. RTAs were 
regulated under art XXIV of the 1947 GATT as an exception to from the MFN 
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requirement of GATT Article I. However, in this new dispensation of international 
economic relations, Hafez argues that ‘It is no longer possible to view the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) as a rule and RTAs as the exception.’54 This is plausible 
because the recent trend demonstrates that RTAs are capable of articulating trade 
rules in areas such as investment and competition policy where the WTO has had 
minimal success.
55
  
Some other reasons for this shift include the fact that that certain trade policy areas 
that have become of crucial importance to several Members are excluded from the 
multilateral negotiating agenda.
56
 The previous reference to competition policy is 
also appropriate here because competition policy has failed to materialise within the 
WTO Doha Round of negotiations.
57
 In July 2004, the General Council of the 
WTO decided that it will discontinue the deliberations on the interaction between 
trade and competition policy (in addition to investment and transparency in 
government procurement).
58
 As a consequence, RTAs have become an attractive 
platform for developed countries to promote favourable markets for their investors.
59
 
In 2005 Puri, commenting in an UNCTAD Report on competition policy related 
provisions in RTAs, stated that many RTAs now contain various commitments on 
competition policy at regional and national level.
60
 These commitments relate to the 
adoption and enforcement of competition laws between the participants to these 
agreements.
61
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[A]allow Members to single out trade liberalization with specific 
markets. They also involve less burdensome negotiations than those at 
the WTO; especially if among like-minded parties and allow the parties 
to such agreements to trade according to custom-built regulatory aspects 
and trade policy disciplines.
62
  
The shift in the status of the RTA system from a subordinate to a coordinated system 
of international trade can also be attributed to the weak discipline mechanism for 
RTAs under the multilateral system.
63
 From the outset, the inclusion of RTAs under 
art XXIV of the GATT 1947 was contentious because although it was regarded as a 
potential stepping stone for the attainment of the tenets of the multilateral trade 
system, it was also recognised as a potential hindrance.
64
 To ensure that RTAs 
fulfilled their potential as a stepping stone for the attainment of the multilateral 
ideals, ‘...the provisions of the GATT regarding RTAs stipulated that they should not 
result in higher barriers to trade with third parties; they should also be ambitious in 
their scope and result in extensive trade liberalisation.’65 These stipulations for the 
compliance of RTAs with the objectives of the GATT have achieved mixed results. 
This is because from a perusal of the provisions of the GATT 1994, GATS and the 
Enabling Clause, there are inconsistencies between the new regionalism and the 
provisions which seek to bring regionalism in line with the conventional norm of the 
multilateral trade system. One of such inconsistencies is the variations in the nature 
of RTAs which have emerged from the original concept under art XXIV. For 
example, Dukgeun draws attention to the trend in Asian FTAs where modified trade 
remedy rules which are a departure from the WTO system are now being adopted.
66
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A specific example of such an FTA is the ‘new age’ partnership agreement between 
the Japan-Singapore FTA (JSEPA) with its ‘focus on the services sector 
liberalisation and in the promotion of foreign direct investment between the two 
countries.’67 SM Thangavelu and M Toh point out that: 
In addition to reducing tariffs and non-tariff barriers (NTBs), JSEPA also 
covers issues such as regulatory reforms, facilitation of customs 
procedures, cooperation in science and technology, media and 
broadcasting, electronic commerce, advancing information and 
communication technology, movement of natural persons and human 
resource developments.
68
  
Also, RTAs now include dispute settlement provisions and bespoke trade remedy 
measures which are an indication that RTAs are heading in the direction of self-
sustaining regimes for the conduct of international trade.
69
 Admittedly, this does not 
necessarily imply that the WTO is no longer a useful platform for the regulation of 
international trade relations. Interestingly, even the emergence of dispute settlement 
structures in RTAs has not escaped the scrutiny of the WTO which still has a 
significant role to play in ensuring that these dispute settlement mechanisms do not 
conflict with that of the WTO.
70
 It shows however, how the relationship between the 
two regimes has shifted from the erstwhile position when RTAs were subservient to 
the multilateral system to a position of coexistence between both regimes.  
More specifically, it is argued that this new era of interdependence between RTAs 
and the WTO has made the intrusion of the norms of international trade into the 
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domestic space of federal setups more pronounced.
71
 For example, RTAs are now 
used not only as instruments for regional integration but also as vehicles for strategic 
market access.
72
 Like the JSEPA cited earlier, countries seeking regional agreements 
include disciplines such as intellectual property, government procurement, 
investment, environment etc. which help to facilitate such strategic market access 
objectives.
73
  
In the context of this thesis, the impact of the new regionalism and its implication for 
the evolving relationship between regionalism and multilateralism is that 
international trade is now transnational in nature.
74
 For example, Sparke avers that 
there is a localised neo-liberal effect of cross border regional initiatives on 
governance practices in the countries involved in these regional initiatives.
75
 He 
argues that: 
[The neo-liberal effect of cross border regional initiatives] is not a 
deliberate and intentional effect of state sovereignty at all, but rather 
operates to consolidate geographically a more systemic and transnational 
state effect that is emerging as a result of the deregulative, decentralizing 
and competition-based governance imperatives unleashed by free trade.
76
 
In economic terms, this transnational effect is found in the ability of RTAs to 
increase competition in the domestic production of the countries involved in an 
RTA.
77
 Economists envisage that RTAs have the potential effect of combining the 
markets of the participant countries, thereby making it possible to reduce monopoly 
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power as firms from different countries are brought into more intense competition, 
which ought to lead to lower costs, prices and higher quality.
78
  
In institutional terms, this leads to closer interactions between actors across 
geographic borders. It is in these increased interactions between domestic actors in 
different jurisdictions, that the expansive scope of the new regionalism has brought 
the process of international trade closer to local levels of governance. This occurs in 
the form of increased opportunities for local regulation and facilitation of the 
expanding trade process. It is in these circumstances that SFGs in federal systems are 
becoming increasingly active in the international economic process. For example, 
McMilan in his study of the increased activities of US state governors in foreign 
policy highlights that it is ‘…difficult for governors to ignore how their US state may 
be affected by international events, whether from economic, environmental, political 
or public health challenges.’79 This is because there is a relocation of these issue 
areas from the exclusive competence of central governments towards SFGs. This 
thesis agrees with this view because the extended disciplines which come under the 
purview of the agenda of the new RTAs directly encroach into the policy space of 
SFGs.
80
  
In essence, what has changed in the dynamics of international economic relations is 
that the institutional formalism associated with international economic participation 
is increasingly being surpassed by functional considerations such as ‘access’ arising 
from the strategic location of SFGs  in the international economic process. For 
example, it is now practicable for SFGs with comparative advantages on a subject 
matter to demand more input in negotiation in regard to such areas.  According to 
Hocking,
81
 this happens when the opportunities created by an externally expanding 
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regionalism coincides with internal regionalism which is driven by comparative 
advantage.
82
 
In summary, a shift in the hierarchy of norms in the international trade system is 
evidenced by a change in the character and scope of RTAs originally recognised 
under art XXIV, rather than a change in legal status. The significance of this change 
is that the introduction of RTAs which are broader in scope than originally envisaged 
by the multilateral system has not only increased the prominence of RTAs vis-a-vis 
the WTO, but has also created an avenue for SFGs to express themselves in 
international arrangements. This is because the new RTAs encompass subject matters 
which are transnational in nature and therefore encroach into the domestic space of 
countries party to these RTAs. This in turn encourages the proliferation of domestic 
actors in the international economic process. 
3.3.2 A Pseudo Constitutional Order Emerging in the International Trade 
System?  
In chapter two, arguments for and against the proposition that a constitutional order 
has emerged were considered. The position adopted in this thesis is that, though the 
expanding scope of the multilateral and regional trade systems may not be enough to 
support the argument that a constitutional order has crystallised, it is substantial 
enough to demonstrate that the rules relating to international trade interaction have 
changed.
83
 This is evident in the divergence between the existing constitutional 
theory on foreign affairs powers in federal systems and the reality of SFGs now 
engaging within the evolving framework of the international trade system. Even if 
this emerging framework is an imperfect process of constitutionalism as Cass 
claims,
84
 it is definitely normatively distinguishable and potent in its redefinition of 
international trade practice.  
With the new regionalism, there is a new consideration which further exacerbates the 
constitutionalisation debate. The resurgence of regionalism and the scope of these 
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new agreements do not tilt the scale in favour of either side of the argument. This is 
because the nature of the new regionalism could provide evidence to support both 
sides of the debate. For example, an argument in support of the pro-
constitutionalisation of the world trade system is that regional integrations such as 
the EU which fall under the purview of the multilateral trade system have manifested 
characteristics which are akin to a conventional constitutional order. These 
characteristics include coherence, unity and a rule of recognition.
85
  However, this 
could conversely be argued as an error of conflating an institution with a 
constitution. This is one of the central anti-constitutionalisation arguments of Cass.
86
  
In the context of the WTO, Cass describes the institution-constitution conflation as 
an attempt by pro-constitutionalisation scholars to conceptualise the WTO as an 
institutional system and not a rules-only system; thereby attempting to vest WTO law 
with unity and coherence which is in consonance with a new constitutional legal 
order.
87
 She argues that conflating institutions with constitutions is ambiguous 
because the use of the language of constitutionalisation to unify and legitimise the 
WTO contains some uncertainties in relation to content.
88
 
In the context of the new regionalism, Cass’s arguments could be used to support the 
argument that even though RTAs such as the EU are taking on formalised and 
detailed institutional mechanisms like the WTO, they still fall short of a 
constitutional order. If the WTO, for all the strides it has made to distinguish itself 
from its member states as an independent regime, is yet to gain universal acceptance 
as a constitutional order, it is doubtful if regionalism will change that scepticism. The 
examples of deep integration in the EU are the closest manifestations of a claim to 
constitutional order in international trade relations. This is because the mandate of 
the EU is becoming increasingly concerned about other issues aside from 
                                                 
85
 ibid.  
86
 ibid 97- 100. 
87
 ibid 100. 
88
 ibid.  
88 
 
establishing a Common Commercial Policy
89
 which makes it difficult to rely on its 
jurisprudence as a basis for validating the constitutionalisation claims.  
Based on these uncertainties in the arguments for and against the existence of a 
constitutional order in the international trade system, one significant point which is 
glaring from the constitutionalisation debate is the reality of the changing landscape 
of international economic relations. The strides achieved by the WTO in 
distinguishing itself as an independent controller of international trade relations and 
the deeper integration models of the new regionalism may not add up to a 
constitutional order in international trade.  They are however substantial enough to 
support the position that a new dispensation of international economic relations is 
emerging. In this emerging dispensation, international regimes have challenged the 
status quo of nation-state centred practice in international economic relations. This 
has occurred both outwardly towards international cooperation and inwardly towards 
local participation.   
3.4 The Distinguishing Characteristics of the Current Dispensation of 
International Economic Relations.  
In this last section, the key points which have been identified in this chapter will be 
summarised. 
3.4.1 The International Economic System is now a Complicated Labyrinth of 
Overlapping Regimes. 
In this dispensation of international economic relations, there is an increase in the 
complexity of the international trade system due to overlapping regimes. These 
complications arising from the interplay of RTAs with the multilateral trade system 
were referred to as the ‘spaghetti bowl’ effect by Bhagwati. He first referred to the 
term in 1995 to describe the problem posed by complicated Rules of Origin (RoO) in 
RTAs.
90
 This term can also be used to describe the complications which arise due to 
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the complex negotiations and trade interactions which dot the international 
landscape. In terms of the complex RoO to which Bhagwati was originally referring 
with the term – ‘Spaghetti Bowl effect’, it is clear with the expanding scope of 
RTAs, that RoO are not the only headache faced in this dispensation of international 
economic relations. In addition to complicated RoOs, the interplay between 
regionalism and multilateralism in a globalised era of international relations has 
generated access for new stakeholders to the international economic process which 
makes foreign economic policy formulation for any nation an arduous task. It is 
challenging to interact in a multi-layered system of international economic relations 
where new actors such as SFGs and non-state actors are now prominent. The 
interplay between all the relevant stakeholders brings into question the relevance of 
the existing norm of central exclusivity in foreign relations. This issue is central to 
the investigation in this thesis because it is paramount that the competing interests 
which have emerged in the international economic process be balanced enough to 
achieve success in a multi-layered international economy. This issue will be 
elaborated on in chapter four where the recommendations of specialist international 
organisations will be considered with regard to best practices for effective 
functioning in the current era of international economic relations.  
3.4.2 Shift in the Hierarchy of International Trade Regulatory Norms which is 
intruding into Domestic Policy Arena of Federal Systems. 
It has been argued in this chapter that globalisation has facilitated the resurgence of 
regionalism which as a consequence is affecting the hierarchy of norms in 
international trade. This shift in hierarchy is not legal because in strictly legal terms 
RTAs are still subject to the requirements of GATT Article XXIV and the WTO 
dispute settlement system would be used – and indeed has been used – to challenge 
RTAs that do not comply with its requirements. However in terms of relevance, the 
prolefiration of RTAs has challenged the priority of the WTO in international 
economic relations. Furthermore, due to the expansive scope of recent RTAs, 
opportunities (which do not exist under the WTO system) have opened up for new 
actors in international economic relations.
91
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3.4.3 Internationalisation of the Economies of SFGs 
A significant characteristic of the new dispensation of international economic 
relations identified in this chapter is that the economies of SFGs are now exposed to 
the international scene. This has necessitated a response by SFGs to the new 
situation. According to Kresl, major cities across the world have been forced to 
respond to the opportunities which globalised economic relations have presented to 
their urban economies.
92
  In his analysis of the impact of Single European Act (SEA) 
on the economies of SFGs in the EU, Kresl argues that: 
The lowering of barriers to cross-border movement of goods, services, 
capital and labor (the "four freedoms" of the SEA) has brought many 
changes in European economic interaction. For cities, it has meant that 
they must now compete with each other for highly mobile capital, for 
infrastructure projects funded by a central agency, for major events and 
for location of production facilities. Regional and Länder authorities have 
to contend with many conflicting interests, as was noted above, more 
than ever, though, these authorities must take a proactive position to plan 
strategically, to promote, to cooperate with other third tier entities, and to 
create a competitive advantage if the region or Land is to experience 
rising income, production and employment Those who take a passive 
stance are likely to suffer decline.
93
 
This view expressed by Kresl is also evident in other federal jurisdictions. For 
example, the economies of states in the US such as California, Texas and New York 
are now so integrated into the mainstream of international trade relations that it is 
impossible to discountenance their role in the world economy.
94
 This era of 
international economic relations has been characterised by the rise of mega cities 
such as New York, London and Lagos as ‘demi-sovereigns’ in international 
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relations.
95
 Accordingly, the economies of the nation-states where these mega –cities 
are located are now becoming so significantly dependent on the international 
character of these cities.
96
 The internationalisation of the economies of SFGs 
presents a challenge because it runs contrary to the norm which ignores the 
participation of SFGs in international economic relations. This divergence between 
the existing theory and the emerging reality will be considered in chapter five.  
3.4.4 Increase in the Opportunities for SFGs to affect the International 
Economic Process.  
A significant characteristic of the current dispensation of international relations is an 
increase in the opportunities for SFGs to express themselves in international 
relations. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is the most prominent avenue for such 
expressions. FDI is defined by the OECD dictionary as ‘A cross-border investment 
by a resident entity in one economy with the objective of obtaining a lasting interest 
in an enterprise resident in another economy.’97 FDI has become an important tool 
for economic development in the 21
st
 century and is a key element for international 
economic integration in the current dispensation of international economic 
relations.
98
 
From an institutional perspective, the main actors in FDI interactions include the host 
governments which are responsible for creating the regulatory framework for 
facilitating investments in the host country, the foreign private investors which are 
the direct participants in the economy of the host country and the home country of 
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the foreign private investors which provide the regulatory framework for the 
protecting the interests of private investors in their country.  
The process of FDI emphasises the significance of SFGs in the current dispensation 
of international relations. First, the host country attracts foreign investors based on 
potential avenues for investment within the different geographical constituencies in 
that host country. To attract foreign investors to a host country, the involvement of 
the SFGs in the location of a potential investment opportunity is needed. Monaghan 
supports this view arguing that ‘Customised coalitions of sub-national institutions 
effectively initiate, negotiate and accelerate insidership of inward investment within 
the foreign market both prior to and during formal entry.’99 Conventionally, the 
central government acts as the mouth piece for SFGs and makes the necessary 
arrangements to facilitate the entry of a foreign investor into that location of the 
investment opportunity.  Such arrangements include the provision of sovereign 
guarantees, a legal framework, investment incentives and infrastructure. Compliance 
is traditionally the area where the input of a SFG is required. The SFG is mandated 
by conventional constitutional practice to comply with whatever terms the central 
government puts in place in relation to any FDI. This is one of the reasons why the 
arguments of Warner and Gerbasi considered earlier, support the view that SFGs are 
losing governmental authority due to the new governance nexus emerging. This 
nexus is composed of international agreements, nation-states and private 
corporations.
100
 They argue that the multinational corporations are now enjoying 
rights accruing from investment treaties at the expense of a diminishing role for 
SFGs in the FDI process. This view is consonant with the views expressed by Brewer 
and Young who believe that there has been a shift in foreign investment law from a 
position in which states have rights and multinationals have duties to a reversal of 
these roles.
101
 This is also reflective of a general view in the foreign investment 
jurisprudence that there has been a policy shift in Foreign Investment Law which 
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now situates foreign investment as an issue best regulated by international regimes 
rather than by the nation-state.
102
  
Beveridge has considered this shifting focus in the foreign investment law discourse 
and the reversal of positions between the participants to the foreign investment 
process.
103
 She utilises the policy science concepts of ‘policy frames’ and ‘policy 
transfer’ as tools for examining the evidence of a transformation in international law 
of foreign investment issues from a state-centered classical international law frame, 
within which foreign investment appeared as a property issue to a market centered 
neo-liberal frame, under which foreign investment is regarded as a ‘trade’ issue.104 
She argues that although the new frame has shown promise in situating FDI as a 
trade issue under the multilateral framework of the WTO, success in this regard has 
been curtailed by the impasse reached at the multilateral negotiations on this issue.
105
   
The position in Beveridge’s study is useful in this thesis because of its utilisation of 
‘policy frames’ as against ‘policy paradigms’ in explaining the changing landscape 
of international law on foreign investment. Beveridge highlights a distinction 
between ‘frames’ and ‘paradigms’. According to her, paradigms focus on ‘the ‘core’ 
or central features of laws, policies and analyses, stripping them bare or reducing 
them to a minimum yet essential content. Frames on the other hand, refer to the outer 
limits within which laws or policy must fit if they are not to be disruptive of the 
existing orders.
106
 This conceptualisation of policy frames by Beveridge is an 
appropriate ‘view of the world’107 through which the changing patterns of FDI 
interactions can be appreciated. Policy frames from the FDI perspective present a 
useful parallel for considering the evidence of the changing character of international 
economic relations. This is because the participation of SFGs in the FDI process is 
not substantial enough to fit the description of a policy paradigm as the activities of 
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SFGs in the FDI process do not form a ‘core’ or central feature of the FDI 
framework. However, it is possible to locate their role in the outer limits within 
which laws or policy on FDI in federal setups must fit if the existing legal order on 
FDI is to function without disruption.  
Furthermore, it is argued that the policy shift in the international law on foreign 
investment identified by Beveridge is now extending beyond a market-centered neo-
liberal frame towards a new frame in which market driven considerations must now 
be balanced against the regulatory concerns of new institutional participants such as 
SFGs. 
It is the view in this thesis that the actions of SFGs in relation to FDI point to the 
growing prominence of this level of government as stakeholders in FDI interactions 
and therefore the policy frame must be widened to incorporate these new actors.  
The decision in the Metalclad case may point to a victory of the central governments 
and private corporations over SFGs, but it is also evident that the capacity of SFGs to 
affect the process of international relations is a reality.  More importantly, it also 
shows that the dynamics of the new dispensation of international relations makes it 
possible for SFGs to express themselves in international relations. One way in which 
SFGs express themselves in the FDI process is by becoming active in trade 
promotion. This makes them key to the FDI interactions of a nation-state.
108
  
However, a pattern identifiable under this current dispensation of international 
economic relations is that SFGs are going a step further than just trade promotion 
and are becoming ‘gatekeepers’ to the economies of their respective nation-states.109 
This is a pattern which has been observed in Nigeria with the growing prominence of 
the SFGs as the determinants of FDI inflow to the country. SFGs are now in the 
forefront of the FDI drive not because they are conforming to the agenda of the 
federal government but rather in line with their own development objectives.
110
 This 
development points towards the emergence of a new protocol in Nigeria’s 
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international economic interaction. This observation will be elaborated on in chapter 
six.
111
 
In addition to the FDI example, another type of opportunity which has arisen for 
SFGs under the current dispensation of the international economic system is the 
opportunity to affect the trade liberalization process in federal systems. SFGs are 
able to affect the trade negotiation process because the expansive scope of 
international trade norms now encroach on areas which directly affect them. As a 
consequence, any policy action they take has the potential to positively or negatively 
impact the overall international economic process. Hayes describes this emerging 
trend thus: 
The emergence of regional and local governments on the world scene, 
coupled with an aggressive trade agenda encompassing politically 
sensitive areas to some degree under the control of these local entities, 
increases the potential for disguised restrictions on trade and other 
protectionist measures which could thwart trade liberalization. As most 
of the negative fluctuations created by international trade liberalization 
(i.e., loss of jobs) are borne at the local level, the likelihood of trade 
restrictions emanating from the local level increases.
112
 
This view depicts the extent of the intrusion of international trade norms in the new 
dispensation of international economic relations. The real impact of international 
trade norms are now felt at the grassroots, which gives regulators at this level the 
impetus to participate in the international economic process. These opportunities 
presented to SFGs to act will not always lead to a positive contribution from these 
actors. This emphasises why it has become imperative to re-assess the theories 
underpinning the distribution of powers for foreign economic relations in federal 
systems.   
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3.5 Conclusion  
Based on the characteristics of the current dispensation of international economic 
relations discussed above, SFGs have responded to this expansion in the scope of 
opportunities for international economic participation by demanding more 
involvement in the process. This is due to the obvious reason that their stake in and 
the ramifications of the decisions reached at the international level have increased.  
Gavin
113
 analyses this manifestation of the evolving interaction between old and new 
emerging actors in the foreign economic policy sphere under the concept of 
multilevel regulatory governance.
114
 He defines multilevel regulatory governance as: 
‘Regulatory strategies and activities covering the development, execution and reform 
of regulation between national, supranational and sub-national levels.’115 He argues 
that the expansion in the trade policy sphere has necessitated the involvement of new 
actors such as SFGs and requires coherence between the multiple layers of trade 
regulation which have emerged in light of the evolution of the international trade 
system.
116
  
From the discussions and analyses above, globalisation coupled with the evolution in 
the external relationship between multilateralism and regionalism has played a 
crucial role in the expansion of the participation of SFGs in international economic 
interactions. The resurgence of regionalism in the recent past, especially with the 
quest for deeper integration has created the impetus for the internal fragmentation of 
the sovereign status of most participants to these regional arrangements. In instance 
of the EU, the quest for integration has been resisted in some instances by member 
states because they have at times struggled to come to terms with the amount of 
national sovereignty which they have had to give up. More interestingly, the 
perforation of the sovereign status of members of regional arrangements in the 
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integration process has led to a fragmentation of the internal sovereignty bond which 
hitherto constrained SFGs from expressing themselves on the international front.  
In essence, the forays of national governments in federal setups into regional 
arrangements has come at the price of a loosening grip on the dictates of the 
constitutional restraints and/or benefits which come from the traditional principles of 
Westphalian sovereignty.
117
 As Spiro puts it, ‘The institutionalisation of interstate 
relations, the disaggregation of the state and economic globalisation all suggest 
foundational shifts in the structure of the global system.’118  
These issues will be considered more comprehensively in chapter five where the 
theoretical basis underpinning the participation of SFGs in international economic 
interactions will be discussed and analysed. At this stage in the analysis, the 
summary of the arguments in this chapter is that the current dispensation of the 
international trade system has been shaped by geopolitical circumstances facilitating 
the expansion and incursion of international trade norms into the domestic arena of 
nation- states. In federal systems, this has encouraged the participation of SFGs in 
the international economic process. This brings into sharp focus the appropriateness 
of the existing theoretical framework for international economic interactions in 
federal systems.  
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Chapter Four: The Evolution of Nigeria’s Constitutional and Institutional 
Framework for Foreign Economic Participation (1960 –2013). 
4.1 Introduction. 
The development of federalism in Nigeria (between 1960 and 2013) has a chequered 
history characterised by repeated episodes of ‘ethno-religious’ political upheavals 
and long periods of military interregna.
1
 In the context of this investigation, the aim 
in this chapter is to examine the political, social and economic problems associated 
with the evolution of federalism in Nigeria to ascertain how they have impacted on 
the competences for foreign economic participation in Nigeria between 1960 and 
2013.  The main focus will be on the constitutional and institutional patterns of 
Nigeria’s international foreign economic policy framework and the relationship 
between the development of Nigeria’s federal system of government and the 
distribution of powers for international economic relations between the FG and 
SFGs.  
The analysis in this chapter will also include a critique of the extant (constitutional 
and institutional) framework under the 1999 Constitution. This will be achieved with 
an evaluation based on working criteria adopted from three international 
organisations – the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO). This critique will help to identify if there are deficiencies in the 
current setup. This will set the tone for further investigations in chapter five on how 
the dynamics of a new dispensation in international economic relations are impacting 
on the existing federalism theory of central exclusivity in foreign affairs which the 
Nigerian trade policy mechanism is currently founded upon.  
Ideally, the developments in the constitutional and institutional framework for 
Nigeria’s international economic regime can be categorised into five eras: 1960 – 
1966 (first civilian Republic), 1967 – 1979 (military rule), 1979 – 1983 (second 
civilian Republic), 1983 – 1998(military rule), and 1999 – 2013 (fourth civilian 
Republic). However, due to word count limitations of this thesis and the vast 
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literature on the five eras identified above, the main focus of this chapter will only be 
on two periods of civilian rule (first and fourth civilian republics) in the development 
of Nigeria’s federal system. These two periods have been selected for more detailed 
analysis because they represent two dissimilar positions in the 
federalism/international economic relations nexus in Nigeria and hence better 
illustrate the evolution which has occurred in the constitutional/institutional 
framework of international economic participation. The 28 years of intermittent 
military rule is also important to the discourse because the command style of military 
rule contributed to a centralisation of political structures in Nigeria. As such the 
discussions on this period will be considered, albeit in a condensed form.  Also, the 
discussions in this chapter will only briefly touch on the second civilian republic 
because the constitutional and institutional arrangements of this era have been 
replicated under the current fourth republic. 
Excluding the introduction and the conclusion, this chapter is divided into three 
major sections. Section 4.2 – 4.5 focuses on describing the distinct patterns in the 
evolution of the constitutional and institutional structure of Nigeria’s trade policy 
regime since independence. Section 4.6 introduces working criteria of the minimum 
standards of an ideal framework for international economic regimes, as developed by 
specialised international economic and development organisations. In section 4.7 the 
working criteria are used as a yardstick for critiquing the effectiveness of the 
constitutional and institutional framework of Nigeria’s international economic policy 
regime. 
4.2 The Constitutional and Institutional Dimension of Nigeria’s 
International Economic Policy Framework (1960 – 1966). 
4.2.1 Developments in the Nigerian Federal System (1960 – 1966). 
The conception of federalism in Nigeria pre-dates the attainment of independence in 
1960.
2
 The seeds of federalism in Nigeria were sown under the colonial rule of Great 
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Britain. For example, pre-independence constitutions such as the Richard 
Constitution of 1945 and the Macpherson’s Constitution of 1951 served as a catalyst 
for the adoption of a federal structure because they introduced the regional system 
into Nigeria.
3
 The Lyttleton Constitution of 1954 built on this regional platform by 
introducing a quasi-federal structure.
4
 The Littleton Constitution provided for a loose 
federation where each region was granted some form of autonomy.
5
  
On the attainment of independence in 1960, the 1960 and 1963 (Republican) 
Constitutions provided for four constitutions in one single document (one for the FG 
and one for each of the three regions).
6
 Under this arrangement, the FG superseded 
the regions only to the extent of inconsistencies between the laws from each level of 
government.
7
 The federal system in Nigeria between 1960 and 1966 was 
characterised by strong regional governments each of which had a significant degree 
of autonomy.
8
 This constitutional arrangement was predicated on the principle that 
each region got as much as it contributed to the earnings of the country. For example, 
the principle of derivation was used as the basis for revenue allocation amongst the 
regions from export duties accruing to the federal consolidated fund.
9
 Also, 50% of 
mining rents and royalties was payable to the region of origin, while 30% of such 
mining proceeds went to the federal distributable pool account; from where it was 
distributed amongst the regions on the principle of size of landmass, population and 
need.
10
 In summary, a symbiotic economic arrangement was in operation amongst 
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the component units of the Nigerian federation during the period (1960 – 1966). This 
inspired each region to look inward to concentrate on areas where it had a 
comparative advantage; with each region being renowned for one form of economic 
activity or the other.
11
  
4.2.2  Federalism and international economic policy in Nigeria (1960 – 1966) 
The Constitutional framework 
On the broad subject matter of foreign affairs, the 1960 and 1963 constitutions gave 
the FG a lead role.
12
 Foreign affairs were under the Exclusive Legislative List (ELL) 
as the prerogative of the FG.
13
 In the specific context of trade and commerce, the FG 
had overall responsibility.
14
 However, the constitutional provisions which gave the 
FG a lead role also indicated a significant role for the regions in Nigeria’s 
international economic interactions. For example, the principal section which 
conferred legislative power on the FG for trade and commerce was section 71 of the 
1960 Constitution (later renumbered as s 77 of the 1963 Constitution).
15
 It provided 
that: 
(1) Parliament may make laws for Nigeria or any part thereof with 
respect to trade and commerce between Nigeria and other countries and 
trade and commerce among the  territories, including (without prejudice 
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to the generality of the foregoing power) the export of commodities from 
Nigeria, the import of commodities into Nigeria,
16
 the establishment and 
enforcement of grades and standards of quality for commodities to be 
exported from Nigeria
17
 and the preservation of freedom of trade and 
commerce among the territories
18
  
(2) For the purposes of this section, Parliament may- 
(a) confer on any person or authority exclusive power to acquire from a 
purchasing authority established for a Region by the legislature of that 
Region any commodity for export from Nigeria, to export any commodity 
from Nigeria or to sell any commodity outside Nigeria;
19
 or 
(b) Make provision for the inspection of commodities to be exported from 
Nigeria at the port of shipment from Nigeria and for the enforcement of 
grades and standards of quality in respect of commodities so inspected.
20
  
(3) The powers conferred upon Parliament by this section shall not 
include powers- 
(a) To establish a purchasing authority for a Region; 
(b) To confer on any person or authority power to acquire in a Region 
any commodity for export from Nigeria from any person or authority in 
that Region other than a purchasing authority established for that Region 
by the legislature of a Region;
21
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(c) To regulate the prices to be paid by a purchasing authority 
established by the legislature of a Region for commodities for export;
22
  
(d) To regulate or prohibit in a Region any processing of a commodity to 
be exported or any dealing with such a commodity other than its export 
from Nigeria; 
23
or  
(e) To make provision for the enforcement in a Region of any grades or 
standards of quality for commodities to be exported from Nigeria that 
may be established by Parliament.
24
  
(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed as precluding the 
legislature of a Region- 
(a) From making provision for any of the matters referred to in 
subsection (3) of this section;
25
 or 
(b) From conferring upon any purchasing authority of the Region power 
to acquire any commodity in the Region for purposes other than export 
from Nigeria
26
  
(5) In this section "purchasing authority' means, in relation to a Region, 
any person or authority empowered to purchase commodities for export 
in that Region.
27
 
From the foregoing provision, the following inferences can be made about the 
allocation of powers regarding international economic participation in Nigeria under 
the 1960 and 1963 constitutions. First, by virtue of s 77 (1), Parliament (FG) at the 
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central level was only exclusively responsible for the actual process of export and 
import and not the processes in-between.
28
 Although item 10 of the ELL provided 
that the FG was responsible for custom and excise duties,
29
 s 77 (3) showed the 
limitations on the FG to dictate how the regions handled matters relating to the 
procurement of commodities for export from the producers, the processing of the 
commodities for export and the setting of price on the goods purchased from the 
producers. In essence, the regions had responsibilities for the processes before final 
export of commodities from Nigeria.
30
 S 77 (2) (a) supports this interpretation 
because it provides that Parliament could only appoint an authority or person to 
acquire goods from the regional bodies (purchasing authorities) for the purpose of 
export.
31
 Also, s 77 (2) (b) provided that parliament could only make provision for 
the inspection of commodities to be exported from Nigeria at the port of shipment 
from Nigeria.
32
  
Parliament was also responsible for legislating on matters relating to standards and 
quality of commodities to be exported from Nigeria. However, the regions were 
responsible for enforcing the legislation on standards and quality made by 
Parliament.
33
 This interpretation is supported by the provision in s 77 (2) (b) 
discussed above.
34
 As such, the regions were responsible for enforcement of 
legislation on standards made by Parliament prior to the commodities reaching the 
port for shipment. This interpretation is also supported by the combined effect of s 77 
(3) and (4) which provided that the FG could not make provision for the 
enforcement in a Region of any grades or standards of quality for commodities 
to be exported from Nigeria which it (Parliament) had enacted and that a regional 
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parliament was not precluded from making laws in relation to any matter in s 77 (3) 
(which includes standards in s 77 (3) (e)).  
A summary of the first and second inferences made above is that every process other 
than export was within the prerogative of the regions to legislate on. The regions had 
power to make laws which empowered their purchasing authorities to carry out 
processes related to international trade and commerce; except inspection at the port 
before export and the actual export.
35
  In essence, the FG did not have powers to 
control how the regions legislated on matters including: enforcement of standards 
which they (Parliament enacted),
36
 processing of commodities for export,
37
 
establishment of purchasing authorities
38
 and regulation of price to be paid by 
purchasing authorities for commodities from the producers.
39
 
A third inference deducible from s 77 is that the FG was solely responsible for 
interstate trade and commerce amongst regions. For example, item 22 of the ELL 
gave the FG powers to control inter regional water ways and item 20 gave the FG the 
powers to control insurance entered into by regions which had trans-boundary 
effects. In effect, the regions could only carry out policy action which operated 
exclusively within the region.  
From the foregoing analysis, it is argued that the regions exercised considerable 
autonomy and shared responsibility with the FG on matters of international trade and 
commerce during the 1960 – 1966 period of civilian rule. There were other 
provisions in the 1960 and 1963 Constitutions which support this argument. For 
example, the regions had the powers to open representative offices in London.
40
 
                                                 
35
 See s 77 (4) (a) and (b).  
36
 See s 77 (3) (e) (n 35). 
37
  S 77 (3) (d) (n 23). 
38
  S 77 (5) and s 77 (2) (b). 
39
  S 77 (3) (c) (n 22). 
40
 See s 66 (s 64 for the Mid- West Region) of the separate constitutions of the regions which gave the 
Governors of the regions powers to appoint Agent Generals for the UK offices. See also Gambari (n 
14)115ff, 123. 
106 
 
These missions were headed by 'Agents General'.
41
 These representatives of the 
regions ‘pursued the economic, educational, and cultural interests of the various 
regions, such as the administration of scholarships and the attraction of foreign 
investment.’42  
During the first republic, the regions had powers by virtue of s 74 of the 1963 
Constitution to influence the ratification of treaties entered into by the FG.
43
 The 
section provided inter alia that no treaty or international agreement entered into by 
the FG could have effect in the regions until the Governor of the region had 
consented to its operation.
44
 At this point in the development of international law, 
SFGs were not recognised as stakeholders in the negotiation of international 
treaties.
45
 Thus, this provision was presumably inserted to safe-guard the 
contributions of SFGs in the treaty making process of federal systems.
46
 Gambari, 
commenting on the effect of this particular provision under the 1963 Constitution, 
argued that during this period the Nigerian state was polarised along ethnic and 
religious lines and as such, ‘It was clearly possible for implementation of a treaty in a 
region to be held up by the governor's refusal to grant consent due to any of the 
aforementioned differences [ethnic and religious difference].’47 He further argued 
that this provision held the door ajar for regional participation in foreign affairs 
because even though the FG:  
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[c]ontrolled the key instruments and agencies for formulating and 
executing foreign policy such as the foreign ministry and overseas 
diplomatic missions, regional governments were allowed to maintain 
quasi-diplomatic offices to represent their interests in the United 
Kingdom.
48
  
Accessing capital from the international scene was another area where the regions 
exercised some level of autonomy during the first republic.
49
 Gambari, Oyediran and 
Akindele point out that during this period, ‘The regions could negotiate and obtain 
foreign loans and technical assistance without the knowledge and approval of the 
national government.’50 However, these loans where restricted only to loans for 
periods not exceeding 12 months on the assets of the regions.
51
 Furthermore, 
although external affairs were under the ELL, the regions capitalised on the freedom 
given to them under the Concurrent Legislative List (CLL) of the 1960 and 1963 
constitutions to propagate foreign policy which had direct and indirect impact on 
international economic relations. For example, Arms and Ammunition, Bankruptcy 
and Insolvency, Census, Commercial and Industrial Monopolies, Combines and 
Trusts, Higher Education, Industrial Development, the Regulation of Professions, 
Maintaining and Securing of Public Safety and Public Order, Registration of 
Business Names and Statistics fell under the CLL and were utilised by the regions to 
propagate policy which directly or indirectly affected foreign relations.
52
  
On some occasions the policies adopted by the regions were at variance with the 
policy direction of the federal government.
53
 Akindele and Oyediran illustrate this 
point with an example of schisms which occurred during the first republic; when the 
western and eastern regions established economic and cultural ties with Israel to the 
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displeasure of the FG which was anti-Israel, because it was controlled by the 
northern region.
54
 
The Institutional framework 
During the first Republic, international economic relations was subsumed under the 
broader framework for foreign policy.
55
  Inamete is of the view that foreign policy 
(including foreign economic policy) was generally controlled by the FG during the 
first republic. The general structure of foreign policy (including foreign economic 
policy) during the first republic according to Inamete is expressed hereunder: 
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Figure 2 Foreign Policy Decision-Making in Nigeria (1960 – 1966) Source: Inamete 2001. 
This diagrammatic representation by Inamete captures the broader context within 
which foreign economic policy was situated during the first republic. However, it 
does not take cognisance of the role played by the regional governments in the 
process during this era. Although Inamete talks about the role of the regions in 
foreign policy during the first republic, he limits it only to the ability of the regions to 
open representative offices abroad.
56
 However, the analysis in the previous section of 
the constitutional provisions under the 1960/63 constitutions demonstrates that the 
role of the regions in Nigeria’s foreign policy was not solely restricted to the opening 
of representative offices abroad. Hence, Inamete’s structure does not adequately 
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capture the arrangement as it then was. More specific to foreign economic policy and 
in the context of the contribution of the regions to the process of international trade 
and commerce during this era, it is argued that Inamete’s structure represented above 
could be modified thus: 
   
Figure 3: Modified Foreign Policy Decision-making in Nigeria (1960-1966) 
Source: Inamete 2001. 
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It was pointed out in the analysis in the previous section that the competence for 
conducting external relations and specifically international economic relations was 
shared between the FG and the regions. As such, the institutions responsible for 
Nigeria’s international economic relations during the first republic can be broadly 
categorised into two levels – federal and regional.  
Federal level 
Nigeria operated a parliamentary system of government from 1960 – 1966 and as a 
consequence; the government at the FG level was structured along the lines of 
overlapping responsibilities between the Executive and Parliament.
57
 The Executive 
comprised the President, the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers,
58
 while 
Parliament consisted of the President, a Senate and a House of Representatives.
59
 
The Federal Parliament had powers to make laws for the good governance of 
Nigeria.
60
 In the area of trade and commerce, it was discussed in the previous section 
that Parliament had powers relating to subject matters such as export and import, 
standards etc. However, their powers in this regard where not exclusive as s 77 
demonstrates that the regions also shared some of the responsibilities. Inamete points 
out that the fact that Parliament did not have a committee which had oversight 
functions over foreign policy during the first republic is evidence of the limited role 
of the Federal Parliament in this regard.
61
  
In regard to the role of the Federal Executive in international economic policy, s 84 
provided for allocation of portfolios to Ministers. As such the President, acting in 
accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister, could assign to the Ministers of the 
Government of the Federation responsibility for any business including the 
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administration of any department of government.
62
 The portfolios which centred on 
international economic relations included the foreign ministry which was responsible 
for external affairs,
63
 the ministries of commerce and industry, finance, and 
economic development.
64
 The ministry of commerce and industry had strong 
formalised links with the ministry of external affairs. For example, officials of the 
ministry of commerce and industry were seconded to work with external affairs.
65
 
Although the ministry of foreign affairs was the lead ministry in relation to foreign 
policy, these other ministries played a part in Nigeria’s international economic 
relations during the first republic.
66
 For example, the ministries of finance and 
commerce and industry directly advised the Ministers-in-Council on measures to 
promote investment in Nigeria (e.g. tariff protection, tax holidays and import duty 
relief).
67
 
Regional level 
At the regional level, there was a similar political structure to that of the FG. There 
was a measure of overlap between the executive (Governor, Premier and the Cabinet 
Ministers) and the regional Parliament.
68
  
In regard to foreign policy, the most conspicuous foreign affairs institution of the 
regions was the Agents General office. These offices in the UK undertook some 
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aspects of the region’s trade objectives such as trade promotion.69 In addition to the 
Agents – General office, the regional government was able to implement 
international economic related policy in several ways. For example, the regional 
parliaments were responsible for passing legislation on issues relating to enforcement 
of standards set by Parliament;
70
 local mobilisation, sensitisation and training on the 
processing of commodities for export.
71
 The regional executive (including the 
regional ministries of commerce and industry) was responsible for the establishment 
of purchasing authorities
72
 and the regulation of the price to be paid by these 
authorities for commodities purchased from the producers at source.
73
 They also 
implemented the legislation on standards and quality passed by Parliament.   
During this era, there was evidence of cooperation between the FG and regions on 
international economic issues. For example, the National Economic Council was a 
forum for FG-regional cooperation on economic and development policies. There 
was equal representation from both levels of government. The council met once a 
year but there were sub-committees which met more frequently.
74
  
4.3 The Period of Military Interregna. 
During the first republic, Nigeria experienced a number of political upheavals which 
destabilised the civilian government and cumulated in a military takeover in January, 
1966. The most notable conflict which eventually led to the first coup d’état in 
Nigeria was the western regional crisis which started in 1962.
75
 This was the 
beginning of the military intervention in Nigerian politics which continued 
intermittently from 1966 to 1979 and then again from 1983 – 1999. During the years 
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of military rule in Nigeria, three military governments succeeded each other during 
the first spell from 1966 to 1979 and four military governments ruled Nigeria 
between 1983 and 1999. 
4.3.1 The Constitutional framework 
The legal framework during the periods of military rule in Nigeria was formal but 
unconstitutional. It was formal because the military administration had a structured 
legal order which operated through the promulgation of decrees at the centre and 
edicts at the state level. It was however unconstitutional because it was undemocratic 
and sometimes arbitrary. Some significant decrees which were introduced between 
1966 and 1999 include Decree No 1 of 1966 which was used by the Ironsi 
administration to suspend the 1963 Republican Constitution. Also, the Ironsi 
administration was responsible for disbanding the Agents – General offices which 
the regions operated during the first republic.
76
 The Gowon administration 
maintained this status quo and further entrenched the central command by the 
military government by promulgating the Federal Military Government (Supremacy 
and Enforcement of Powers) Decree 28 of 1970.
77
 This Decree was introduced in 
response to a judicial decision in the celebrated case of Lakanmi & Kikelomo Ola v 
Attorney-General (Western State) & Others
78
 where a military decree was held to be 
invalid for the first time during the military era. However, Decree No 28 ‘asserted 
that the first and second military coups were revolutions that altered the legal orders 
preceding them.’79 This action consolidated the supremacy of military decrees over 
the Nigerian constitution during this era.
80
 
The significance of the broad powers wielded by the central command was expressed 
in the general context of foreign policy. The military administrations which ruled 
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Nigeria for 28 years cumulatively had unfettered powers to negotiate, sign and 
implement international agreements on behalf of Nigeria without requiring 
ratification from the SFGs.
81
 This was in sharp contrast to the role which SFGs 
(regions) had in the first republic. During the military era, the SFGs only enjoyed 
some level of safeguard under the Gowon administration by virtue of the fact that the 
state military governors were members of the Supreme Military Council (SMC); this 
was later reversed under the Muhammad/Obasanjo administration.
82
 In spite of the 
involvement of SFGs in the SMC under the Gowon administration, it is still doubtful 
if their input into Nigeria’s foreign policy was significant. This is because the nature 
of military hierarchy made it rare for SFGs to challenge the central command.
83
 Even 
if the state administrators had a voice in the SMC, there was no apparatus within 
SFGs which made it possible for them to have any impact on the international scene 
as was the case during the first republic. The implication of a centralised hierarchy 
system on distribution of competences for foreign policy was that SFGs were 
relegated to the background.  
In the context of SFGs and foreign policy, the Obasanjo administration set up the 
Adedeji committee in 1975 to carry out a comprehensive review of Nigeria’s foreign 
policy.
84
 Gambari points out that ‘The Adedeji Committee did not recommend or 
foresee a formal role for SFGs in foreign affairs. Perhaps this was in keeping with 
constitutional provisions or the prevailing tendencies of the time, but it was clearly a 
significant omission.’85 It is argued that the omission of SFGs from the foreign 
policy arena by the Adedeji committee was a reflection of the military’s preference 
for a centralised command system. More importantly, it marked a turning point 
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which culminated in the centralisation of the structures for foreign policy in Nigeria 
which has formally persisted till now.
86
 
4.3.2 Institutional Framework. 
The institutional framework during the military rule was structured in line with the 
centralised command system operated by the military. Major foreign policy decisions 
were determined by the central command (the SMC).
87
 More so, each military 
administration during each era had the Head of State as a prominent propagator of 
Nigeria’s foreign policy objectives.88  
Under each military administration, the SMC and the Federal Executive Council 
(FEC) were the highest levels of government involved in the making of foreign 
policy in Nigeria. According to Inamete, the FEC handled foreign policy issues 
which ‘required the coordination of policy design, development, implementation and 
evaluation, by various ministries—e.g. national security, immigration, international 
border disputes and international trade issues.’89 However, ‘The FEC was clearly 
subordinated to the SMC. As the highest decision-making body, the SMC could 
change, or nullify, any FEC decision.’90 
In regard to international economic relations, the institutional framework in place 
during each successive regime was concentrated at the federal level. The federal 
ministries which played a lead role in Nigeria’s international economic interactions 
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during military rule included the ministries of finance, economic development, trade, 
and industry.
91
 Each of these ministries reported to the FEC and/or the SMC.  
Each administration had military governors at the state levels. The governors also 
had a cabinet which was manned by commissioners appointed by the military 
governor. There were trade related ministries at the state level; however they did not 
exercise similar powers to that of the civilian administration of the first republic. The 
military administrations at the state level were confined to handling domestic matters 
within their jurisdictions. As such, the involvement of SFGs in foreign policy were 
little or non-existent at this point in Nigeria’s history.92  
There are arguments in support of a proposition that the periods of military rule in 
Nigeria did not abrogate the existence of a federal system in Nigeria. Those in 
support of this position include Gambari, Akindele and Oyediran who argue that 
military rule did not totally abrogate the practice of federalism in Nigeria, but only 
hampered its proper functioning.
93
 The views in this thesis do not align with this 
interpretation of the historical account because the retention by the military 
government of SFGs headed by junior ranking military officials does not suffice to 
make the system of government in place during this period federal.
94
 For example, 
during each era of military rule the Constitution was suspended and successive 
military governments adopted a unified and hierarchical command system. This 
brings into question the validity of claims asserting a continued existence of a federal 
system in Nigeria under military rule. 
                                                 
91
 Inamete (2001) (n 87). 
92
 Gambari is of the view that military administrations in Nigeria have had a better record of checking 
state forays into foreign affairs than have civilian governments Gambari (n 86) 122-124. 
93
 Akindele and Oyediran (n 77) 603. See also Oyovbaire, who argues that military rule was 
compatible with federalism in Nigeria Sam E Oyovbaire (ed), Federalism in Nigeria: A Study of the 
Development of the Nigerian State (Macmillan 1983) 273 cited in Dele Olowu, ‘The Literature on 
Nigerian Federalism: A Critical Appraisal’ (1991) 21 (4) Publius 151, 159. Those in support of the 
counter position that federalism ceased to exist in Nigeria during the military era include AO Phillips, 
‘Fiscal Goals and the Revenue Allocation System’ in Dele Olowu (ed), The Nigerian Federal System: 
Administrative Problems under Civilian and Military Governments (FACS Publications 1991). Philips 
is of the view that federalism died in Nigeria with the emergence of military rule in 1966. See also G 
Williams (ed), State and Society in Nigeria (Afrografika 1980) 100. Williams argued that military rule 
turned Nigeria into a unitary country in federal disguise. 
94
 During the Gowon era, the regions were renamed states and Nigeria now comprised of 12 states. It 
later became 19 during this period under consideration. 
118 
 
In the context of foreign policy (including international economic interactions), the 
centralised command system of military rule determined the distribution of powers in 
this regard. The structure of foreign policy during each military administration was 
similar in that little room was allowed for SFGs to express themselves on the 
international scene.
95
  
4.4 The Constitutional and Institutional Dimension of Nigeria’s 
International Economic Relations Framework (1979 – 1983). 
In 1979, the Obasanjo administration paved the way for a return to civilian rule in 
Nigeria. Nigeria departed from the parliamentary system of government operated 
during the first republic and adopted a presidential system of government built on the 
US model.
96
 The military handed over to a civilian elected president – Shehu 
Shagari. A new constitution was adopted for Nigeria in 1979 which restored the 
federal system of government.
97
 The Shagari administration was in office till 
December, 1983 when the military took over power in a military coup d’état.  
As a result of the striking similarities between the constitutional and institutional 
provisions during this era and the subsequent fourth republic, the discussions in this 
section will be brief. The significant point to note from this era is that the 
constitutional framework for foreign policy in Nigeria under the 1979 constitution 
gave the FG wide ranging powers to control Nigeria’s foreign policy. Akindele and 
Oyediran point out that:  
There is abundant evidence in the record of the Constitution Drafting 
Committee and in the provisions of the 1979 constitution itself of the 
determination of the authors of the constitution to make the federal 
government the sole Nigerian actor and spokesman in international 
affairs.
98
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The constitution achieved this objective by ensuring that the external affairs 
competence of the FG encompassed all the areas where SFGs had been active 
in the foreign scene during the first republic. The legislative competence of the 
FG was extended to cover all aspects of: 
…trade representation; external affairs; implementation of treaties 
relating to matters on the exclusive legislative list, trade and commerce 
between Nigeria and other countries, and borrowing of moneys within or 
outside Nigeria for the purposes of the federation or of any state.
99
  
Other areas which were formerly within the competence of SFGs which were now 
exclusively reserved for the FG included: the powers to setup purchasing authorities, 
inspection of commodities, standards and control of prices for commodities.
100
 The 
only aspect of sub-national participation in foreign policy which was carried over 
from the 1963 constitution was the safe-guard requirement which was retained under 
s 12 of the 1979 constitution.
101
  
4.5 The Constitutional and Institutional Dimension of Nigeria’s 
International Economic Policy Framework (1999 – 2013). 
4.5.1 Developments in the Nigerian Federal System (1999 – 2013). 
Nigeria returned to civilian rule on May 29, 1999. General Obasanjo (now retired) 
became the first civilian elected President of the fourth republic. In this dispensation 
of civilian rule, Nigeria was under the leadership of President Obasanjo from 1999 to 
2007. President Umaru Yar’ Dua took over in 2007 and was in office till 2010 when 
he died due to terminal illness. His Vice President – Goodluck Jonathan took over 
office and completed the late Yar’ Dua’s first term in 2011. He was re-elected in 
2011 and will complete his own first term in 2015.   
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A new constitution which was drafted during Abacha’s military rule was enacted as 
the Nigerian 1999 Constitution.
102
 The constitution restored a federal system of 
government to Nigeria and retained the presidential style of the second republic. 
Nigeria comprised three recognised levels of government (the FG, 36 states and local 
governments).  
In 2003, the Obasanjo administration introduced a midterm economic development 
strategy themed National Empowerment and Economic Development Strategy 
(NEEDS) to run from 2003 to 2007.  NEEDS was targeted towards poverty 
alleviation, employment generation, reorienting values and wealth creation.
103
 This 
development agenda was also premised on a ‘vision of a Nigeria with a new set of 
values and principles, which will facilitate the achievements of national goals of 
wealth creation, employment generation and poverty reduction.’104 
With respect to Nigeria’s trade policy, NEEDS sought to achieve predictability in 
Nigeria’s trade policy regime and also to improve Nigeria’s regional integration so as 
to serve as a stepping stone to global integration.
105
 A state level framework - 
SEEDS (State Economic Empowerment and Development Strategies) was also 
introduced by the 36 states in Nigeria. NEEDS and SEEDS were meant to be 
complementary in Nigeria’s development agenda.106 The relevance of this 
development agenda in the context of this investigation is because its central focus 
was on institutional reforms which included: Public sector reforms, Privatization and 
liberalization, Governance, Transparency and anticorruption as well as service 
delivery by government agencies.
107
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At the inception of NEEDS and SEEDS in 2003, the FG claimed that: NEEDS was 
designed to fashion for Nigeria a common ground for all economic agents to 
interplay, in a healthy and sustainable manner. The NEEDS and SEEDS were 
intended to be complementary so as to coordinate a planning framework with agreed 
common priorities between the FG and SFGs. A significant aspect of the 
development agenda was the adoption of a standard strategic planning cycle used in 
many governments and business organisations around the world.
108
 The five steps of 
the cycle were: 1) Setting Targets, 2) Developing Strategies, 3) Planning and 
Allocating Resources, 4) Implementation and 5) Monitoring and Evaluation.
109
  
On face value, the ideals and vision of the NEEDS/SEEDS agenda point towards a 
robust framework for achieving an appropriate level of cooperation between the FG 
and states on issues of economic importance. However, it is not clear to see if this 
elaborate agenda achieved its anticipated targets. More so, this thesis is particularly 
concerned about the constitutional dimension which is needed to achieve true federal 
ideals in Nigeria’s general development agenda and her international economic 
interactions in particular. Hence, this agenda will be critiqued in section 4.7 where 
the system in Nigeria will be evaluated in line with working criteria adopted from the 
similar development strategies adopted in the NEEDS/SEEDS. 
Yar’Adua took over from Obasanjo in 2007 and immediately introduced a Seven 
Point Agenda to compliment the NEEDS strategy of the previous administration. 
This complimentary development agenda streamlined the priorities of the Yar’Adua 
government to issues such as power generation, health, education, communication, 
transport, agriculture and security.
110
  
In this current dispensation of civilian rule, Nigeria has undergone two Trade Policy 
Reviews with the WTO in 2005 and 2011.
111
 In the regard to the institutional 
framework for Nigeria’s trade policy regime, both reports identified that 
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predictability in Nigeria’s trade regime was yet to be actualised.112 During this 
period, Nigeria’s trade policy was hinged on the desire to improve the efficiency of 
her trade and trade related institutions. Reforms have been carried out in the banking 
sector and the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) sector.
113
 
Under the fourth republic, the 1999 Constitution and the Nigerian Trade Policy 
Document (NTPD) 2002 are the key documents which provide the constitutional and 
institutional framework for international economic policy in Nigeria.
114
 
4.5.2  Constitutional framework.  
The 1999 Constitution maintained the central dominance of the FG in foreign policy 
which was inherited from the 1979 Constitution and the years of military rule.  
The provisions of the 1999 Constitution which entrench central exclusivity in 
Nigeria’s international economic regime include: Item 62 of the ELL which provides 
for ‘Trade and commerce, and in particular - (a) trade and commerce between 
Nigeria and other countries including import of commodities into and export of 
commodities from Nigeria, and trade and commerce between the states;…’ Other 
Items in the ELL which give the FG plenary powers on matters of international 
economic relations include: Item 20 which empowers the FG to send and receive 
diplomatic, consular and trade representation; Item 26 which provides that external 
affairs is within the competency of the FG; and Item 31 which provides for the FG’s 
powers to implement treaties relating to matters on the ELL.
115
 Some other ancillary 
Items which consolidate the powers of the FG in relation to international economic 
relations include Item 39 which puts the FG in charge of mines and minerals, 
including oil fields, oil mining, geological surveys and natural gas. Also, s 16 of the 
1999 Constitution (Fundamental Objectives of State Policy) identifies the national 
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economy including external economic relations as an objective of the Nigerian State 
to be discharged by the FG.   
4.5.3  Institutional Framework. 
The Nigerian Trade Policy Document (NTPD) sets out the institutional framework 
for international trade and commerce in Nigeria during the fourth republic. In the 
context of international economic interactions, one of Nigeria’s trade policy 
objectives under the NTPD is to ensure: ‘effective participation in trade negotiations 
to enhance the achievement of national economic gains in the multilateral trading 
system, as well as regional and bilateral arrangements…’116 
The NTPD consolidates the position of the FG as the primary institution responsible 
for international economic policy in Nigeria. For example, under the institutional 
framework contained in the NTPD, the FEC headed by the President is the highest 
decision making organ on matters of foreign economic policy. In the context of 
international trade, commerce and investment, the NTPD gives the Federal Ministry 
of Commerce and Industry (now renamed Federal Ministry of Trade and Investment 
(FMTI)) the overall responsibility for coordinating trade policy formulation in 
Nigeria.
117
 The Ministry is responsible for coordinating the activities of three other 
principal organs responsible for decision making on trade related issues. These 
organs are the FEC, the National Council of State (NCS) and the National Assembly 
(NA).
118
 However, trade policy ratification ultimately rests with the FEC. Other 
organisations that offer policy inputs include Federal Ministry of Finance (FMF), 
Federal Ministry of Industries (FMI), the Nigeria Customs Service and the Central 
Bank of Nigeria.
119
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Within the federal level of government, policy may be initiated at the ministry level 
mainly by the FMTI or FMI. In addition to these principal organs there exist some 
other committees and boards which have an advisory role in relation to trade related 
issues. For example there is the Tariff Review Committee/Board, which reviews all 
request and issues relating to tariffs. There is also the National Focal Point on 
Multilateral Trading Matters; the Export Strategy Committee; and the Committee on 
Export, Import, Free Trade Zone, Freeport and Procurement Policies which meets on 
ad-hoc basis. 
The National Council on Commerce (NCC) – which is the highest body/council 
where trade policy issues are taken – is the forum of expression for SFGs and non-
state actors such as the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN), Nigerian 
Association of Small Scale Industry (NASSI) and Nigerian Association of Chambers, 
Industry, Mines and Agriculture (NACCIMA) etc. Their contributions within this 
forum are in the forms of dialogue and policy decisions which are institutionalised 
through feedback mechanisms. These include reports back to the council on a yearly 
basis as reports of implemented trade decisions.
120
  
From interviews and the NTPD, the objectives of the NCC can be summarised as 
follows:  
• The NCC is a soft law mechanism for incorporating the views of all 
stakeholders (including SFGs) on issues of trade and commerce; 
• The NCC is a knowledge sharing forum which is meant to serve as an avenue 
for the central government to obtain views and opinions from stakeholders on 
what Nigeria’s international economic policy direction should be; 
• The NCC is an avenue for the central government to keep stakeholders 
abreast of the policy direction which the FG is constitutionally empowered to 
handle, make laws and/or sign agreements on; and 
• The process is more reflective, informative and reactionary rather than 
proactive. 
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It was identified during the field trip to Nigeria that the NCC is the most significant 
forum for SFGs to participate in Nigeria’s international economic interactions. 
However, the extent to which it is an effective reflection of the level of SFGs 
participation is in doubt. For example in Figure 4 below, the NCC is conspicuously 
omitted from the diagrammatic structure of Nigeria’s trade policy regime under the 
NTPD. This is an indication of its negligible ranking in the existing system.   
 
It has been identified that the original position after independence regarding 
international economic interaction was that of a shared competence between the FG 
and SFGs. The analysis above also demonstrates that the disruptions to the operation 
of federalism in Nigeria from 1966 upwards played a significant role in the deviation 
from the position obtainable during the first republic.  
Figure 4: International Trade Policy Structure in Nigeria 2002. Source: 
Nigerian Trade Policy Document 2002. 
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Up to this point, the analysis in this chapter has predominantly been explantory, 
outlining the historical evolution in the framework for Nigeria’s international 
economic relations from 1960 - 2013. More importantly, it has been outlined in this 
section how and why the system for international economic relations in Nigeria 
aligns with a central exclusivity model. It was identified in the analysis that there was 
a significant alteration of competence for international economic relations between 
1960 and present.  
In the next section of this chapter, the effectiveness or otherwise of the current 
centralised position will be discussed so as to establish the suitability of the extant 
constitutional and institutional framework for international economic participation in 
Nigeria.  
4.6 Assessment of the Effectiveness of the Extant Institutional Framework in 
Nigeria. 
To objectively assess the current framework for international economic participation 
in Nigeria, this chapter will adopt working criteria which encapsulate the minimum 
standard of what a country’s international trade framework should adhere to. The 
working criteria will be based on recommendations developed by international 
organisations such as the WTO, UNDP and OECD from their comprehensive studies 
on trade policy in developed and developing countries.  
There are other variables which have contributed to the overall functioning of 
international economic relations in Nigeria. For example, it was identified in the first 
part of this chapter one that there have been systemic issues such as lack of political 
continuity, over dependence on one resource base, corruption and political instability 
to mention a few. These issues have played a significant role in shaping the current 
system for international economic relations in Nigeria. However, the focus in this 
thesis is on the constitutional and institutional issues affecting the competence for 
international economic relations in Nigeria. 
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4.6.1 Elements of an Effective Policy Framework for Economic Relations. 
It is not possible to recommend a single policy framework or exhaustive criteria 
which are ideally suited for promoting effective economic relations for all countries 
and in all circumstances.
121
 The reasons being that: 
- Countries have different objectives which they seek to achieve from their 
participation in international economic interactions;  
- Countries within the international system are at different developmental 
stages; and 
-  Countries do not have the same endogenous constitutional configuration 
which facilitates and shapes their international economic interaction.  
However, international organisations such as the WTO, UNDP and OECD have 
undertaken studies and reviews on the patterns of economic policy in developing and 
developed countries alike, pointing to several features or arrangements which are 
regarded as a minimum requirement of an ideal policy framework. As such, these are 
recommended as a yardstick for measuring the effectiveness of a country’s regime.  
OECD 
In the context of developing countries, the OECD in 2001 recommended a set of 
Guidelines on Capacity Development for Trade in the New Global Context. The 
OECD advocated that foreign aid donors and the recipient developing countries 
should seek to construct trade policy frameworks based on the following elements: 
1. A coherent trade strategy that is closely integrated with a country’s overall 
development strategy. 
2. Effective mechanisms for consultation among three key sets of stakeholders: 
government, the enterprise sector and civil society. 
3. Effective mechanisms for intra-governmental policy co-ordination. 
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4. A strategy for the enhanced collection, dissemination and analysis of trade-
related information. 
5. Trade policy networks supported by indigenous research institutions. 
6. Networks of trade support institutions. 
7. Private sector linkages. 
8. A commitment by all key trade stakeholders to outward-oriented regional 
and global strategies.
122
 
The OECD also advocates that every trading nation should adopt a four-stage trade 
policy cycle -formulation, negotiation, implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation- to effectively interact in the international trade system.
123
  
The OECD in its 2006 report on the ideal elements of National Sustainable 
Development Strategies (NSDS) in OECD countries has also advocated that sub-
national governance structures have a role to play in developing a coherent NSDS 
policy.
124
 The OECD is of the view that ‘local and regional authorities should be 
fully involved in the development of national strategies with certain delivery aspects 
devolved to sub-national level.’125 The OECD further emphasises in this report that 
there is need for linkage between national and local structures in the development of 
NSDS.
126
 Although this recommendation originated within the sustainable 
development paradigm, it presents a useful parallel which is relevant to international 
trade. More so, environment and international commerce have become increasingly 
linked in a globalised era of international relations. Both subject matters are affected 
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by the trans-boundary considerations and interconnected issues which make it 
imperative that policies on these subject areas are developed in tandem. As such, a 
national strategy on sustainable development feeds into a national strategy on 
international economic relations and the OECD recommends SFGs as crucial 
stakeholders in this process.  
Furthermore, it was identified in the previous section of the chapter that some of the 
key development agendas (NEEDS and SEEDS) introduced in Nigeria during the 
fourth republic were fashioned according to a similar cycle based strategy advocated 
by the OECD.
127
 Therefore it is useful to consider the theoretical model relied on so 
as to compare the theory with its actual application in Nigeria.  The key themes 
within these recommendations above which are useful to the analysis in this chapter 
include the reference to: coherence, integration, consultation and co-ordination.  
 The UN (UNDP). 
The UN under the auspices of the UNDP has reiterated the need for similar qualities 
in an ideal trade policy framework. In its recommendations for trade policy capacity 
building in developing countries, the UNDP has advocated the engagement of all 
relevant stakeholders as a key factor for success. In a 2011 UNDP report on Trade 
and Human Development: A Practical Guide to Mainstreaming Trade,
128
 it is 
recommended that government entities at national and sub-national levels should be 
involved at some stage in the creation of trade and development policy.
129
 It also 
states that:  ‘Trade must be actively mainstreamed into every stage of the policy 
cycle, beginning with sound analysis, consultation and communication.’130What is 
instructive in this recommendation is the recognition of the participation of SFGs in 
the trade and development nexus and the emphasis on linkage between stakeholders. 
The analysis in section 4.7 will consider whether Nigeria’s international foreign 
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economic policy framework under the current dispensation has embraced these 
elements. 
The UNDP report also identifies some of the challenges militating against 
mainstreaming trade with development to include inter alia:  
- Shortcomings in stakeholder consultation and interdepartmental 
coordination 
- A political culture of limited participation which results in weak 
parliamentary processes.  
- The narrow involvement of the private sector, civil society and other 
stakeholders in trade policy formulation.  
- Poor accountability in trade negotiations and implementation of trade-related 
reforms. 
The UNDP also presents a typology of a trade policy cycle which is similar to the 
OECD’s model. The UNDP model has five stages. Stage one covers situation 
analysis and diagnostics; stage two outlines vision, strategic goals and priorities, 
defines the action plan and allocates resources; stage three manages trade 
negotiation; stage four focuses on implementing and monitoring the programme and 
stage five focuses on managing and using the evaluation.
131
  See Figure 5 below: 
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Trade and Development Policy Cycle Source: UNDP 2011. 
The importance of this trade cycle typology to this thesis is the consideration it gives 
to the link between development and trade policy.
132
 More importantly, it also 
identifies the place of SFGs as stakeholders in the process of broad consultations 
required for an effective trade policy cycle.
133
  
WTO  
The periodic review of the member states trade regimes by the Trade Policy Review 
Mechanism (TPRM) has become an important yardstick for measuring the adherence 
of member states to sound domestic economic policies and its impact on their ability 
to adhere to their commitments under WTO agreements. The TPRM is relevant to 
the analysis in this chapter because a fundamental element which informs the work 
of the TPRM is domestic transparency. In the specific context of institutional 
capacity of a trade regime, the TPRM is particular about stability and predictability 
in the constitutional and political framework of WTO member countries. The WTO 
encourages its members to adopt policies which meet these stipulations because they 
are believed to be beneficial not only to the member states under review, but also the 
trading partners of such member states and to the overall functioning of the 
multilateral trade system.
134
 This emphasis on stability and predictability will be 
considered in the subsequent analysis of Nigeria’s extant framework on international 
trade, commerce and investment.  
From the foregoing, key elements which will be adopted as working criteria for 
assessing Nigeria’s international foreign economic regime include:  
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Flexibility 
Flexibility is a reoccurring factor which can be deduced from the recommendations 
of the three organisations considered above. Flexibility in a literal sense can be 
defined as ‘The quality of bending easily without breaking, e.g. willingness to 
change or compromise.’135 Flexibility in a framework is characterised by 
accommodation of all relevant stakeholders through consultation, dialogue and 
compromise where necessary. In the context of international economic policy, 
flexibility has become imperative because of the crosscutting nature of international 
economic issues. For example, it is now clear that international trade intersects with 
issues such as the environment, human rights and human development. As a 
consequence, new actors are emerging in the international trade processes which 
were not traditionally recognised in international law. For example, the UNDP and 
OECD recommendations which advocate wide participation with relevant 
stakeholders in efforts to successfully mainstream trade with development objectives 
emphasise how difficult it is to achieve coherence and predictability in the absence of 
flexibility.  
Coherence/ Predictability 
Flowing from the above, it is argued that Coherence is another important element 
which is required in an ideal trade policy framework.  Coherence entails consistency 
in the overall policy direction of a trade regime. For example, the recommendations 
of the OECD, UNDP and the WTO emphasise the need for coherence between trade 
and national development strategies. More importantly they identify the need for 
wider participation and accommodation of all stakeholders to achieve coherence.  It 
can be inferred that predictability is a product of coherence in a trade regime. 
Predictability in the context of trade policy is the ability of potential trade partners 
and investors to foretell the effect of trade policies on their interaction within the 
trade framework of a given country. If there are inconsistencies in a trade regime, 
invariably predictability will be absent. 
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Transparency/ Accountability 
Transparency is achieved when there is openness and full participation between all 
stakeholders to the foreign policy formulation process. For example, the OECD 
recommends that in view of the global context of international trade, a commitment 
by all key trade stakeholders to outward-oriented regional and global strategies is 
required.
136
 This necessitates transparency and accountability amongst all 
stakeholders to the process. Any actor which has the ability to affect the trade policy 
process who is not accommodated into the trade policy process is less accountable 
for their actions and this has the potential to compromise the transparency of the 
overall process. This is a reason why the OECD and the UN emphasise the need for 
all government entities at national and sub-national levels to be involved at some 
stage in the creation of trade and development policy.
137
 It is also a reason why the 
WTO requires broad participation of all stakeholders such as consumer groups and 
local levels of government in the international trade regime of its member states.
138
 
In essence, the commitment of all stakeholders is necessary to achieve transparency 
and accountability in an ideal trade framework.  
Integration  
Finally, the need for ‘integration’ can be inferred from the recommendations of the 
OECD and the UNDP. Integration refers to inclusiveness in a framework. A trade 
regime must effectively combine the role of all the relevant stakeholders in order to 
achieve coherence. For example, the OECD, UNDP and the WTO recommend that 
on a policy level there is need for integration between a country’s trade and 
development strategy. On an institutional level they also advocate for an effective 
consultation mechanism among three key sets of stakeholders: the government 
(national and sub-national), the Organised Private Sector (OPS) and civil society. 
The WTO Trade Policy Review of Nigeria in 2011 reiterates this point.
139
 The report 
highlighted the improved consultation between the government and the OPS but 
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noted that there is still an exclusion of organisations which represent consumers and 
rural dwellers.
140
 It was recommended by the WTO that official agencies involved in 
the international trade process in Nigeria could improve their consultative processes 
and access to information and enhance trade policy development capacity.
141
 This 
highlights the importance of the role of SFGs for better integration of rural dwellers 
in Nigeria’s international economic interactions.142 
In the next section, these elements will be used to critique Nigeria’s international 
economic policy framework. The focus will be on the presence or absence of these 
ideals in Nigeria’s extant constitutional and institutional provisions for trade and 
commerce. 
4.7 A critique of the extant Constitutional and Institutional Framework for 
International Trade and Commerce in Nigeria. 
On the basis of the analysis above, it will be argued in this section that there are 
inconsistencies between Nigeria’s international economic policy directions and the 
requirements for full stakeholder participation under an ideal policy framework. It 
will be demonstrated in this section that the extant theory underpinning Nigeria’s 
international trade framework does not mirror the recommendations considered in 
the previous section. 
4.7.1 The Constitutional Deficiencies.  
1. The Mirage of ‘Safeguards’ for SFGs under s 12 of the 1999 Constitution  
Nigeria operates a dualist system for implementing international law.
143
 Under the 
dualist theory, international and domestic legal commitments exist on entirely 
separate planes and international treaties signed by dualist states do not have 
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domestic legal effect until they are incorporated into national law via the passage of 
parallel domestic legislation.
144
  In Nigeria, this is encapsulated under s 12 of the 
1999 Constitution.
145
 The section provides inter alia: ‘No treaty between the 
Federation and any other country shall have the force of law to the extent to which 
any such treaty has been enacted
146
 into law by the National Assembly…’147 and any 
such domesticated treaty ‘…shall not be enacted unless it is ratified148 by a majority 
of all the Houses of Assembly in the Federation.’149 The last limb of this section (s 
12 (3)) is presumably a safeguard intended to guarantee the participation of the SFGs 
and ensure that the FG has a check on its broad mandate for matters of international 
trade relations.
150
 However, there is no record of this section being utilised by SFGs 
since its introduction under the 1979 Constitution and so its practical benefit to SFGs 
is questionable.
151
 Furthermore, because the NA is made up of state representatives 
their interests are presumably considered to be catered for under s 12 (1) through the 
NA.
152
  
Relating this to the recommendations discussed in the previous section, the UNDP 
report stated that one of the challenges which can militate against mainstreaming 
trade with development is the presence of ‘A political culture of limited participation 
which results in weak parliamentary processes.’153 It is argued that this challenge is 
present in Nigeria’s international trade and development framework. This is 
evidenced by the disinterest and lack of understanding by SFGs of their 
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constitutional role in Nigeria’s international trade process. For example, during the 
interviews conducted in Nigeria, an interviewee stated that: 
It is private agencies which are involved in international trade not states 
per se. States do not control international trade issues constitutionally, so 
even if the Stakeholders Forum [the NCC] has more legal backing, it 
would not create any added leverage for states because states do not have 
a direct involvement in international trade; so asking for more powers or 
an improved role of SFGs under the consultative fora such as the NCC 
will not make any difference.
154
 
Further evidence of the disinterested stance of SFGs was expressed by another 
interviewee at the federal level in Abuja who stated that under the current review 
process of the 2002 trade policy document, drafts were sent to SFGs for their input 
and consideration but only 4 out of the 36 states responded accordingly. He was of 
the view that this may be because states do not consider issues relating to 
international trade of to be interest to them since the constitution excludes them from 
this area.
155
 
As was identified in section 1.4.5 of chapter one, there are other factors which can 
explain the reason for this disinterest by SFGs. For example, the lack of capacity or 
uneven distrubtion of economic wealth amongst SFGs makes it difficult for all SFGs 
to have the same leve of participation in Nigeria’s international economic 
interactions. In addition to these capacity deficiencies, it is argued that the existence 
of the mindset discussed in this section is indicative of a political culture of ‘limited 
participation’ which was identified by the UNDP as a factor militating against an 
effective trade policy framework. This mind-set discourages SFGs in Nigeria from 
utilising s 12 (3) of the 1999 Constitution as an avenue to contribute to and 
strengthen the parliamentary process relating to Nigeria’s international economic 
participation.   
                                                 
154
 Personal Interview with Mr Joel - State Director for Trade, Edo State Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry, July 2012. 
155
 Focus Group Discussion with Mr Bawa Lere Lawal – Deputy Director Trade; Mr Ezikpe Kalu – 
Assistant Director Trade, Mr Sunday Oghydi – Assistant Director, and Mr Abdul Hamid – Chief 
Commercial Officer at the Ministry of Trade and Investment Abuja, June 2012. (See comments of Mr 
Kalu). 
137 
 
2. The ‘Side–Doors’ being Exploited by SFGs to Circumvent the Constraints 
of the 1999 Constitution. 
Interestingly, although the constitutional restrictions on Nigerian SFGs identified in 
the previous section may discourage them from engaging in the constitutional 
process for Nigeria’s international economic interactions, in reality SFGs still have 
an effect on Nigeria’s international economic relations. This is because the 
exigencies of the current dispensation of international economic relations has 
exposed cracks and loopholes which are progressively being exploited by SFGs.  
The origin of this issue is rooted in the constitutional provisions of Items 18 and 30 
of the CLL. Item 18 provides that: ‘Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, a 
House of Assembly may make Laws for that state with respect to industrial, 
commercial or agricultural development of the state.’ This provision has been the 
catalyst for state governments such as Lagos, Akwa Ibom, Ondo etc., which have 
been active in the international scene. Chief among these front line states is Lagos. 
This is not surprising because Lagos is the industrial and commercial nerve centre of 
Nigeria.  
Since 1999, Lagos has attracted a significant amount of FDI into the state to achieve 
its development agenda. Interestingly, the rising profile of the state has attracted the 
attention of not only international private investors but also national governments. 
Between 2011 and 2013, the Lagos state Governor - Mr. Babatunde Fashola - has 
hosted trade delegates from sovereign nations comprising of high ranking officials of 
these countries. For example, in 2011, the British Prime Minister - David Cameron in 
his first official visit to Nigeria led a business delegation to Lagos state and shunned 
Abuja, the capital city.
156
 Also in 2012, the Lagos state governor received the British 
Deputy High Commissioner to Nigeria - Mr. Peter West and discussions centered on 
the improvement of economic relations between Lagos and the United Kingdom.
157
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He also received the Vice Minister, Foreign Trade of the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands - Mr. Simon Smits - in 2012 to discuss ways to tackle the challenges 
posed by infrastructure deficit and coastal erosion in Lagos state.
158
 Fashola also 
hosted the Russian Ambassador to Nigeria - Mr. Nickolay Udovichenko in 2013, 
with the Governor canvassing for mutual collaboration between Nigeria and Russia 
in the development of rail transportation.
159
  
As a result of the growing commercial and economic relations between Lagos and 
China, Lagos state recently introduced a policy which is of significant note. The 
Lagos state government in 2011 introduced the Mandarin language to the educational 
curriculum of its secondary schools. This policy is backed by the constitution 
because Item 30 of the CLL provides that:  
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs of this item shall be construed so as 
to limit the powers of a House of Assembly to make laws for the State 
with respect to technical, vocational, post-primary, primary or other 
forms of education, including the establishment of institutions for the 
pursuit of such education.
160
  
At face value this looks like a legitimate action carried out by Lagos state which has 
no foreign trade implication. But on closer analysis, it exposes an indirect means of 
promoting an economic agenda of the state. It is argued that the action of Lagos state 
is a subtle exploitation of a loophole in the constitution to foster its international 
economic relations with another sovereign nation.  This policy action points to a 
reoccurrence of what was obtainable during the first republic.  It is evident from the 
recent activities of Lagos that the use of constitutional side doors has re-emerged.   
It is the view in this thesis that there is a difference in these recent episodes of state 
expression in the international scene via constitutional side doors which can be 
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distinguished from the earlier episodes. As was identified by Akindele and Oyediran, 
the pre-occupation with ethnic allegiance and regional identities strongly influenced 
the character of the early Nigerian state. Thus, the constitutional ambivalence which 
made it possible for the regions to chart conflicting foreign policy objectives with the 
central government were attributable to regional politics and its impact on the 
dynamics of the Nigerian federalism. Although regional politics is not a thing of the 
past in the Nigerian federalism, it is argued that the current episode of states 
expressing themselves via side doors in the constitutional provisions is spurred on by 
the economic aspirations of SFGs and the fact that the current dispensation of 
international economic relations is very attractive and easily accessible to any SFG 
seeking to achieve economic and or political aims. In essence, even though the 
constitutional conditions under the 1960 and 1963 Constitutions were more 
conducive for active participation in foreign economic policy as against the 1979 and 
1999 Constitutions, the re- emergence of the use of side doors by SFGs is testament 
to the inability of the constitution to suppress states that are bent on expressing 
themselves on the international scene.  
These episodes raise a lot of questions about the recent contribution of SFGs in 
Nigeria to international economic relations. Although, most of the activities of Lagos 
state are taking on an international dimension, the constraints of the extant 
constitutional stance on foreign policy still makes their activities prima facie 
unconstitutional.  However, as Akindele and Oyediran aver: 
In the literature on federalism, there is an increasing awareness that the 
explanation for the vitality, decay, or death of a federal political 
arrangement is ultimately to be sought not in the dry bones of formal 
constitutional law but in the nature and character of the instrumentalities 
through which power is actually exercised in the political system.
161
 
Thus, the activities of Lagos state represent a significant manifestation of the 
changing realities of Nigeria’s international economic interactions. It could be 
explained as an inevitable occurrence in a globalised world economy and/or a 
welcome development in view of the contribution of these SFG activities to 
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economic growth and development in Nigeria.  However, it is clear that these 
occurrences are not yet reflected in the extant constitutional and institutional 
framework in place. 
These deficiencies mirror the lack of flexibility in the extant constitutional 
framework because the limitations on the constitutional powers of SFGs run contrary 
to the recommendations of the OECD and the UNDP which have recognised the 
importance of SFGs in the attainment of trade policy objectives. Also, the examples 
of constitutional limitations cited above demonstrate the lack of coherence within 
Nigeria’s international economic policy framework. The use of side-doors by SFGs 
is evidence that their constitutional exclusion has not deterred them from 
participating in Nigeria’s international economic relations but has given them leeway 
to resort to loopholes and grey areas in the constitution.  
This situation leaves room for conflicting policies between SFGs and the FG which 
hinders coherence and erodes the predictability of Nigeria’s trade regime. This 
constitutional restriction also affects transparency and accountability because the 
non-recognition of SFGs under international law gives them a unique role which can 
be either advantageous or disadvantageous. For example, an advantage of non-formal 
recognition is that SFGs can capitalise on a status as ‘sovereignty-free’ actors not 
constrained by the trappings of statehood. 
162
 according to Hocking, ‘By exploring 
the boundaries between the conventional but often misleading distinctions between 
state and non-state actors, they [SFGs] have been able to play a variety of roles in 
several political arenas.’163 The downside to this non-formal recognition of SFGs is 
the ability to escape accountability for their actions and also to erode the 
transparency of the overall trade process by engaging in policy action which runs 
counter to the policy direction of the FG. The probability of this disadvantage 
occurring in Nigeria is evident in the constitutional circumstances described above. 
The use of side-doors by states has the potential to increase because SFGs are keen to 
achieve their developmental objectives irrespective of their constitutional limitations. 
If they are allowed to continue in these circumstances, it is arguable that they will 
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constitute a hindrance to the attainment of transparency and accountability in 
Nigeria’s international economic regime. 
These constitutional restrictions also demonstrate the lack of integration 
(inclusiveness) of the extant international economic framework in Nigeria. In 2003, 
the FG emphasised its commitment to integrating the FG and SFGs in Nigeria’s 
development agenda under the NEEDS/SEEDS platform. However, it is argued that 
the constitutional framework under the 1999 Constitution does not provide a 
conducive environment for integration of ‘all’ stakeholders in the trade-development 
agenda. The fact that SFGs are limited to using loopholes to achieve their 
development agenda does not reflect a commitment by the FG to achieving a truly 
inclusive framework. 
In the next section it will be pointed out that the FG’s idea of achieving co-operation 
between the stakeholders was only tailored to accommodate the FG and the OPS. 
This is contrary to the recommendations of the OECD which advocates the full 
participation of the FG, SFGs and the OPS. 
4.7.2 The Institutional Deficiencies: A Critique of the Extant Institutional 
Linkage between SFGs and the FG  
The NTPD was introduced in 2002 with an objective of re-positioning Nigeria’s 
trade regime to take advantage of the changing global economic system.
164
 The 
NTPD was designed to disengage the government from business activities and 
empower the OPS to be the engine of Nigeria’s economic growth.165 However, a 
purview of the NTPD shows that it is not a realistic aim. Ogunkola and Bankole 
reiterate this view by pointing out inconsistencies between what is stated in the 
NTPD and what is actually obtainable in practice.
166
 Their study focused on the 
problems associated with Nigeria’s import prohibition policies and they summarised 
these issues and the failings of the NTPD in this regard thus: 
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Several lessons can be drawn from Nigeria’s import prohibition policy 
experience. Perhaps the most general of these is that the coherent and 
consistent pursuit of good trade policy requires not only a robust and 
appropriate domestic institutional framework and process for trade 
policy-making but also a supportive and institutionalized multilateral 
arrangement for trade policy surveillance. Weaknesses in both of these 
may be responsible, in varying degrees, for the persistence of Nigeria’s 
import prohibition policy. Nigeria’s internal trade policy surveillance 
mechanism consists largely of the domestic framework and trade policy-
making process, both articulated at length in the Trade Policy of Nigeria 
(Federal Ministry of Commerce 2002). However, the country’s actual 
trade policy-making deviates quite substantially from what this document 
stipulates. These deviations largely explain the lack of coherence 
between policy statements and policy actions; this probably also derives 
from the absence of local ownership of the trade liberalization policy 
which appears to have been induced by the World Bank-IMF supported 
structural adjustment programme.
167
 
In addition to these general flaws pointed out above, it is also noticeable that the 
reference to a re-positioning strategy in the NTPD 2002 does not take cognisance of 
all the dimensions of the said changes occurring in the global system.
168
 For 
example, the NTPD does not reflect the changing patterns in governance structures 
which are a distinct characteristic of the current multileveled global economic 
system. More specifically, the NTPD does take cognisance of the fact that the 
changing structure of global governance is not totally market driven but now 
encompasses a combination of both private market forces and institutional regulators 
(state and non-state alike).
169
  
From this perspective, it is argued that the extant institutional framework for trade 
policy in Nigeria is deficient because it is not flexible enough to accommodate SFGs 
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as a key component in the policy process. This lack of flexibility makes the extant 
framework incoherent because as was demonstrated with the examples in the 
previous section, Nigeria’s SFGs are growing in prominence on the international 
economic scene. Therefore, their exclusion from the institutional framework for 
international economic relations creates opportunities for inconsistent policies 
between them and the FG. It will also be demonstrated below from an analysis of the 
NTPD that the extant institutional framework is not inclusive because it excludes 
SFGs from key areas which are important for achieving coherence between trade and 
development objectives in Nigeria.  
Evidence to support these claims made above is found in the NTPD 2002. For 
example, section 2 of the NTPD provides for the ‘trade policy framework’.170 It 
states that the objective of Nigerian trade policy is to ‘encourage the production and 
distribution of goods and services to satisfy domestic and international markets; for 
the purpose of achieving and accelerating economic growth and development.’171 In 
order to achieve this objective, it is asserted that Nigeria’s trade policy ‘must be 
supported by domestic policies which foster innovation, predictability, 
transparency, rule of law and international competitiveness and should be 
implemented in a pragmatic and flexible manner.’172 However, Section 6.2 of the 
NTPD 2002 which provides for the ‘implementation strategy [action plan]’ in 
Nigeria’s international trade regime contradicts the objectives cited above.173  
From the criteria identified in section 4.6.1, it was pointed out that SFGs are 
important stakeholders for effectively linking trade and development objectives. In 
this regard, the NTPD deficient because the only subject matter on which SFGs are a 
designated implementation agency is on the acquisition of land.
174
 On every other 
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subject matter under the ‘action plan’, SFGs are excluded. For example under section 
6.2.1 of the NTPD 2002 (Policy Process):
175
 
(Table 1) Source: The NTPD, 2002 
SI
N 
IDENTIFIED 
PROBLEM 
RECOMMENDE
D SOLUTION/ 
IMPLEMENTATI
ON STRATEGY 
IMPLEMENTATI
ON TIME 
FRAME 
IMPLEMENTATI
ON 
AGENCY 
1. Conflicts that 
engender –  
misunderstand
ing and lack 
of cooperation 
among various 
agencies 
Reach out to all 
stakeholders all 
through the 
preparatory stages 
Short Term FG/OPS 
 
From Table 1 we see that SFGs are excluded as an implementation agency for the 
recommended solution. Based on the recommendations of the OECD and UNDP 
identified earlier, it is argued that SFGs ought to be included as an implementation 
agency.
176
  This is because conflicts and misunderstanding in the trade policy process 
referred to in Table 1 arise within SFGs as frequently as any of the other two 
designated implementation agencies. Therefore, consultation and linkage between 
national and local structures as recommended by the OECD and UNDP is vital in 
this regard. Furthermore, the exclusion of SFGs on this point contradicts the position 
adopted by the FG under the NEEDS/SEEDS development agenda of 2003; where it 
was claimed that the FG recognised the importance of intergovernmental cooperation 
and the location of policy implementation in the lower levels (i.e. states) of 
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government.
177
 From Table 1 we see that the FG’s idea of reaching out to ‘all 
stakeholders’ excludes SFGs. 
An interviewee in Edo state flagged up an example of the conflicts which could arise 
due to lack of cooperation between the FG and SFGs in relation to international 
trade. According to the interviewee, most of the ECOWAS protocols and agreements 
signed by Nigeria are done by consultation with technocrats within the ECOWAS 
commission and within the ENFP forum which excludes SFGs. He said that SFGs 
are not consulted on how these agreements affect them. He said that what are 
reported to the NCC are the decisions reached after deliberation stages at the 
ministerial or secretarial level. He said a consequence of this process is that 
ECOWAS rules are not operational and/or beneficial to trade actors within Nigeria. 
He gave the example that there is no free passage of goods for Nigerian traders in 
spite of the agreements signed. According to him, Nigerian traders are made to seek 
further certifications within each member state of ECOWAS. He was of the view that 
because some of the regional interactions in which Nigeria is involved have far 
reaching implications on trade actors located within SFGs, their involvement at the 
deliberation stages of these regional interactions would better place SFGs to discover 
problems at the grassroots; thereby facilitating the proper dissemination of 
information and advising potential exporters and those involved in the export chain. 
(Table 2) Source: The NTPD, 2002 
SI
N 
IDENTIFIE
D 
PROBLEM 
RECOMMENDED 
SOLUTION/ 
IMPLEMENTATI
ON STRATEGY 
IMPLEMENTATI
ON TIME FRAME 
IMPLEMENTATI
ON 
AGENCY 
1. Lack of 
stable 
environmen
t for long 
term policy 
Involve all agencies 
and stakeholders in 
the design of 
coherent 
appropriate policy 
framework/initiativ
Short Term FG/FMC/OPS/FMS
T 
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decisions 
 
es  
 
 
Table 2 above refers to the need for a stable environment when taking long term 
policy decisions.
178
 Once again, SFGs are excluded as a designated implementation 
agency. This contradicts the recommended working criteria discussed earlier which 
emphasises the importance of incorporating ‘all relevant stakeholders’ (government 
and private actors) in an ideal policy cycle.
179
 This also contradicts the recommended 
solution/implementation strategy stated above in Table 2 which claims to ‘involve 
all agencies and stakeholders in the design of coherent appropriate policy 
framework/initiatives.’180 It is difficult to imagine how coherence can be achieved if 
SFGs are not factored into any policy action recommended in Table 2.  
(Table 3) Source: The NTPD, 2002 
S/
N 
IDENTIFIED 
PROBLEM 
RECOMMENDED 
SOLUTION/ 
IMPLEMENTATI
ON STRATEGY 
IMPLEMENTATI
ON TIME FRAME 
IMPLEMENTATI
ON 
AGENCY 
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1. Need to 
strengthen 
national 
capacity in 
the 
formulation 
and 
implementati
on of the 
policies. 
Information system 
on trade control 
measures  (TCMIS 
and SMART) 
installed in micro-
computers for staff 
and exporters 
Short Term 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FG/FMC/OPS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Capacity building 
for officials and 
core groups of 
exporters; 
Short Term 
 
FG/FMC/OPS 
 
 
In the scenario in Table 3, SFGs are again excluded.
181
 The contradiction in their 
exclusion in this aspect of the policy process is that SFGs are the physical location 
where implementation of any multilateral or regional agreement occurs. Thus, the 
need to strengthen national capacity in the formulation and implementation of trade 
policies requires the input of SFGs. The role of the OPS in this regard is 
understandable as they are the primary actors in international trade. However, the 
exclusion of SFGs which have the closest physical proximity to the exporters is 
tantamount to denying the very existence of SFGs as the physical location for all 
trade process conducted in Nigeria.  
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Table 4 below which is the structure for export promotion under the NTPD gives 
more examples of shortcomings due to the exclusion of SFGs.
182
  
 (Table 4) Source: The NTPD, 2002 
SI
N 
IDENTIFIE
D 
PROBLEM 
RECOMMENDED 
SOLUTION/ 
IMPLEMENTATI
ON STRATEGY 
IMPLEMENTATI
ON TIME FRAME 
IMPLEMENTATI
ON 
AGENCY 
1. Lack of 
international 
standardisati
on of 
Nigerian 
products. 
 
Encourage products 
for export to be 
graded and 
disinfected and 
non-compliance to 
attract sanction 
Mutual 
international 
cooperation and 
recognition of 
certificates with 
our trading 
partners. 
Set up an inter-
ministerial, 
intergovernmental 
and inter agency 
committee to deal 
with the issue of 
trade 
barriers on the 
Short Term 
 
 
 
 
 
Short Term 
 
 
 
Short Term 
 
FG/FMC/OPS 
 
 
 
 
 
FPIS/SON/NAFD
AC 
 
 
FG/FMI/SON/FM
C 
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road; 
 
The issue of standardisation of goods for export was discussed in section 4.2.2.
183
 It 
also came up during the interview in Abuja. One of the questions put to the 
respondents was: 
Considering the growing complexity within the international trade regulatory 
environment – with the current tussle for prominence between multilateralism and 
regionalism, do you think that a centralised or a decentralised policy formulation 
structure is best suited to help Nigeria effectively achieve improved and meaningful 
participation in international trade? 
The 2nd Participant was of the view that a centralised system is better for Nigeria 
because SFGs would be unable to handle such responsibilities due to the fact that 
they would create confusion and inconsistencies which the FG would eventually still 
have to take responsibility for. He cited the example of standards which in his 
opinion would be inconsistent if SFGs were allowed to make policy on this matter. 
He argued that this is an example of a policy which is best regulated by the FG. The 
1st Participant however disagreed with the views expressed by the 2nd Participant on 
the standards example. He argued that standards on cotton exported from Nigeria 
(which has in recent times been rejected for being substandard)
184
 is a consequence 
of the centralisation of the standards process and the abolition of the role of SFGs in 
the standards process through the instrumentality of Commodities Boards.
185
 He 
argued that when the Commodities Boards were in charge, the quality of cotton was 
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ascertained by grading the cotton at state level before it was sold to merchants for 
onward exportation. However, with the abolition of this process, merchants now buy 
from the cotton farmers directly – bypassing the grading process which was done at 
the state level – and then the Standard Organisation of Nigeria (SON) does a 
centralised sampling process to ascertain quality at the ports. He argued that the 
quality of the cotton exported has significantly dropped with the new process 
because the SON agents at the port find it difficult to do a thorough job due to the 
vast quantity they have to go through. 
The argument here is that it is not practical for either SFGs or the central government 
to handle standardisation singlehandedly.  In view of the problem identified in Table 
4, it is only sensible that cooperation should be encouraged between all the 
stakeholders (including SFGs) to achieve the recommended solutions. Although 
uniformity is crucial to the attainment of standardisation, an approach which 
excludes the SFGs makes it difficult for a culture of quality to reach the grassroots.  
(Table 5) Source: The NTPD, 2002 
SI
N 
IDENTIFIE
D 
PROBLEM 
RECOMMENDED 
SOLUTION/ 
IMPLEMENTATI
ON STRATEGY 
IMPLEMENTATI
ON TIME FRAME 
IMPLEMENTATI
ON 
AGENCY 
1. Need for 
concrete 
attempt at 
enhancing 
agricultural, 
industrial, 
solid 
mineral and 
service 
sectors in 
the non-oil 
Attract foreign 
investment in 
export oriented 
industries which 
will enhance 
product 
development and 
diversification 
(emphasis added) 
 
NEPC shall be the 
 
Short/Medium 
Term 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NIPC/NEPC/ 
NEPZA/Commerci
al 
Desks Abroad 
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sector for 
domestic 
and foreign 
markets 
one stop Agency for 
the administration 
of export incentives 
in Nigeria 
(emphasis added) 
  
 
 
Short Term 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FG/ NEPC/FMC  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Table 5, two of the recommended solutions under the Trade Support 
Infrastructure framework of the NTPD have been selected for appraisal.
186
 It is 
argued that the recommended solutions to the problem mentioned in Table 5 ought 
to include SFGs because these two areas have become priority areas for SFGs 
interested in meeting their development goals. From the empirical evidence which 
has been considered in this thesis about the growing prominence of SFGs in FDI 
promotion, it is only practical that they should be involved in the process as 
implementing agents.  
To buttress this point, the recent policies of active states such as Lagos and Cross 
Rivers have been the driving force in the resurgence of the non-oil sector in Nigeria. 
For example, Lagos in the past eight years under the leadership of Governor Fashola 
has created a vibrant economic environment in Lagos which has facilitated the 
growth of the non- oil sector of the Nigerian economy. Lagos state has been at the 
forefront of the Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) drive in Nigeria. Thus it is argued 
that the exclusion of SFGs as a policy implementation agency is a shortcoming 
because the SFGs which have been proactive in the development of their respective 
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areas of comparative advantage have had to work within the constraints arising from 
their exclusion under the implementation framework of the NTPD.  
 (Table 6) Source: The NTPD, 2002 
SI
N 
IDENTIFIE
D 
PROBLEM 
RECOMMENDED 
SOLUTION/ 
IMPLEMENTATI
ON STRATEGY 
IMPLEMENTATI
ON TIME FRAME 
IMPLEMENTATI
ON 
AGENCY 
1. Need to 
achieve a 
regulatory 
environmen
t conducive 
for trade 
Promote trade 
liberalisation and 
competitiveness 
while at the same 
time putting in 
place appropriate 
measures to 
safeguard the 
interest of domestic 
producers against 
influx of imports 
and unfair trade 
practices(emphasis 
added) 
Promote a 
conducive 
environment for 
foreign investment 
in export-based 
commodities and 
services (emphasis 
added) 
Short Term 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Short Term 
FG/FMC/FMI/OPS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FG/OPS  
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The points mentioned in Table 6 are part of the recommendations of the NTPD 
under the Regulatory Framework.
187
 It is argued that the two solutions mentioned are 
deficient because they do not take cognisance of the importance of SFGs in the 
regulation of international trade matters. Excluding SFGs which are closest to the 
exporters is questionable in view of the fact that SFGs have the regulatory capacity 
to disrupt any international trade obligation which Nigeria is bound to adhere to. 
Irrespective of the standard federal compliance clause which is inserted in most 
international economic agreements, SFGs through their legislative activity can 
hamper the effectiveness of Nigeria’s international economic process if they are not 
incorporated into the framework. A good example of this is when SFGs implement a 
tax regime which adversely affects the ease of doing business for foreign investors. 
Considering that SFGs have this capacity in Nigeria, it is only logical that they 
should be part of the implementation agency responsible for ensuring that the 
regulatory regime for international trade in Nigeria achieves the policy objectives in 
the action plan. Other significant institutional shortcomings identifiable under the 
current framework include the low priority level of the NCC, the lack of quality 
representation for SFGs under the forum of the National Assembly (NA) and the 
exclusion of SFGs from the ENFP. In line with the criteria adopted in this chapter, it 
is argued that the exclusion of SFGs and the low priority level given to them under 
these three forums is an indication of the deficiency of the current institutional setup. 
It has repeatedly been reiterated in the course of this section that the OECD, UNDP 
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and WTO have in their recommendations emphasised the importance of cooperation 
amongst all stakeholders to the trade and development process. An inference from 
these recommendations is that intergovernmental cooperation is a priority in this 
dispensation of international economic relations. However in Nigeria, under the 
current framework, the fora where SFGs have an input on Nigeria’s international 
economic process are not accorded this recommended priority level.  
In chapter six, the inadequacy of the cooperation measures under the NCC, NA and 
ENFP will be discussed more exhaustively.
188
 The reason why they are better treated 
in chapter six is because a consideration of their shortcomings is directly correlated 
to the recommendations needed to correct these deficiencies. Furthermore, this thesis 
will consider the theoretical issues (central exclusivity and cooperative federalism) in 
chapter five which will form the basis for a more insightful critique and reform of 
these three fora in chapter six. For now, it is suffices to say that the general setup for 
international economic interactions in Nigeria has deviated from the principles of 
cooperation which existed at independence. The current setup is at variance with 
sound recommendations from international organisations which advocate a system 
similar to that in existence in the first republic.  
These examples from the international trade and commerce sector which have been 
analysed above are not exhaustive of the shortcomings arising from the exclusion of 
SFGs from the implementation strategy/action plan of Nigeria’s international 
economic framework. However, the rundown of the implementation agencies listed 
above demonstrates that the FG and the OPS are the central focus of Nigeria’s 
international economic regime. It also demonstrates that the extant framework does 
not reflect the emerging trends of Nigeria’s SFGs activities in international economic 
relations. 
The exclusion of the SFGs in the areas identified above is reflective of the FG 
plenary powers in relation to Nigeria’s international economic interactions.  It is 
argued that the FG having such dominant control is counter-productive because the 
sheer magnitude of the task required to run a stable, coherent and efficient 
international economic policy regime (especially in the current dispensation of 
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international economic relations) cannot be handled solely by one level of 
government. This has been recognised by the OECD and UNDP, which rightly 
advocate the need for a framework which encompasses all stakeholders to the 
process. In contrast, the centralisation of international economic process in Nigeria 
makes SFGs totally dependent on the FG. This does not encourage most SFGs in 
Nigeria to be proactive and efficient in the maximisation of their potential. This 
attitude is similar to the political culture of ‘limited participation’ which was 
identified earlier in section 4.7.1.   
In institutional terms, the existence of this mind set has far reaching negative 
implications on the aspirations of the Nigerian State to actualise economic 
development via the instrumentality of international trade and commerce; SFGs who 
are constitutionally excluded do not have the zeal to push forward their areas of 
comparative advantage from potential to actualisation because they are made to 
believe that it is not within their constitutional job description. They have come to 
believe that the FG knows what is best them. The danger with this assumption that 
the FG knows best is the fact that the federal agencies such as the Nigerian Export 
Promotion Council (NEPC) which are burdened with the responsibility of charting 
and dictating the economic fortunes of the 36 states of the country have a limited 
capacity (political, technical and financial) and therefore lack the ability to guarantee 
an effective utilisation and maximisation of the potential which exists in abundance 
within each state.  
More so, the existing mind-set is a handicap to SFGs which psychologically would 
have been better placed to maximise their potential if it was not taken out of their 
hands by the existing constitutional configuration. This is not helped by the fact that 
SFGs in Nigeria are not constitutionally encouraged to look inwards to harness their 
potentials which could transform their fortunes and consequently translate to a more 
competitive outlook of Nigeria’s participation in international economic relations.  
The role of Nigeria’s SFGs under the NTPD is restricted to one objective: ‘The 
maintenance of a virile and effective trade extension service… and the promotion of 
buying and selling using private operators.’189 Ironically, there is no indication that 
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they have a say in the actualisation of the role they are supposed to be primarily 
responsible for.  
4.8 Conclusion  
The arguments in this chapter have sought to establish the significance of the 
relationship between the development of federalism in Nigeria and the evolution of 
constitutional and institutional provisions for Nigeria’s international economic 
interactions. The chapter considered the historical evolution of federalism in Nigeria 
and revealed a noticeable shift from a structure of shared competence between the 
FG and SFGs (regions as they were called from 1960 – 1967) on foreign trade policy 
under the 1960 and 1963 Constitutions to a structure of central exclusivity in favour 
of the FG from 1966 to 2013. It was identified that the shift from shared competence 
to central exclusivity began in 1966, when Nigeria’s political structure became 
influenced by the unitary structure of government favoured and perpetuated by the 
military which ruled the country intermittently for about 30 years until May 1999. It 
was argued that the military’s unitary style has influenced the extant framework 
(constitutional and institutional) which favours a dominant FG in international 
economic interactions.  
It was also identified in this chapter that the extant framework is operating contrary 
to the minimum ideals of an international trade framework as recommended by 
international organisations such as the OECD, WTO and UNDP. The evaluation of 
the extant framework in line with working criteria (flexibility, coherence, 
transparency, accountability and integration) adopted from the recommendations of 
these organisations exposed contradictions and deficiencies in the existing 
constitutional and institutional framework for international trade in Nigeria. More 
particularly, the evaluation identified the exclusion of SFGs in Nigeria which are 
regarded as important stakeholders for the attainment of an ideal international trade 
and development framework.  
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Chapter Five: A Theoretical Basis for the Role of SFGs in Nigeria’s 
International Economic Interactions: An Appraisal of Two Constitutional 
Viewpoints (Central Exclusivity and Cooperative Federalism).  
5.1 Introduction.  
In chapter three, a proposition was introduced that the dynamics of international 
economic relations (including the international trade system) has been altered 
significantly due to geo-political circumstances such as globalisation.
1
 These changes 
in the dynamics of the international economic system were viewed within the context 
of an evolving relationship between multilateralism and regionalism (RTAs) in 
international trade.
2
 From this perspective, it has been argued that the new 
dispensation of international economic relations is characterised by an expansion of 
multilateralism into disciplines which were hitherto within the exclusive competence 
of national governments and the resurgence of a new wave of regionalism which is 
dynamic in nature and expansive in scope.
3
  
In relation to the hypotheses outlined in chapter one, the arguments of this thesis 
have so far sought to establish a link between the evolving international economic 
system and Nigeria’s internal framework for international economic policy.4 In 
chapter one and four of this thesis, the empirical evidence which points to an 
increased presence of Nigerian SFGs on the international scene was considered.
5
 It 
was argued that the totality of the evidence highlights a changing dynamic in 
Nigeria’s international economic interactions.6 However, it was also outlined in 
chapter four that in as much as the participation of Nigeria’s SFGs in international 
activities is on the increase, the existing constitutional and institutional framework is 
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still at variance with the emerging phenomenon.
7
 It was identified that in Nigeria, 
foreign relations is rigidly conceptualised as an area which is exempted from the 
dictates of the federal process.
8
 It was further argued that the inconsistency between 
the emerging role of Nigeria’s SFGs in international relations and the extant 
constitutional/institutional framework creates a divergence between theory and 
reality.
9
 The conclusion reached is that the current constitutional and institutional 
framework for Nigeria’s international interactions does not align with the realities of 
the evolving international economic system and therefore is in need of change.
10
  
In chapter one, cooperative federalism was introduced as an alternative theory to 
central exclusivity in foreign relations.
11
 Cooperative federalism was distinguished 
from the mainstream revisionist views because cooperative federalism seeks 
complementary competence rather than concurrent competence for SFGs in 
international relations.
12
  
In this chapter, the existing status quo (central exclusivity) and an alternative option 
of cooperative federalism will be appraised from a constitutional federalism 
perspective so as to identify which viewpoint is best suited to cater for the role of 
SFGs in Nigeria’s international economic interactions under the current dispensation 
of international economic relations.  
A plethora of neologisms have developed within the Constitutional and International 
Political Economy (IPE) literature which rationalise and critique this emerging 
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phenomenon in foreign affairs federalism.
13
 As such, it was a challenge finding an 
appropriate framework which captures the context of this investigation. The 
justification for selecting the two theories under the constitutional federalism 
discipline is because they directly address the allocation of powers between the 
central government and SFGs on matters relating to international economic relations. 
Although the main focus of the discourse is constitutional, this chapter will be 
drawing from applicable parallels which can be gleaned from a general 
understanding of the theoretical perspectives of the other disciplines which have not 
been selected as the main focus of this investigation. There is interconnectivity 
between the multidisciplinary theoretical dimensions of the activities of SFGs in the 
area of foreign relations which in the context of this investigation can be traced to a 
common denominator- the changing landscape of international relations. For 
example, theories on regulation which include harmonisation and decentralisation are 
useful for understanding the changing dynamics of foreign affairs federalism. The 
reason why this disciplinary perspective has not been selected as the central focus for 
this thesis is because regulatory theory places emphasis on competence of actors 
involved in the provision of public goods within a nation-state. This is applicable to 
federal and unitary systems alike but the perspective of this thesis is different 
because it focuses on constitutional and institutional competences of domestic 
institutions involved in foreign relations which are peculiar to federal systems alone. 
However, concepts such as ‘sub-optimal’ and ‘optimal’ regulation will be considered 
during the appraisal of the constitutional theories because they are important 
yardsticks for ascertaining the functional merits and demerits of the constitutional 
theories under consideration.
14
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5.2 Two Theoretical Viewpoints on the Constitutional Allocation of Foreign 
Affairs Powers in Federal Systems. 
Central exclusivity is a situation where the central government has exclusive 
jurisdiction on matters of international relations.
15
 This represents the orthodox 
position in foreign affairs federalism. In the US, this view point is encapsulated 
under the pre-emption
16
 and dormant foreign affairs doctrine.
17
 The second view 
point - cooperative federalism - represents an alternative approach which advocates 
cooperation and joint participation in a federal setup on matters of international 
relations within a shared legal sphere.
18
  
These two viewpoints can also be categorised into broader headings of dual 
federalism (central exclusivists) and ‘non – dual’ federalism (cooperative 
federalism).
19
  
A significant hallmark of the dualist federal model is the two-way 
compartmentalisation of regulatory competence and allocation of constitutional 
powers between levels of government.
20
 Dualism seeks to protect the core of plenary 
control entrusted to each component of the two levels of government in a federal 
setup. Overlap might only be tolerated at the periphery; but in the core areas, the idea 
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of one-and-only-one sovereign is maintained.
21
 On the other hand, ‘non – dual’ 
federalism theories are the alternative models of federalism which have emerged as a 
replacement for dual federalism in the new era of international relations. ‘Non – 
dual’ federalism models are characterised by a framework which places less 
emphasis on a regimented compartmentalisation of powers between levels of 
government.
22
  
Under the ‘non – dual’ framework, there are a plethora of theoretical variants such as 
polyphonic federalism,
23
 reflexive harmonisation,
24
 ‘the two level game’ theory,25 
the ‘second image reversed’ approach26 and cooperative federalism.27 Although these 
theories share normative similarities, cooperative federalism has been selected under 
the ‘non – dual’ category because it has an appeal of simplicity in its application 
which is crucial for the case study Nigeria. Cooperative federalism is more malleable 
                                                 
21
 Bader (n 18) 7. 
22
 Scholars such as Schapiro, Bader and Schütze have argued that dual federalism has become extinct 
in light of the changing landscape of international relations and the federal process. They have 
advocated the merits of alternative theories under the dynamic model of federalism as fitting for the 
new dispensation of federal relations. While Schapiro advocates for a polyphonic model of federalism, 
Bader and Schütze favour the merits of cooperative federalism as a successor to dual federalism. 
23
 Schapiro is a leading proponent of the Polyphonic conceptualisation of federalism. Under this 
model, competing values are used as a yardstick when deciding whether to site authority at the state or 
federal levels, or both. Dialogue, redundancy, and plurality are best promoted by state regulation, 
whereas uniformity, accountability, and finality find expression in federal control. See generally 
Robert A Schapiro, ‘Polyphonic Federalism: State Constitutions in Federal Courts’ (1999) 87 (6) Cal 
L Rev 1409. 
24
 This model is a form of alternative governance theory which focuses on multilevel governance 
structures and is peculiar to the European Union. Deakin is a leading proponent of this theory. 
Reflexive harmonisation focuses on the allocation of regulatory competence in the EU relying on a 
remodelling of the Tieboutian model of regulatory competition to achieve a learning process between 
levels of government which is dependent on norms that establish a balance between ‘particular’ and 
‘general’ mechanisms. See Simon Deakin, ‘Legal Diversity and Regulatory Competition: Which 
Model for Europe?’ (2006) 12(4) ELJ 440. 
25
 Putman is the leading proponent of this theory. This theory analyses the intersection between 
domestic and international regimes and its impact on the policy choices made at both the domestic and 
international levels. Putman focuses on the impact of domestic ‘win sets’ and the opportunities and 
constraints which these factors have on international negotiations. See generally, Robert D Putman, 
‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’ (1988) 42(3) IO 427.  
26
 Gourevitch is the leading proponent of this theory. It focuses on the influence of domestic 
considerations e.g. bureaucratic factors and transnational actors, in the internal/external relationship 
between a state and international regimes. See Peter Gourevitch, ‘The Second Image Reversed: The 
International Sources of Domestic Politics’ (1978) 32 (4) IO 881. 
27
 Schütze and Bader are leading proponents of cooperative federalism. Their views will be 
expounded upon in the course of this chapter.  
162 
 
and can effectively utilise the existing formal and informal channels in Nigeria’s 
international economic regime lowering the chances of complications arising.
28
   
The two theoretical viewpoints selected for appraisal in this thesis will now be 
systematically considered in turn so as to identify the origin, rationale, strengths and 
weaknesses of the two viewpoints in relation to the context of this research.  
5.3 Central Exclusivity in International Economic Relations: The US 
Experience. 
The constitutional framework for central exclusivity in the Nigerian federal system is 
modelled after the system in the US, which is the oldest federal system in the world. 
Thus the US will be used as the yardstick for explaining the origin and evolution of 
this constitutional principle.
29
  
5.3.1 Origin of Central Exclusivity.  
Justice Sutherland in United States v Curtiss – Wright Export Corps30 opined that the 
federal government in the US inherited the power to act exclusively on matters of 
foreign interactions from the British Crown upon the attainment of independence. He 
argued that the Crown passed on the power of external sovereignty which includes 
the power to levy war, conclude peace etc. to the colonies as a collective unit rather 
than to each individual colony.
31
 Schütze also points out that at the inception of the 
American Union, foreign affairs were always of central concern to the American 
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Republic, because a united stance had played an important role in winning 
independence from Great Britain.
32
  
Although the origin of central exclusivity dates back to colonial periods in America, 
and the subsequent introduction of the 1787 American Constitution, its entrenchment 
and justification within the American federal jurisprudence only started gaining 
ground in the 1800’s. A broad federal exclusivity over foreign affairs was found in 
cases such as Holmes v Jenninson,
33
 Knox v Lee,
34
 and Chae Chan Ping v United 
States.
35
 For example in Chae Chan Ping, the courts drew a distinction in the 
relationship between the states and the central government in the US on matters of 
external and internal competence respectively.
36
 According to the court, ‘For local 
interests the several states of the Union exist, but for national purposes, embracing 
our relations with foreign nations, we are but one people, one nation, one power.’37  
The entrenchment of central exclusivity in American federal jurisprudence continued 
into the 1900s, with the 1920 case of Missouri v Holland which entrenched the 
proposition that the treaty making powers of the US was the exclusive preserve of 
the federal government.
38
 Another significant landmark case was the 1936 case of 
United States v Curtiss – Wright Export Corps39 where central exclusivity was 
justified on the basis that it was an external power accruing to the federal 
government rather than from the American Constitution.
40
 This position was 
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emphasised in United States v Belmont
41
 were it was held that: ‘…government power 
over external affairs is not distributed, [between the national government and several 
states] but is vested exclusively in the national government.’42 After this, the 
entrenchment of central exclusivity persisted in subsequent opinions of the courts all 
the way through the mid-1900s.  
In Zschernig v Miller,
43
 the Supreme Court for the first time struck down a state’s 
legislation which had foreign affairs implications by relying on the dormant foreign 
affairs doctrine. This case was based on a challenge to a legislation in the State of 
Oregon which deprived an East German national of his right to inheritance on the 
basis that nationals of countries which did not have a reciprocal right for US citizens 
to take property on the same terms as the citizens of that nation were denied such 
rights under the Oregon law. This was an area where there was no existing federal 
law expressly catering for the issue covered by the Oregon legislation. However, the 
court held that ‘…any state law which had a direct impact on foreign affairs and may 
as well adversely affect the power of the central government to deal with those 
problems…’44 and therefore was an encroachment on the dormant powers of the 
central government to act on matters of foreign relations.
45
 This approach was not 
subsequently reaffirmed in the cases which followed over the next 30 years, but it 
was the clearest signal up to that point and afterwards of the status of foreign affairs 
as the exclusive preserve of the central government in the US.
46
  
The recent crop of foreign affairs federalism cases in the US since the early 1990s 
have not adhered to the broad dormant foreign affairs type interpretation of central 
exclusivity as elucidated in Zshernig v Miller. Instead, a ‘dominant federal interest’ 
approach has persisted; with the central government regarded as the dominant player 
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in foreign affairs.
47
 According to Schultze, subsequent cases after Zschernig such as 
Crosby v National Foreign Trade Council,
48
 and American Insurance Association v 
Garamendi
49
 ‘have cast doubt over the constitutional exclusivity thesis…’ and have 
turned to a ‘legislative pre-emption paradigm.’ 50  
The preceding cases represent just a cross section of the vast federalism 
jurisprudence which has emanated from the development of central exclusivity in 
foreign affairs federalism. This section of the chapter has sought to establish that 
central exclusivity is deeply rooted in the historical development process of the 
American Union. The origin and historical development of central exclusivity in the 
American federalism indicates that it was a constitutional viewpoint which was 
practical and sensible in light of the circumstances with which the Union was faced 
as it evolved. This aligns with the arguments in chapter one and two where it was 
maintained that the evolution of the federal process has played a significant role in 
shaping the theoretical underpinning of international interactions in specific 
dispensations of international relations.
51
  
5.3.2 The Scope and Implications of Central Exclusivity. 
From the foregoing, the implication of these developments in foreign affairs 
federalism spanning over three centuries in the US is that there has been a 
presumption in favour of central exclusivity on matters of international relations. The 
corollary of central exclusivity is that there are no concurrent powers for SFGs in 
relation to the enumerated areas in the Constitution. Central exclusivity is founded on 
the theoretical presumption that the central government alone should enjoy the 
capacity to conduct foreign relations because SFGs participating in international 
relations has the potential to complicate the foreign relations of a federal setup. For 
example in international trade, the need for certainty and uniformity over the terms 
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of trade between trading nations is a significant factor which has informed the 
centralisation of international trade policy within one tier of government.  
In line with the potential complications which could arise from the involvement of 
SFGs in international relations, the Constitutions of most federal countries expressly 
state that the central government is responsible for matters of international 
interaction including foreign economic policy. In the US, the federal (central) 
government is constitutionally authorised to conduct foreign affairs. This is by virtue 
of art I, s 8 and art II of the American Constitution which authorises the federal 
political branches to conduct foreign relations through the enactment of federal 
statutes, treaties and executive agreements.
52
  
From the historical development of the foreign affairs doctrine as it was identified in 
the Zschenig case, it shows that the express exclusion of SFGs from enumerated 
areas under the Constitution is not the only way in which central exclusivity has 
operated in relation to foreign affairs. There are circumstances when there is no 
express provision under the constitution which stipulates if a subject matter which 
has foreign affairs implications comes under federal jurisdiction to the exclusion of 
SFGs. This is regarded as a grey area in federal/state relations on matters of 
international relations and is becoming increasingly prominent due to the evolving 
international relations system.
53
 Thus, for central exclusivity to be achieved in the 
foreign relations domain, multiple methods of exclusion have been adopted over the 
years to cater for both the express and grey areas.  
One method of exclusion which has persisted in the historical development of the 
American federal system is the pre-emption doctrine which operates pursuant to the 
Supremacy Clause in the US Constitution.
54
 Another method of exclusion is in the 
form of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine which in the US is encapsulated under 
the Foreign Commerce Clause; found under art 1, s 8, Clause 3 of the US 
Constitution. As pointed out in the last section, the continued viability of this 
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doctrine is questionable because it has not been given validation in the recent crop of 
foreign affairs federalism cases in the US.
55
  
However, the pre-emption doctrine still remains the most entrenched and adaptive 
tool of central exclusivity which has persisted even in light of the changing dynamics 
of international relations.
56
 In Hines v Davidowitz
57
, which centred on the validity of 
an Alien Registration legislation introduced by Pennsylvania during World War II, 
the Supreme Court outlined the parameters for the application of the pre-emption 
doctrine thus: 
…where the federal government, in the exercise of its superior authority 
in this field, has enacted a complete scheme of regulation and has therein 
provided a standard for the registration of aliens, states cannot, 
inconsistently with the purpose of Congress, conflict or interfere with, 
curtail or complement, the federal law, or enforce additional or auxiliary 
regulation.
58
  
 
The implication of this ruling is that laws made by states in the US which conflict 
with any subject matter on which the central government has already legislated, 
based either on the expressly enumerated powers in the Constitution or on any matter 
not listed but having a relationship with such enumerated powers, will be regarded as 
inconsistent. In relation to the scope and yardstick for ascertaining when a state law 
should be pre-empted, the Court stated that it takes into consideration expressions 
such as ‘conflicting; contrary to; occupying the field; repugnance; difference; 
irreconcilability; inconsistency; violation; curtailment, and interference..’, ‘…but 
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[that] none of these expressions provides an infallible constitutional test, or an 
exclusive constitutional yardstick.’59 
This broad interpretation of the scope of pre-emption may have been easy to 
reconcile as at 1941 because treaties were the central instruments of international 
relations which the central government had to worry about. The court was content 
that ‘whatever power a state may have is subordinate to supreme national law.’60 But 
in light of the multiplicity of instruments with legal implications which have 
emerged on the international plane and the diverse actors now engaged or seeking to 
engage in international relations, it is doubtful if the court anticipated the full 
ramifications of the decision. Either they were advocating a formula so wide that 
there is no room for state activity in international relations or they only expected this 
formula to apply only to international agreements properly so called (as recognised 
under the Vienna Convention on Treaties). Whatever the case, the pre-emption 
doctrine under the current dispensation of international relations means that the 
central government will constantly be at logger heads with SFGs. This is because 
international relations now transcends so many interconnected issues that the wide 
range of phrases listed by the court will always find state legislative activity to be in 
conflict with the central government. 
From the above analyses of the origin, historical evolution and scope of central 
exclusivity in foreign affairs federalism, the following characteristics can be 
deduced. First, central exclusivity in the area of foreign affairs has been a potent 
force in the development of the American federalism. Second, foreign affairs has 
been classified as an exceptional category in the central/state relationship which was 
presumed to be better handled by the central government because of the potential 
pitfalls of allowing states to SFGs concurrent jurisdiction. Third, exclusivity for a 
central government on matters of foreign interactions arises in two situations namely: 
areas of express enumerated powers in favour of the central government and the grey 
areas when there are no expressly enumerated powers but the activities of SFGs in 
these areas still has a potential to conflict with the presumption in favour of the 
central government’s jurisdiction. Fourth, the pre-emption and dormant foreign 
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affairs doctrines are the instruments by which central exclusivity has operated in 
American foreign affairs federalism; and the pre-emption doctrine has eclipsed the 
dormant foreign affairs doctrine as the embodiment of central exclusivity in foreign 
affairs federalism in the US. Lastly, applicable parallels can be drawn between the 
US and Nigeria in the process of central exclusivity in foreign affairs, because 
Nigeria’s political system and approach to foreign relations is modelled after the US.  
In the next section, the merits and demerits of central exclusivity in international 
relations will be considered so as to present an objective assessment of the viability 
of this theoretical position. In this section, the main emphasis will now be on 
international trade relations as an aspect of foreign economic affairs.  
5.3.3 Appraising the Advantages and Disadvantages of Central Exclusivity in 
International Trade Relations.  
In this section, the advantages and disadvantages of central exclusivity will be 
considered. First the advantages will be discussed, and then the corresponding 
diasadvantage (if any) will follow.  
Advantages 
1. Certainty and Uniformity in International Trade Relations 
One important consideration which makes central exclusivity desirable in 
international trade relations is because of the need for certainty and uniformity in 
trade terms.
61
 Over a century ago, Justice Taney in Holmes v. Jennison
62
 expressed 
this view about foreign relations in general stating that ‘To allow the states 
concurrent powers in the area of international relations would not be well calculated 
to preserve respect abroad or union at home…’63 He believed that the ability of a 
nation to speak with one voice was crucial to stability. Within the context of 
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international trade, the need for certainty of trade terms is a major advantage of 
central exclusivity in international trade relations. Central exclusivity was 
particularly instrumental to the ascent and entrenchment of the neo - liberal tenets of 
the multilateral trade order. This is because the removal of barriers to free trade 
(tariff and non-tariff alike) would have been hindered if trading nations had 
overlapping levels of regulation which could result in the side-stepping of 
agreements reached between trading partners. Conflict could arise if there is no 
central voice which harmonises the policy stance of each trading nation. For 
example, an SFG involved in international trade relations could for selfish political 
reasons adopt subversive trade rules which are in conflict with those of the rest of the 
country; thereby incurring retaliatory measures against the whole country. In 
essence, the actions of one or more SFGs could adversely affect the rest of the 
country.
64
  
Also, the involvement of SFGs could result in protracted trade negotiations and 
stalemates if there are conflicts arising due to different viewpoints at different levels 
of regulation. This situation is evident in Canada which has a liberal federal structure 
that accommodates the input of SFGs in its foreign policy regime. During the 
implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, there was tension in the central 
government/provincial relationships. This was due to a challenge by Alberta of 
Ottawa's authority to enter into international commitments that affected subject 
matters under the constitutional jurisdiction of the provinces.
65Although Alberta’s 
challenge was a legitimate exercise of their mandate under the Canadian 
Constitution, the motives were deemed to be politically calculated to flex its muscles 
with the central government under the guise of legitimate concern about the Kyoto 
protocol.
66
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Spiro
67
 in his analysis of the role of US states in immigration regulatory patterns is 
candid enough to admit that one of the merits of the dominance of central 
governments in international relations for the better part of this century is reduced 
state involvement in foreign policy which could lead to conflict.
68
 Spiro asserts that 
‘…as [is] true with the rest of foreign policy, there were (emphasis added) significant 
structural advantages in allocating immigration policy to a centralised agent capable 
of processing immigration decisions as part of the general mix of foreign relations 
considerations.’69 He identifies that there was a tendency for SFGs to act on 
preferences that could upset the sensitive balance of bilateral relations, with possibly 
catastrophic consequences.
70
 In summary, centralised foreign policy action has the 
distinct advantage of presenting a common front, commanding respect abroad and 
encouraging uniformity of trade terms.  
2. Centralisation Caters for the Diversity of Views and Prevents Arbitrary 
Abuse by the Central Government via Built-In Constitutional Safeguards  
Another merit of central exclusivity is the presence of constitutional safeguards in 
the provisions which allocate treaty making powers to the central government. These 
safeguards are presumably inserted to ensure contribution from the SFGs while 
limiting the excesses of the central government at the same time.
71
 For example in 
the US, this safeguard is found in the legislative procedure relating to the treaty 
making powers of the President. Before a treaty is ratified between the US and a 
foreign country, the President must obtain the consent of two-thirds of the Senate.
72
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In Nigeria, a similar provision is found in s 12 of the 1999 Constitution
73
 which was 
discussed in chapter four. It was pointed out that there is no record of this section 
being utilised in Nigeria and that this moribund section is indicative of a political 
culture of ‘limited participation’ in Nigeria’s international trade regime. 74   
3. Central Exclusivity is Important for Achieving Optimal Regulation in a 
Complex International Trade System 
Another appeal of central exclusivity in international trade relations is that it is 
perceived to be important for optimal regulation in light of the evolving complexities 
in international economic interactions. This advantage is premised on the belief that a 
complex international trade regime, which has different types of trade agreements 
and commitments involving multiple parties with expansive implementation 
requirements, necessitates a harmonisation approach so as to effectively manage the 
system.
75
 For example in the EU, the Commission is responsible for the negotiation 
agenda of all the member states in regard to issues where the EU has competence.
76
 
The Commission seeks the authorisation of the member states before it commences 
the negotiation process but is thereafter responsible for ironing out the complicated 
details of the agreements.
77
 Considering the variations in the agreements being 
negotiated with different countries and regions all over the world, the role of the 
Commission as the representative of the member states is crucial for ensuring 
optimal outcomes for the EU as a whole.
78
 If each member state is allowed to put 
forward its own terms and conditions during negotiations, the process could be 
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cumbersome. There is also an advantage which comes from the resources being 
pooled together during negotiation under the auspices of the EU because not all 
member states have the financial capacity to negotiate on their own. Moreover, the 
member states have a common objective which informs the competence of the 
Commission when negotiating so it is easier to reconcile the considerations of each 
member state under the Commission’s negotiation mandate. Thus, attaining optimal 
policy outcomes in an era of globalised economic interactions is enhanced when 
there is harmonisation of the negotiation process.  
4. A Common Front in Foreign Affairs as an Effective Tool for Adopting 
and/or Preventing Trade Retaliation in International Trade Relations 
Another merit of central exclusivity in foreign economic relations, and especially in 
international trade is that it is effective for adopting and/or curbing trade retaliation 
measures against other trading partners. Trade retaliations refer to measures adopted 
by a trading nation in response to foreign measures that nullify or impair their rights 
under international trade law.
79
 Schaefer argues that one of the major reasons why 
states are not allowed to engage in foreign affairs is because the founders of the 
nation (the US) had this concern that retaliation against a state action in foreign 
affairs would affect the nation as a whole.
80
  
The EU,
81
 US
82
 and Japan
83
 have utilised trade retaliation measures which are in 
accordance with WTO rules, as a major tool for forcing compliance from their 
trading partners.
84
 Without a centralised policy mechanism, it would be difficult to 
achieve this objective. For example, the ability of the EU’s Technical Barrier 
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Instrument (TBI) to curb any “illicit commercial practice” by a third party which is 
harmful to the common commercial policy of the EU will not be effective if each 
member state is allowed to dictate its own foreign trade relations. The EU has 
demonstrated the potency of a common front by implementing a measure in March, 
2013, which prohibited the importation of timber products from countries like 
Nigeria which have not signed an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the 
EU. Timber products from Nigeria are now considered ‘illegally sourced products.’85 
If the member states in the EU have the power to opt out of this common front, then 
the potency of this action against countries at which the measure is targeted will be 
weakened.
86
  
Disadvantages 
1. Central exclusivity does not give room for variation in the 
conceptualisation of international trade relations 
An argument against adhering to uniformity and certainty as a basis for the conduct 
of international economic relations is that central exclusivity does not give ample 
opportunity for variation in the conceptualisation of foreign relations. The issues 
which relate to international relations are broad and varied and as such it is becoming 
increasingly difficult to properly delineate the limits of what could affect 
international trade. For example, in the early years of the multilateral process the 
emphasis was on tariff reductions. However, it soon became clear that the biggest 
obstacles to entrenching multilateral liberal tenets were Non – Tariff Barriers 
(NTBs).
87
  
                                                 
85
 See vanguard newspaper report titled: ‘EU to shut out Nigeria from its Timber Market in 2013 - 
Official’ Vangaurd Newspaper (Lagos, 18 December 2012) 
<http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/12/eu-to-shut-out-nigeria-from-its-timber-market-in-2013-
official/#sthash.Bji8p9cH.dpuf> accessed 30 June 2013.  
86
 See generally Cosmas O Ochieng, ‘The EU – ACP Economic Partnership Agreements and the 
“Development Question”: Constraints and Opportunities Posed by Article XXIV and Special and 
Differential Treatment Provisions of the WTO’ (2007) 10 (2) JIEL 363. 
87
 NTBs (NTBs are also referred to as Non – Tariff Measures under the WTO rules) cover a broad 
range of policies which have the potential to impact negatively on the MFN or NT clauses in the 
GATT Agreements. See generally <http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/glossary_e/ntbs_e.htm> for 
what constitutes NTBs under WTO rules for non-discrimination. See also Edward J Ray, ‘Changing 
Patterns of Protectionism: The Fall in Tariffs and the Rise in Non-Tariff Barriers Symposium: The 
175 
 
In view of the broadening scope of international trade relations, the challenge with 
central exclusivity as the accepted norm is that it presents a truncated view of the 
evolving international economic process. For example, because the conceptualisation 
of foreign relations is still rooted in nation-state practice, international economic 
arrangements between SFGs and international actors are denied recognition under 
international law.
88
 However, this mechanism which helps to protect the continuation 
of nation-state practice in international relations creates a limited conceptualisation 
of international relations. This is because in reality, economic arrangements which 
are trans-boundary in nature have a bearing on international relations irrespective of 
the perceived illegitimacy of the actors involved or the form utilised. In a bid to deny 
the legitimacy of arrangements which do not conform to the norm, central exclusivity 
denies the power of these arrangements and their ability to either negatively or 
positively affect the course of international economic relations.  
In realisation of the potential of SFGs to negatively or positively affect the 
international economic process it is not surprising that Russia and China, who 
traditionally operated highly centralised political systems, have allowed their SFGs a 
degree of latitude on foreign economic policy.  A look at post cold-war Russia shows 
that the Kremlin out of necessity rather than democracy have given economic and 
political autonomy to regions of the Russian federation such as Tatartan, Bashkartas 
and Chuvasia.
89
 It is argued that such moves by the Kremlin were informed by a 
realisation that the activities of its regions had far reaching consequences for both the 
economic and political stability of Russia.
90
  
In the case of China, a country which has predominantly been unitary in its style of 
governance, its exponential economic growth in the past 20 years is partly 
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attributable to the fact that she revolutionised her political and economic institutions; 
to effectively capture a broad conceptualisation of the comparative advantage to be 
gained from recognising the role of the provinces in foreign trade. According to 
Zheng
91
 ‘…in post- Mao China, the central party-state is no longer monolithic in all 
aspects of China's foreign affairs. Instead, provincial governments have become 
increasingly paradiplomatic actors in China's foreign trade.’92  
From the foregoing examples, the reality is that international economic interactions 
are now characterised by new actors and complicated factors, hence the growth of 
alternative governance theories seeking to make sense of the complexities in a new 
dispensation of global integration. For example, Gavin’s93 study on multi – level 
governance focuses on the manifestation of the evolving interaction between old and 
new emerging actors in the international economic policy sphere.
94
 He defines 
multilevel regulatory governance as ‘Regulatory strategies and activities covering the 
development, execution and reform of regulation between national, supranational and 
sub-national levels.’95 He argues that the expansion in the international economic 
policy sphere has necessitated the involvement of new actors such as SFGs; which 
requires coherence between the multiple layers of international economic 
regulation.
96
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2. Broad pre-emption powers enjoyed by central governments encroach into 
the domestic space of SFGs because of the expanding scope of 
international economic relations 
As was pointed out earlier, central exclusivity is based on a presumption that foreign 
relations are best managed by the central level of government. But in a dispensation 
of foreign relations which is characterised by interwoven issue areas, for a central 
government to fully exert its influence abroad, a plethora of interconnected issues 
including finance, taxation, trade, health, environment, national security etc. which 
have a bearing on the foreign relations objectives of the country have to be taken into 
consideration. These issues which affect foreign relations are constantly expanding 
and encroaching into new areas which fall within the jurisdiction of SFGs. While in 
theory a dualised track is maintained in relation to foreign affairs, in reality, the 
constitutional parameters of the central/state relations are constantly being expanded 
in favour of the central government so as to accommodate the expanding scope of 
foreign relations.
97
 The danger with such a broad interpretation of the mandate given 
to a central government in relation to foreign interactions is that it erodes the 
distinctive areas of competence between the central and state governments. With the 
central government having the upper hand due to pre-emptive powers, they can rely 
on this expansive scope of foreign relations as a pretext to justify unnecessary 
encroachment into the constitutional space of SFGs. The expanding scope of 
international economic relations also makes it difficult to differentiate between 
subject matters which are constitutionally within the jurisdiction of SFGs and those 
which are the prerogative of the central government. In a bid to stay on top of all 
things pertaining to foreign relations, the central government can abuse the 
‘occupying the field’ doctrine by constantly pre-empting SFGs if they take any 
action which has a link to international relations.  
For example in India, agriculture is under the jurisdiction of the regions.
98
 During the 
multilateral negotiations at Doha which led to the introduction of the WTO in 1994, 
the regions raised concerns because the central government did not consult with them 
before signing up to multilateral commitments on agriculture which had significant 
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implementation impacts on the agricultural sector in India.
99
 When the regions 
challenged the legitimacy of the central government’s usurpation of the regions’ 
jurisdiction on agriculture and the cavalier attitude in which their concerns were 
handled, the central government ignored them.
100
 This is not surprising considering 
the constitutional powers of the central government to sign treaties and the 
importance of the multilateral process at that point in time. These powers provide 
justification for central governments to cover the field in relation to any area having 
implications on foreign affairs. This is not healthy for a federal system because it 
creates political tension as was the case in India or leads to total disinterest by SFGs 
in anything which has to do with foreign relations. Either of these outcomes is 
dangerous because implementation of any international agreement eventually relies 
on grassroots compliance by SFGs. If SFGs feel politically outmuscled in the 
negotiation process or lose interest in anything pertaining to trade agreements, they 
could frustrate the implementation of such an agreement signed by the central 
government. Political tension could lead to rebellious counter action by SFGs and 
disinterest could lead to lax compliance.  
3. Central exclusivity does not take cognisance of federalism as an evolving 
process 
It is difficult to reconcile central exclusivity in federal systems in light of the 
constantly evolving nature of the federal process discussed in chapter two.
101
 
The significance of the federal process is that it is ideally meant to encourage joint 
participation and shared responsibility for the issues common to the parties to the 
federal arrangement. These issues are never static and as a consequence, the political 
and constitutional response must also evolve accordingly. More so, the exigencies of 
the evolving international trade system necessitate an adjustment in the configuration 
of federal setups; to effectively reflect the realities of the changing dynamics of the 
international economic system and the welfare expectations of the constituent units 
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of the federal setup. This assertion is evidenced by the expansion of the regulatory 
competence of the multilateral system of the WTO and Regional Trade Agreements 
(RTAs) which has led to an incursion of international economic norms into the 
domestic policy sphere of countries in the international system.
102
 This expansion in 
the international economic regulatory competence to include issues such as consumer 
protection, environment, services etc., has led to a proliferation of new actors (state 
and non – state actors alike) who are now more directly affected by the process of 
international economic participation and regulation. Putting the extent of this 
external incursion by international economic regimes into context, it simply means 
that a federal setup is more prone to changes due to exogenous influences than a non 
– federal setup.103 Central exclusivity does not adequately capture this dynamic 
nature of the federal process by insisting on an exemption for foreign relations from 
federalism tenets. This is a disadvantage because the influence of changes in the 
international system on the opportunities for SFGs to participate in international 
economic arrangements is increasingly harder to ignore.  
4. Central exclusivsity does not encourage the maximisation of potential in a 
federal system  
The current dispensation in the international economic system is laden with 
opportunities for nations to expand their participation and effectively utilise 
international trade and commerce as tools for economic development. Central 
exclusivity does not encourage the maximisation of potential under this new 
dispensation of international trade relations. This is because the constitutional 
categorisation given to foreign relations does not encourage SFGs to participate in 
the trade process. This disadvantage is particularly evident in a country like Nigeria 
where the general perception is that foreign trade interactions involve the federal 
agencies and the primary exporters/importers but not SFGs. Therefore, SFGs in 
Nigeria do not see any reason why they should bother themselves about an area 
which is the exclusive preserve of the central government. The central government 
does not help the situation because they are quick to emphasise to SFGs that their 
(the SFGs) contribution to Nigeria’s international trade mechanism is merely 
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advisory. The constant refrain from the centre to SFGs is that they should steer clear 
of the regulation of international trade because it is not their constitutional role. The 
consequence of this perception is that most SFGs in Nigeria are either oblivious to 
the potential and capacity they have in the current dispensation of international 
economic relations where opportunities are rife or they are discouraged from acting 
on them.  
Moreover the central government has over the years shown its inability to actualise a 
diversification of the Nigerian economy because in reality its foreign policy 
objectives are tied to crude oil production which is the most attractive resource to the 
central government.
104
 The central government’s handling of the Nigerian oil 
industry and the neglect of other lucrative resources in the country is evidence that 
central exclusivity is a policy stance which is not helping to maximise foreign trade 
potential in Nigeria.  
5. Targeted retaliation is now possible under the new dispensation of 
international trade relations 
It has been argued that the fears about retaliation which arise from the transgressions 
of one or more SFG are no longer an issue because in the area of international trade 
interaction, targeted retaliation is now a reality. In a globalised world, a foreign 
nation can target retaliation against any specific sub-national entity (e.g. US state 
government).  Spiro is of the view that globalisation has changed the dynamics of 
international relations to the extent that ‘There is now better information, increased 
communication and increased awareness of the US’s political system which makes 
foreign states less likely to misascribe the actions of one state to the nation as a 
whole.’  He argues that ‘The world is no longer so neatly divided into sovereign 
boxes locked in a zero-sum conflict that was buffered by few institutional restraints.’   
Spiro further identifies that this evolution in the dynamics of international relations is 
also evident in the international trade system as characterised by the fluctuating 
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relationship between multilateralism and regionalism, the globalisation effect on the 
conduct of international trade; and more importantly the redefinition of the actors 
now regarded as the subjects of international trade interaction.    
In the US context, the circumstances of the Cold War which made it imperative for 
central governments to control the delicate relationships fostered by bloc alliances 
and the high stakes of Cold War relations is no longer an issue. Spiro further argues 
that not only have the stakes diminished, but the very nature of the international 
society may have changed in such a way as to more completely undermine the 
foreign affairs differential.  He argues that the nation has been disaggregated, so that 
the channels of contact across national boundaries are now myriad where they used 
to be singular.  He links these changes in the external dynamics with the internal 
configuration of federal setups by asserting that with the change in the nature of 
trans-boundary contacts comes an understanding of the internal allocation of 
authority in other nations. In his view, with this new dynamic, other nations will be 
less likely to  misascribe the position of one institution to that of another or of the 
nation as a whole. 
 
 
5.3.4 Summary: Rebutting the Status Quo  
Foreign affairs have remained immune from the dictates of federalism for a 
significant part of the last century. This immunity covers the broad spectrum of 
matters which include international trade relations. Central exclusivity in 
international trade relations has reigned supreme in most federal setups all over the 
world. In Nigeria, the position is not different. From a perusal of the constitutional 
provisions, the structure of the international trade policy mechanism and the 
interviews conducted with policy makers at both state and central level, it is 
established that the central government in Nigeria has plenary powers for the conduct 
of international trade. Based on the advantages and disadvantages identified in the 
previous section, it is argued that central exclusivity in international trade relations is 
no longer tenable as the applicable constitutional stance for Nigeria in this new 
dispensation of international trade relations. From the foregoing analyses, it is clear 
that the immunity which foreign relations have been ascribed excluding it from the 
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dictates of the federal process is no longer realistic. Spiro supports this view stating 
that: 
…the disaggregation of the state and economic globalisation all suggest 
foundational shifts in the structure of the global system. To the extent 
constitutional doctrines have been grounded in the old framework, they 
must be re-examined against the new. Frameworks conceived in other 
times may emerge inappropriate in the changed global context.
105
 
In the pre-globalisation era it was acceptable to distinguish between issues which 
were external or internal to the constitutional process of a federal setup. However, 
with the consistent incursion of international trade issues from the multilateral and 
regional systems into the domestic space of trading nations – especially federal 
setups - the distinction between what is external and internal is now a mirage. As 
Spiro points out above, the globalisation of the world economic system has given rise 
to a rethink of the methods by which effective international trade relations is 
achieved.
106
 
The popular logic that harmonisation of regulation is the most effective method of 
bringing all the overlapping and interconnected aspects of an evolving international 
trade system into a coherent flow is now questionable. It is increasingly clear that the 
new dispensation of international trade relations demands more. For example, the EU 
has recognised the need for differentiation in its harmonisation technique by 
encouraging experimentation in policy formulation at local levels under the guidance 
of the subsidiarity principle.
107
 This has led to a growing body of literature on 
multilevel global governance. The study of multilevel governance structures 
recognises that the impact of globalisation on international relations in general has 
resulted in a need for coordinated regulation at different levels of interaction.
108
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These levels are international, regional, national and sub-national.
109
 All four levels 
of governance are interconnected and an attempt to isolate any of the levels is no 
longer tenable because it could have a negative ripple impact which will affect all the 
other levels. This does not dispense with the need for uniformity; but to achieve 
uniformity and certainty, diversity must be incorporated. This is a reason why the 
continued exemption of international trade policy from the mainstream of the federal 
process is unrealistic. For example, competition policy cuts across all levels of 
interaction in the multilevel system and can only be effective if there is cooperation 
on all the four levels of interaction. At the international level, cooperation on 
competition policy is required because services are now a significant aspect of 
international trade; which makes it possible for monopolies to be exported from one 
trading nation to another, thereby distorting competition in the world trade system.
110
 
At a regional level cooperation is also required because countries interacting due to 
geographic or economic ties can negatively or positively affect any efforts at the 
international or national level.
111
 At the national level, Item 14 under the State List, 
Schedule 7 of the Indian Constitution, all stakeholders (state and non – state actors) 
must cooperate so as to achieve compliance with measures reached at both the 
regional and international levels. In the US, the role of the states in achieving a 
coherent competition policy is recognised to the extent that state agencies acting 
pursuant to a clearly articulated state law are given a qualified exception from federal 
antitrust scrutiny.
112
  
In Nigeria, the challenge with the current structure is that in relation to competition 
policy at the national level, SFGs are frozen out of the equation. Commercial and 
industrial monopolies, combines and trusts are under the ELL of the Nigerian 1999 
Constitution.
113
 There is neither a comprehensive legislation on competition policy in 
place nor linkage between SFGs and the FG in relation to the competition policy 
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regime of the country. The FG has addressed issues of competition policy in a 
fragmented fashion. For example, the privatisation process in sectors such as power 
and oil and gas is carried out by the central government pursuant to its exclusive 
prerogative under the constitution.  This runs contrary to the practice in other 
jurisdictions and the growing recognition of the expanding implications of 
competition policy on all levels of international interactions.  
Compliance with competition policy continues to remain an unfulfilled dream in 
Nigeria and it is plausible that it is caused by important stakeholders such as SFGs 
being excluded from the process. When central (federal) agencies enjoy a monopoly 
in monitoring competition policy, ‘regulatory capture’ can occur.114 In the case of 
Nigeria, regulatory capture is exemplified in the privatisation process of public 
utilities, where the control of the privatisation process by the Bureau for Public 
Enterprise (BPE) - the federal agency having the prerogative for privatisation- has 
raised question marks about the legitimacy and transparency of the process. It is 
argued that the exclusive prerogative enjoyed by the BPE has effectively created 
more monopolies in Nigeria. For example, controversies have surrounded the undue 
advantage which Transcorp PLC enjoyed in the privatisation process in Nigeria 
during Obasanjo’s presidential tenure.115 Transcorp has taken over major public 
utilities amidst reports of improprieties which exist in its holding structure, 
incorporation and listing on the Nigerian Stock Exchange.
116
 According to a report 
by Ikita, ‘…Transcorp’s shares were listed in the Nigeria Stock Exchange (NSE) 
even without any certificate of incorporation issued by the Corporate Affairs 
Commission (CAC), the registrar of companies in Nigeria.’117 The broader 
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implication of this kind of practice is that competition policy, which has become an 
important aspect of international trade relations in this current dispensation, requires 
competing regulatory actors such as SFGs which can create a redundancy effect in 
competition regulation. Schapiro in his ‘Polyphonic’ conceptualisation of federalism 
describes ‘regulatory redundancy’ as a situation where there is overlapping 
regulation from different levels of government which serves as a fail-safe mechanism 
and encourages innovation because one regulator need not maintain its status quo if 
other regulators have back-up measures in place.
118
 
Another example which demonstrates the incompatibility of central exclusivity with 
the current dispensation of international trade relations is found in the financial 
sector. In the pre – globalisation era, it was possible to justify centralised regulation 
of international financial interactions because there was a well-defined understanding 
of the permissible actors which could be involved in international finance 
arrangements and the type of international financial arrangements recognised by 
international law. Under this dispensation, it was easier adhering to central 
exclusivity in foreign relations because the constitutional understanding of the 
permissible participants in international relations made it difficult for SFGs to 
interact in the international financial system. This was an era when state practice was 
the only recognised standard in international relations. However with the advent of 
globalisation process, there was an evolution of the international financial system 
characterised by integration of domestic financial systems into an international 
financial system.
119
 An obvious consequence of integration has been an increase in 
external regulatory cooperation among the financial systems of the world.
120
  
The emergence of a globalised financial system has also had an inward contraction 
effect which penetrates the domestic regulatory framework of federal setups. This 
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effect is evidenced by the fact that SFGs are now permissible actors in international 
financial arrangements. For example in this dispensation, ‘The World Bank and the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC, the Bank’s private sector arm) are jointly 
encouraging sub-national lending to states or provinces, aimed at boosting direct 
engagement at the state or municipal level.’121  In India, this has become a prominent 
issue which is attributed to the economic liberalisation reforms she embarked on in 
the 1990s.
122
 Sridharan is of the view that economic liberalisation reforms have 
‘given the Indian states unforeseen opportunities to sprout an external wing.’123 One 
way in which the states in India have expressed themselves is by ‘conducting 
negotiations and concluding agreements with international economic institutions 
such as the Asian Development Bank…’124 Jenkins argues that the importance of 
these activities of the Indian state should not be exaggerated because the central 
government has still maintained a level of control over the process.
125
 However, it 
points to the manifestation of an outcome which came about by a process of 
economic liberalisation in India. Furthermore, it shows a shift from the old 
constitutional paradigm of central exclusivity and the emergence of a new process of 
international financial cooperation. In essence, the process of economic liberalisation 
coupled with the globalisation effect in international financing lead to an outcome 
where SFGs became active participants in international financial arrangements. More 
importantly, this has led to a paradigm shift in the constitutional arrangement in India 
so as to cater for the outcome.
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Based on the inadequacies identified with the existing status quo of central 
exclusivity, it is now pertinent to consider the viability of cooperative federalism as 
an alternative viewpoint relating to the constitutional allocation of powers between 
the central and SFGs on matters of international trade. The aim in the next section is 
to appraise cooperative federalism as a replacement for central exclusivity in foreign 
affairs federalism in light of the outcomes which have emerged from a process of 
evolution in the international trade system. 
5.4 Cooperative Federalism in International Relations 
Cooperative federalism is a model of federalism which falls under the ‘non – dual’ 
categorisation of federalism. Cooperative federalism represents a mid-point between 
the orthodox dualised conceptualisation of federalism and revisionist decentralisation 
theories; which are the extreme opposite of central exclusivity in the foreign affairs 
federalism spectrum.  
Cooperative federalism entails a process of federal relations where different levels of 
government in a federal setup work together as complementary parts in a shared legal 
sphere.
127
 This could mean joint participation by each level of government in the 
formation and/or implementation of policies achieved either through formal or 
informal channels. According to Bader, ‘Cooperative federalism occupies a 
regulatory middle ground that best realizes the values of federalism, while 
simultaneously creating a useful paradigm shift away from dualist, regulatory-
centred thinking about federalism.’128 Cooperation could be achieved through 
dialogue between institutions at different levels of government which form or 
influence the policy output of the federal setup.  
Cooperative federalism can be mistaken for other alternative dynamic federalism 
theories, because ‘Dynamic federalism has been a practically natural outgrowth of 
cooperative federalism.’129 However, Bader draws a distinction between cooperative 
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federalism and dynamic federalism.
130
 His distinction is premised on the view that 
dynamic federalism entails overlapping regulatory jurisdiction while cooperative 
federalism situates uniformity and finality for first-order norms at the national level 
while allowing dialogue and plurality at the level of state implementation of those 
norms.
131
 He also argues that dynamic federalism is limited in terms of the 
parameters for dialogue and is dependent on formal enactments that produce contrary 
or inconsistent results. On the other hand, cooperative federalism invites dialogue on 
multiple interconnected planes, including during the adoption of law through the 
political process and the formulation and enforcement of state-specific 
implementation strategies.
132
  
Cooperative federalism is not alien to the federalism discourse especially in relation 
to the internal workings of a federal system. However in the foreign relations sphere, 
it is an idea which has struggled to gain acceptance due to the existing status quo 
which regards foreign affairs as a category where the central government has plenary 
powers. In the US, the focus in the preceding section, even though there has been a 
shift in emphasis from dual to cooperative federalism on the domestic front foreign 
affairs has been more resistant to such changes. According to Schütze, in the US, 
‘The particularly aggressive presumption in favour of a federal pre-emption still 
makes foreign affairs special affairs.’133 Schütze however points out that ‘…even if 
the presumption in favour of federal pre-emption is much stronger in the external 
sphere than in the internal sphere, this milder version of foreign affairs 
exceptionalism [in the US] can ultimately be integrated into a cooperative federal 
picture.’134 This shows that cooperative federalism is not totally incompatible with 
foreign affairs even though it has struggled to gain ground in the US. This view is 
supported by the fact that in other jurisdictions such as Canada (North America) and 
Belgium (Europe), the concept of cooperative federalism in foreign affairs has found 
greater expression. It is understandable why cooperative federalism has found 
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significant expression in Canada because the Canadian federalism has a loose 
structure which makes it closer to a confederation. In regard to Belgium, which is 
deeply fragmented along cultural and linguistic lines, cooperative federalism has 
evolved into a distinct institutional mechanism in the foreign policy sphere. The 
Canadian and Belgian experiences will be considered below. Studying the origin and 
historical evolution of cooperative federalism in these two systems is useful for 
identifying the normative characteristics of cooperative federalism in foreign 
relations. This is because the two systems provide distinctively dissimilar models. 
Canada is very informal and flexible; while Belgium is very formal and highly 
institutionalised. 
5.4.1 Cooperative Federalism in International Trade Relations: The Canadian 
Experience.  
The constitutional configuration of the federal system in Canada is premised on a 
relationship where the provinces have considerable autonomy from the central 
government in Ottawa.
135
 With regards to international trade relations, Canada’s 
involvement in global trade has not been exclusively controlled by the central 
government. This is mainly due to the constitutional uncertainty surrounding the 
allocation of powers on matters of international trade relations.
136
 The constitutional 
provisions which relate to the allocation of powers between the central government 
and provinces for foreign relations include the treaty-making power, the trade and 
commerce power, and the Peace, Order and Good Government (POGG) clause in the 
Constitution Act, 1867.
137
 These constitutional provisions did not give the federal 
government explicit control over foreign policy at the time of Confederation.
138
 The 
only reference to the central government’s role in international relations under the 
Constitution Act, 1867 is found in s 132, which grants the Dominion the authority to 
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implement treaties negotiated by Great Britain.
139
 However over time, the central 
government’s dominance over foreign affairs has expanded.140 For example, 
Kukucha points out that in terms of treaty making the precedent from the case 
Reference re: Weekly Rest in Industrial Undertakings Act (the “Labour Conventions” 
case)
141
 was to the effect that the central government had the power to negotiate 
international treaties, only that it did not have the right to implement agreements in 
areas of provincial jurisdiction.
142
This supposes a dualised conceptualisation of 
foreign affairs in Canada. However in subsequent cases, the Supreme Court of 
Canada took a cautious stance and did not rely on the precedence from the ‘Labour 
Convention case’ in favour of either level of government, preferring instead to 
maintain a balance between federal and provincial authority in this area.
143
This was 
presumably calculated to encourage cooperation between the central government and 
the provinces on matters of foreign relations. In relation to the scope of trade and 
commerce power available to the central government under the Constitution Act, 
1867, Kukucha points out that while Parliament was given control over the 
regulation of trade and commerce by virtue of section 91(2) of the Constitution Act, 
1867,
144
 this exclusive control was in reality subject to limitations. The limitations 
arose from the fact that the provinces were granted jurisdiction over property and 
civil rights including the regulation of contracts; that had a significant impact on the 
conduct of international trade.
145
 
The outlook of these provisions and the interpretation given by the courts show that 
the central government has enjoyed only a slight advantage over the provinces in 
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relation to foreign affairs. The provinces have capitalised on these opportunities to 
express themselves at the international level, particularly in relation to trade 
promotion and the opening of trade offices in other countries.
146
  
In relation to the multilateral and regional trade systems which are the focus of this 
thesis, the central government has a more significant advantage over the provinces 
because international law has frowned upon the direct participation of SFGs in 
international trade agreements.
147
 However, it is in this regard that cooperative 
federalism has flourished in Canada. Kukucha comments that for international trade 
policy: 
…a slightly different relationship between Ottawa and the Provinces has 
evolved, primarily over issues of consultation and participation. At the 
international level, foreign trade agreements now include areas of sub-
federal jurisdiction, such as services, agriculture, alcohol, government 
procurement, national health and safety standards, energy, and 
environment and labour issues.
148
  
With Canada’s involvement in the multilateral negotiations of the GATT from the 
onset of the multilateral trade system in 1947, elements of cooperative federalism 
based on a federal-provincial committee system began to emerge in Canada’s 
interaction with the international trade system. This system evolved in response to 
‘(a) constitutional ambiguity regarding the role of the provinces in Canadian foreign 
policy and (b) the increasing relevance of non-central governments in this policy 
area.’149  
During the Kennedy rounds of GATT negotiations in the 1960s, consultation 
between Ottawa and the provinces on issues of international trade negotiation was 
already evident. Kukucha reports that  
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During the Kennedy Round, for example, some Provinces submitted 
formal reports on tariff policy to the federal government and called for 
greater involvement in the negotiations. Ottawa’s response was tentative, 
however, and there was little indication that it would consider an 
expanded provincial role.
150
  
Even though Ottawa was still sceptical about the involvement of the provinces at this 
point in time, this marked the birth of channels of cooperation between the provinces 
and Ottawa in relation to international trade negotiations.  
During the Tokyo round of GATT negotiations, the provinces became more active in 
international trade negotiations possibly because international trade norms were 
becoming increasingly interwoven into the domestic space of the Canadian 
federalism.
151
Kukucha reports that:  
By the time the Tokyo Round began in 1973, however, GATT’s focus 
had shifted to the difficult issue of non-tariff barriers (NTBs). 
Negotiations on visible tariffs were replaced by discussions of subsidies, 
government procurement, and other technical barriers. Sectoral 
negotiations on fisheries, resource-based products, and agriculture also 
involved areas of provincial jurisdiction. This is why the Provinces 
demanded direct consultation with Ottawa. The federal government 
understood that, given the scope of the issues involved, it would need the 
support of the Provinces in order to negotiate a binding international 
agreement under GATT’s federal state clause.152 
This intrusion of international trade disciplines during the ‘Tokyo round’ of 
negotiations necessitated the strengthening of linkages between Ottawa and the 
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provinces. Canada’s commitments under the multilateral trade negotiations of the 
GATT led to growing concerns for the provincial governments over federal policy 
initiatives that challenged SFG interests.
153
 In response, the provinces ‘especially 
Québec, Ontario, and Alberta, began to demand a more inclusive role in the 
formulation of Canadian foreign trade policy.’154 Ottawa responded by attempting to 
institutionalise the interests of the provinces within the Canadian international trade 
mechanism by including a new Federal Provincial Coordination Division (FPCD) 
under the Ministry of External Affairs. The FPCD became responsible for keeping 
the provinces informed of all relevant Canadian international initiatives.
155
Other 
formal mechanisms for the input of the provinces in international trade negotiations 
included the Canadian Trade and Tariffs Committee (CTTC) introduced during 
the ‘Tokyo round.’156 The CTTC was responsible for gathering briefs from 
businesses, unions, consumer groups, the provinces and other interested parties 
during the Tokyo Round of negotiations at the GATT.
157
 Subsequently, an ‘…ad hoc 
federal-provincial committee of deputy ministers was established in 1975, which was 
replaced by a Canadian Coordinator for Trade Negotiations (CCTN) in 1977.’158 
In 1985, during the build-up to the negotiations of the Canada-US Free Trade 
Agreement (CUFTA) Agreement, ‘The Premiers of British Columbia, Alberta, 
Saskatchewan and Manitoba all announced their support for “full provincial 
participation.”’159 This led to a commitment to continued consultation within the 
CCTN.
160
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After the CUFTA agreement was implemented in 1987, the CCTN metamorphosed 
into the Committee for the Free Trade Agreement (CFTA) with each province 
having one official representative.
161
 A series of consultative committees were also 
instituted within various provincial departments to cater for sectorial concerns.
162
 
The use of such committees became popular in the central government - provincial 
relationship on international trade negotiations throughout the 1980s.
163
 For example 
during negotiations for the NAFTA, an additional committee - the Committee for 
North American Free Trade Negotiations (CNAFTN) was introduced along with 
the CFTA.
164
  
Although the CNAFTN was tailored specifically for the NAFTA negotiations, it 
subsequently metamorphosed into the Federal-Provincial- Territorial Trade 
Committee (CTRADE) system. CTRADE is the current federal – provincial 
cooperation forum in Canada. It involves a series of meetings between Ottawa and 
the provinces which are held four times annually.
165
 Both levels of government 
engage in consultations and information sharing, which includes Ottawa making 
draft documents available to the provinces when Canada enters negotiations in areas 
of provincial jurisdiction.
166
 ‘The provinces are encouraged to provide feedback and 
guidance on these proposals and federal negotiators are sensitive to the economic 
interests of the provinces.’167In addition to the CTRADE forum, Kukucha identifies 
three other forms of consultation which take place between federal and provincial 
governments on matters relating to international trade:  
First, there is almost always more than one department at the provincial 
level in contact with Ottawa on international trade matters. Many of the 
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larger Provinces have specific departments to coordinate CTrade and 
other foreign trade policy considerations. And even where these 
coordinating mechanisms exist, most Provinces have other officials 
responsible for trade policy in a wide range of departments. Ministries of 
environment, agriculture, finance, and forestry all have interests related 
to international economic policy that need to be protected.
168
  
In summary, cooperation between Ottawa and the provinces on matters of 
international trade policy has been the most distinct expression of cooperative 
federalism in Canada. Based on the successes achieved in the international trade 
policy sphere, there have been calls for this model to be transplanted to other policy 
areas such as labour and the environment.
169
 In addition, constitutional formalisation 
of the existing channels of cooperation has been demanded by some provinces but 
rejected by Ottawa.
170
Although the system is without any constitutional 
entrenchment, its development over the years has largely been very successful in 
maintaining the balance between the provinces and the central government at Ottawa 
and has led to the crystallisation of a system of cooperative federalism in Canada’s 
international trade policy mechanism.   
5.4.2 Cooperative Federalism in International Trade Relations: The Belgian 
Experience 
Belgium is made up of three Communities (the Flemish Community, the French 
Community and the German-speaking Community); three Regions (the Flemish 
Region, the Walloon Region and the Brussels Region); and four linguistic regions 
(the Dutch-speaking region, the French speaking region, the bilingual region of 
Brussels-Capital and the German-speaking region).
171
 In view of the multifarious 
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composition of the Belgian state, the federal system in operation in Belgium has 
evolved in tandem with these diversities.
172
  
With regard to the conduct of foreign policy, there is a formal constitutional structure 
for shared competence and cooperation among the component units of the Belgian 
federation.
173
 This formalized process of cooperation is encapsulated in Art 167 (1) 
of the 2007 Belgium Constitution which stipulates inter alia for shared competence 
between the King, Communities and Regions ‘To regulate international cooperation, 
including the concluding of treaties, for those matters that fall within their 
competences in pursuance of or by virtue of the Constitution.’174  
This constitutional arrangement between the components of the Belgian federation 
has been progressively negotiated over time through a series of Special Acts on the 
Belgian Federal State Reform. Notable constitutional milestones in the development 
of the Belgian foreign policy system include The Institutional Reform Act of 8 
August 1988. This Act introduced the constitutional principle of in foro interno in 
foro externo and the absence of hierarchy between different levels of 
administration.
175
 The terms in foro interno in foro externo are Latin phrases which 
literally mean: in foro interno (‘in the inner court’) and in foro externo (‘in the outer 
court’).176 In the context of foreign policy in foro interno in foro externo are used in 
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the context of how the external competences of the regions in Belgium are directly 
correlated with their internal competence under the Belgium constitution.
177
 
According to Paquin, the implication of this is that ‘Belgian SFGs possess a true 
international legal personality and, in practice, this means that foreign countries and 
international organizations can, if they want, negotiate and conclude real treaties with 
Belgium’s SFGs.’178 
The revision of the Constitution in 1993 built on the 1988 reform by further adapting 
the organization of Belgium’s cooperation mechanism for international relations 
along the unique configuration of the Belgian federal system.
179
 This led to the 
introduction of three distinct categories of agreements in Belgium: 1) treaties that 
exclusively involve the powers of the federal government and that are concluded and 
ratified by this same federal government; 2) treaties related exclusively to 
community or regional powers and that are concluded and ratified by communities 
and regions; and 3) mixed treaties.
180
 Paquin explains how each category of treaties 
works thus: 
When a treaty project is brought to the attention of the federal 
government, it must inform the other levels of government. The regions 
and communities can then ask to be a party to the treaty if it affects their 
fields of jurisdiction. It is only after negotiation between the various 
parties that there is a decision about the category of the proposed treaty. 
When an agreement involves federal powers and either community or a 
regional power at the same time, the treaty is concluded according to a 
special procedure convened among the different orders of government. It 
must also be approved by all of the parliaments involved. Mixed treaties 
require twenty different steps to complete the whole procedure.
181
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In the context of international trade relations, these special reforms have empowered 
the three regions in Belgium with competences for determining policy with regard to 
international trade in areas such as foreign markets and exports (without prejudice to 
any national policy to coordinate and promote foreign trade and to cooperate in that 
area).
182
 
This unique approach adopted by Belgium is not without its challenges. Essentially, 
the model of shared competence adopted creates a complex labyrinth of actors and 
multifaceted issues. To cater for these complexities, the constitutional reforms have 
introduced institutional and constitutional checks. For example, the 1993 reform 
introduced three notable constitutional restrictions on the powers of the regions in 
relation to their activities in the international arena. First, there is the substitution 
mechanism under art 169 of the 1993 and 2007 Constitutions. This states that if a 
region does not adhere to an international or EU commitment and it is convicted by 
an international court, then the central government can substitute for the region (but 
not the other way round) to ensure compliance.
183
 According to Bursens and 
Massart-Pierad, this restriction was introduced in anticipation that shared 
competence between the regions and the federal government on foreign policy could 
lead to coordination problems.
184
 Second, it was stipulated in the reform of 1993 that 
the foreign policy activity of the regions must not contradict the broad orientations of 
the commonly agreed foreign policy of the Belgian state (this refers to areas of 
shared ideology such as democracy, national security etc.).
185
 Third, the regions and 
communities are obliged to inform the federal government of any foreign activities 
they are involved in.
186
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Another constitutional method adopted to ensure coordination on foreign policy is 
the use of Cooperation Agreements.
187
 According to Bursens and Massart-Pierad, 
Cooperation Agreements ‘broadly frame the application of Belgium’s external 
relations by involving the various bodies involved.’188 In essence, these agreements 
are intended to ensure that all the relevant stakeholders to foreign relations in 
Belgium are carried along concerning decisions made by any particular actor. An 
example of such a Cooperation Agreement is the one between the regions and the 
federal government, catering for Belgium’s participation in the EU Council of 
Ministers. Under this agreement, ministers of the federative states can represent 
Belgium and conclude agreements in its name.
189
 
The institutional checks available to ensure coordination on foreign policy are mainly 
in the form of committees which are designed to maximise effective coordination by 
minimising potential friction among stakeholders. For example, there is the Inter-
ministerial Committee on Foreign Policy (ICFP).
190
 The ICFP Secretariat is 
maintained by the Foreign Service in charge of relations with Communities and 
Regions.
191
 It does not meet on a regular basis with an average of two meetings 
happening per year.
192
 Therefore, the system also relies on informal meetings 
between cabinet-level personnel and civil servants from both levels of 
government.
193
 The primary objective of this committee is to minimise friction in the 
coordination mechanism on foreign policy by dealing with political conflicts.
194
 It 
achieves this through a mechanism of dialogue and information exchange between 
the centre and the regions.
195
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From the foregoing, it is clear that compliance with international trade norms in 
Belgium is a product of joint participation by the central government and regional 
governments under a formalised and constitutionally recognised framework. 
Compared with Canada, the intergovernmental mechanisms in Belgium are highly 
institutionalised.
196
 As such, Belgium’s compliance with international trade 
agreements is negotiated by all stakeholders and any decision reached is deemed to 
be the common position of the Belgian state.
197
 At this oint in the analysis, the focus 
has been on describing the key elements of cooperative federalism as found in the 
two federal systems discussed above. In chapter six, the deficiencies in the operation 
of cooperative federalism in these two federal jurisdictions are considered.
198
 
5.4.3 The Normative Characteristics of Cooperative Federalism in 
International Trade Relations 
From the details of the relationship between the provinces/regions and the central 
governments in the two countries discussed above, some distinct normative 
characteristics of cooperative federalism in international trade relations can be 
deduced.  
Cooperative federalism in international trade relations is based on intergovernmental 
cooperation amongst relevant stakeholders to the international trade process in a 
federal system.
199
 The experiences in Canada and Belgium demonstrate that the core 
theory of cooperative federalism is reflected in the level of flexibility and 
coordination in the relationships between different levels of government in a federal 
system.
200
 Cooperative federalism is workable in multiple subject areas (e.g. trade, 
environment, culture and education) which are of mutual interest to all the levels of 
government in a federal system. However, the level of cooperation obtainable in any 
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subject area depends on the priority level given the subject matter (both by the 
central and SFGs) and whether or not the subject matter falls under an area which 
Criekemans categorises as ‘conflictual’ or ‘cooperational.’201 According to him, 
areas which are ‘conflictual’ are usually less amenable to strong cooperation between 
levels of government.
202
 Based on this categorisation, it is argued that issues relating 
to international trade are usually of high priority for both central governments and 
SFGs because trade and investment is essential to the survival and development of 
the state as a whole; hence they are ‘cooperational’ and ideal for the emergence of 
cooperative frameworks. Both the Canadian and Belgian experiences demonstrate 
that international trade is a ‘cooperational’ subject matter. As international trade 
norms have expanded into areas where the provinces/regions have competence 
and/or interest for their development objectives, it became imperative for a 
framework for coordination to emerge so as to ensure that the interests of all 
stakeholders are effectively aligned.
203
  
In some instances, cooperation becomes necessary where a particular subject matter 
has a transnational impact which the central government is incapable of effectively 
handling alone. As such, cooperative federalism becomes a functional imperative 
(irrespective of a formal or informal structure in place) which is necessary if such an 
issue-area is to be effectively handled.
204
  
Climate change is an example of a subject matter having transnational impact which 
has proved difficult for central governments to handle without coordinating with 
other SFGs and non-state actors. Kaswan supports this view by proposing the 
application of cooperative federalism model to climate-change legislation in federal 
systems (in particular, she emphasises the need for federal regulators to work with 
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states to develop implementation plans) primarily because central governments 
cannot achieve its goals working alone.
205
 
Cooperative federalism operates through formal and informal channels which present 
a forum for dialogue between the different levels of government on ‘…multiple 
interconnected planes, including during the adoption of law through the political 
process and the formulation and enforcement of state-specific implementation 
strategies.’206 Dialogue in this sense is purposeful and done with terms of reference 
which are designed to encourage participation (proactive and reactionary input) by 
SFGs in the international trade process. According to Bader, ‘In cooperative models, 
states must engage both federal and local authorities in interpreting and 
implementing federal regulatory schemes. Without their participation, the system 
would not exist.’207 The Canadian experience shows that Ottawa had to demonstrate 
a sense of commitment to implementing the mechanisms for cooperation between 
them and the central government or risk having the provinces exploit the loopholes in 
the constitutional provisions to take counterproductive action. The provinces had 
already demonstrated their ability to disrupt the international relations objectives of 
Ottawa if they were not given proper audience. Therefore, Ottawa was sensible 
enough to bring the provinces on board, irrespective of their reservations.
208
 The 
Canadian experience also shows that the contribution of the provinces was not a 
mere formality. For example, during the negotiations of the US – Canada FTA, the 
provinces justified their inclusion in the process. Kukucha, quoting Brown stated 
that:  
[T]he degree of input from the Provinces exceeded that of most other 
domestic actors, including the private sector, other federal departments 
and [P]arliament. Only the TNO itself, the Prime Minister’s Office and 
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the special sub-committee of the federal cabinet on trade appeared to 
have greater access to the negotiating process.
209
  
The scope of cooperative federalism in international trade is not restricted only to 
dialogue but also extends to ‘permitted policy action’ taken by SFGs. This is usually 
coordinated and supervised by the central government. This is demonstrated in the 
Belgian example where permitted policy action by the regions is backed by 
constitutional provisions but is still controlled by checks and balances such as the use 
of cooperation agreements and the constitutional restrictions under art 169 of the 
Belgian Constitution. The Belgian example shows that these permitted policy actions 
are not restricted only to the implementation and enforcement aspects of the 
international trade process (as is the case in Canada) but also include active 
participation in the negotiation process.
210
 This does not mean that the extent of the 
input of the SFGs in the policy process of federal systems is dependent on the level 
of legitimacy which SFGs are accorded within the regime. As Gerken points out, the 
power of dissent is another way in which the SFGs (this encompasses a broader 
scope of minority state and non-state actors in a federal system) can contribute to the 
policy process in federal systems.
211
 The effectiveness of dissent as a tool for 
facilitating cooperation in the area of international trade relations is identifiable in 
the Canadian experience. For example, during the Doha multilateral negotiation and 
the NAFTA negotiation processes, the provinces’ objection to certain issues was 
reflected in the final negotiation position adopted by Canada.
212
 Specifically, 
Kukucha identifies that the original US proposal for art 2.2 of the WTO Agreement 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM), which Washington intended to 
use as a limitation on the competitive state subsidies in Canada, was opposed by 
Canada because the provinces- specifically Ontario and Quebec- opposed it during 
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the negotiation process.
213
 In effect, cooperation can be achieved directly (where 
there is constitutional enfranchisement, as is the case in Belgium) or indirectly by 
dissent and/or pressure (where there is none or limited constitutional 
enfranchisement, as is the case in Canada).
214
 
Cooperative federalism places more emphasis on the political process rather than 
judicial interference. In relation to international trade relations in Canada, the courts 
have been cautious in their pronouncements, ensuring that their interpretations on the 
allocation of powers between the central and SFGs on matters of international trade 
relations do not overtly favour one side to the detriment of the other. Erin Ryan’s 
system of ‘negotiated federalism’ which is a cooperative federalism model, supports 
this position advocating that the courts in their review of central – state relationships 
should accord more deference to a result where greater political and classic 
bargaining safeguards exist.
215
 She argues that this will help mediate the tension or 
the ‘tug of war’ between the core normative values of federalism.216 Referring to the 
Canadian example, Kukucha points out that the Supreme Court of Canada was 
cautious in its pronouncements after the ‘Labour Convention’ case 217 in a bid to 
maintain a balance between federal and provincial authority in this issue-area.
218
This 
was presumably done to allow the political process to flourish seeing as judicial 
interference tends to take sides which leads to constitutional line-drawing and 
conflict.  This does not mean that the judiciary is not involved in the process; rather 
cooperative federalism advocates that the role of the judiciary should be as a 
facilitator for the enhancement of the cooperation process. Bader points out that in 
view of the ever growing challenges facing federal systems, ‘Instead of fighting and 
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line-drawing, the Court and regulators can [sic] seek to work together in order to 
solve problems which have become ever more complex.’219 This has been 
particularly important in international trade relations because the evolving 
international trade system has placed more demands on federal relations, which 
necessitates cooperation.  
The above example shows that cooperative federalism does not mean the absence of 
conflict in the central – state relationship. Irrespective of its quality as a position of 
compromise between centralisation and decentralisation, it is inevitable that 
compromise is not always achieved amicably. Thus, cooperative federalism entails 
the participants to the process disagreeing to agree. This could mean hard fought 
battles and the necessity of judicial intervention to settle issues that the political 
process cannot resolve. For example, in relation to ‘inter jurisdictional grey areas’ 
where there are no clear boundaries of state or federal powers, Erin Ryan has urged 
the Court to adopt a deferential test in ascertaining which level of government should 
prevail on a policy issue.
220
 
Cooperative federalism does not focus primarily on how to achieve state regulatory 
autonomy, but rather seeks to explore practical methods for balancing national and 
state power in relation to specific subject areas which are of mutual interest to both 
levels of government. For example, cooperative federalism models such as ‘Balanced 
Federalism’ and ‘Uncooperative Federalism’ emphasise the need for state 
participation in the policy formulation process instead of pursuing state regulatory 
autonomy.
221
 ‘This way, states thereby gain ex ante and ex post opportunities to 
influence federal law.’222 This makes the process flexible and open to both formal 
and informal methods for achieving mutual agreement on policy issues.
223
 The EU’s 
model of multilevel-governance via the instrumentality of the subsidiarity principle 
is a good example which demonstrates the range of flexibility possible with a 
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cooperative approach to balancing competing rights in a federal process.
224
 With the 
aid of Open Methods of Coordination (OMC) such as reflexive harmonisation, the 
EU has designed practical ways to promote diversity in its rule-making by 
accommodating second order rule-making from the state and non-state actors within 
the member states.
225
 To maintain standards and ensure the promotion of best 
practices, the Commission sets benchmarks as a framework for these SFGs to act.
226
 
The EU’s soft law approach has not been selected for in-depth analysis because the 
application of these cooperative methods of rule-making are not applicable to 
international trade; it is within the exclusive competence of the EU Commission 
because it falls under the Commission’s express external competence to act on 
commercial policy.
227
  
From these examples, it is clear that cooperative federalism can manifest with or 
without constitutional commitment as demonstrated by the different approaches 
adopted by Canada and Belgium respectively. What is essential in the cooperative 
federalism structure is that two or more levels of government in a federal setup 
establish complementary legal rules or fora within a policy area.
228
 
The characteristics which have been identified above show that cooperative 
federalism is a theory of intergovernmental cooperation applicable to federal setups, 
which can exist either as a constitutional doctrine or as a functional manifestation of 
joint participation on a specific policy area. The normative characteristics of this 
theory which have been deduced from the Canadian example show that it is 
applicable to international trade relations. In the next section, the theory will be 
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appraised based on its advantages and disadvantages so as to ascertain how credible 
it is as an alternative framework of choice to replace constitutional exclusivity in 
Nigeria’s international trade interactions.  
5.4.5 The Advantages and Disadvantages of Cooperative Federalism in 
International Trade Relations. 
Advantages 
1. Cooperative federalism as a corrective to dual federalism 
Cooperative federalism is widely acclaimed as a successor and a corrective to dual 
federalism.
229
 With the criticisms which have been levelled against dual federalism 
in light of the changes in international relations, cooperative federalism has been 
heralded as a more practical way of managing federal – state relations.230 In the 
context of international trade relations, this has been a very intriguing transition 
because foreign relations (including international trade) has for a long time been 
regarded as immune from the dictates of federalism. However, a nuanced shift in 
ideology has gradually occurred and this places cooperative federalism in a vantage 
position over other alternative federal models. This is because cooperative federalism 
seeks to balance the competing interests within a flexible framework which is not 
dependent only on constitutional formality to operate. Thus, it promotes shared 
competence between levels of governments while maintaining the distinct 
characteristic of ensuring that the uniformity and stability which come from central 
oversight are not discarded. Furthermore, cooperative federalism shifts the focus 
away from the sovereignty debate and calls for state autonomy and rather focuses on 
ensuring that the interests of both levels of government are adequately represented in 
the policy output of the federal set-up.  
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2. Cooperative federalism encourages participation of all stakeholders to the 
international economic relations   
The cooperative federalism framework makes room for the participation of all 
relevant stakeholders (state and non – state alike) in the international trade process 
without necessitating a radical reform of the constitutional framework in place. In 
line with the working criteria adopted in chapter four outlining the attributes of an 
ideal trade policy framework, cooperative federalism is a good fit for achieving these 
ideals. This is because cooperative federalism gives ample room for the 
representations of all stakeholders proportionate to their relevance in the trade 
process. It transcends a rigid conception of selective relevance to the trade process 
which is found in the existing status quo of central exclusivity in international trade 
relations. For example in Nigeria, the centralised policy model on international trade 
relations regards the federal (central) government as the only recognised subject of 
international trade; the importers and exporters under the auspices of their 
representative bodies are regarded as the objects of international trade, while the 
position of the SFGs has been a subject of controversy. More so, the practice of 
international law in the pre-globalisation era permitted such a status quo. However, 
in a new dispensation of international trade relations, cooperative federalism has the 
advantage of flexibility which can accommodate new actors into the trade process 
without necessitating a radical shift in the constitutional framework in place.  
3. Bottom-up approach to international trade policy formulation  
Cooperative federalism encourages a ‘bottom-up’ approach to international trade 
policy formulation. With the linkage between the different levels of government, 
cooperative federalism allows policy to emanate from the lower levels of government 
where there is the closest contact with the objects of international trade and make its 
way up to the upper echelons of the trade policy mechanism. The advantage of a 
‘bottom-up’ approach in policy formulation is that it enhances better implementation 
of trade policy; the lower levels of government have a sense of participation knowing 
their output is reflected in the international trade policy of the country. It also 
enhances the final output of international trade policy by encouraging the 
incorporation of trade concerns at the lower levels of government into the trade 
209 
 
policy output. Furthermore, it encourages knowledge sharing, regulatory 
experimentation and a learning process. 
4. Cooperative federalism can help to curb rebellious activities of sfgs in an 
era of complex international trade relations  
Cooperative federalism helps to enhance regulatory coherence and maintain peaceful 
coexistence in a dispensation of international trade relations characterised by 
opportunities for SFGs to engage in aggressive foreign policy which is detrimental to 
the general foreign policy objectives of the federal setup. This is because the output 
of SFGs does not go unsupervised under a cooperative model. The channels of 
interaction between SFGs and international trade partners are specified by mutual 
agreement between both parties so that SFGs are less likely to deviate from the 
established framework. Cooperative federalism actually makes it easier for a federal 
setup to operate in the international trade system with one voice and comes with the 
added benefit of diverse representation from its component units.   
Disadvantages  
In this section, the disadvantages of cooperative federalism and a response to these 
criticisms will be discussed.  
1. Cooperative federalism lacks substance because of its flexibility  
Based on its practical approach and flexibility, cooperative federalism has been 
criticised for not having any substance outside the parameters permitted by the 
federal government.
231
 Critics of the cooperative federalism model are of the view 
that the idea of ‘cooperation’ is decidedly one-sided because in practice, SFGs have 
autonomy only to the extent which the federal government allows.
232
 Schapiro, in his 
support of the views of Elazar, argues that ‘What cooperative federalism lacks is an 
adequately specified normative theory’ and that ‘Little work has been done to flesh 
out the constitutional framework of such a normative theory of cooperative 
federalism.’233 Thus, a perceived drawback with the cooperative federalism model is 
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that its quest to attain cooperation within a flexible framework makes it less 
amenable to a definite normative theoretical structure.  
Response to criticism  
This criticism is unfounded because a norm simply means ‘That which is a model or 
a pattern; a type, a standard.’234 These criticisms do not recognise the formal 
mechanism for cooperation which has progressively evolved in Belgium. More 
importantly, in the area of international trade, the Belgian experience shows a 
distinct pattern of engagement which is normatively distinguishable. This is 
encapsulated in the use of constitutional and institutional mechanisms for 
maximising the relationship between the regions and the central government. So, to 
criticise cooperative federalism as lacking an adequately specified normative theory 
means that it is devoid of any standard pattern. This is not correct because there are 
some specific qualities which have been identified from two different country 
experiences. For example, a distinguishable pattern of cooperative federalism 
deduced from Canada and Belgium is the use of committees which coordinate the 
interactions between stakeholders.  
2. Complications and conflict arising from overlapping regulations 
Based on the advantage of elasticity discussed earlier, a criticism of flexibility in the 
cooperation process is that like all other alternative federalism models which 
advocate shared competence it has the potential to create complications and conflict; 
arising from a labyrinth of overlapping regulations which emanate from different 
levels of government. Cooperation in a system of complex international economic 
interactions entails committing enormous resources and manpower to maintain the 
channels of communication between all relevant stakeholders. More so, it is argued 
that having so many representations in the foreign affairs sphere erodes the elements 
of finality and certainty which are important for efficient international relations.  
Response to criticism  
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This criticism is not unfounded because it is essential to have clarity and finality in 
the international relations. However, in view of the complexities which are inherent 
in the current dispensation of international economic relations, one noticeable 
consequence is that certainty, finality and clarity are no longer easy to achieve; even 
under the status quo of central exclusivity in international relations. For example, 
with the regional and multilateral trade system pulling at different directions, the 
international trade system has had to grapple with these complexities by 
acknowledging the realities of coexistence between regionalism and multilateralism. 
As such, the emergence of a labyrinth of complicated overlapping interactions 
between a federal system and the international economic system is not just a 
potential consequence if cooperative federalism is adopted, but a reality which 
already exists due to the external changes in institutional dynamics of international 
economic relations. Thus, it is argued that by encouraging interaction, dialogue, 
consultation and shared competence on interconnected planes, cooperative 
federalism serves a practical purpose in a quest for coherence within an already 
complex system. In essence, cooperation is a resonse to complications (rather than a 
cause of complications) which already exist in this dispensation of international 
economic relations.  
3. Conflict arising from overlapping regulation in the same legal sphere  
Another challenge with overlapping regulations is that it could lead to conflict. 
Cooperative federalism has been criticised by Schapiro for breeding conflict between 
the cooperating parties without providing a method for managing these conflicts.
235
 
He argues that ‘Cooperative federalism blesses the voluntary interaction of state and 
national government...’ but ‘…does little to sort out the conflicts that may arise in the 
relationship.’236These conflicts could arise between the horizontally arrayed 
components of the federal setup and also between the SFGs and the federal 
government.  
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Response to criticism  
This criticism is also inaccurate because cooperative federalism has a method for 
sorting out conflict arising from the process of cooperation. This is achieved though 
the political process and also with a limited interference of the courts. The Canadian 
experience shows that the interaction between the provinces and Ottawa was not 
always amicable during the development of the channels of cooperation on 
international trade negotiations.  
4. Cooperation based on shared competence could lead to sub-optimal 
regulation and create a ‘race to the bottom’ effect 
There is a danger that permitting SFGs to implement trade policy within a framework 
of shared competence could breed unhealthy competition amongst SFGs. This could 
arise when SFGs, in a bid to maximise the benefits of trade policy in its 
implementation within the domestic realm, lower regulatory standards to dangerous 
limits. This could lead to sub-optimal regulation and create a ‘race to the bottom’ 
effect. This is an issue normally associated with decentralisation i.e. regulatory 
competition. However, the aspect of cooperative federalism which permits shared 
competence on matters of implementation bears similar attributes with regulatory 
competition. It is this potential for competition among SFGs in an implementation 
strategy that could create a race to the bottom effect in a cooperative federalism 
model.  
Response to critisisim  
The empirical evidence emanating from the existing literature on regulation is not 
conclusive on the effect of decentralisation on the quality of regulation.
237
 Moreover, 
cooperative federalism offers a balanced form of decentralised regulation i.e. ‘a 
tempered policy-optimization process’ which has the advantage of central 
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supervision to ensure that regulation is only permitted at lower levels where it is 
efficient to do so.
238
 
 
5. Setting boundaries on the activities of sfgs conflicts with the flexibility 
attribute of cooperative federalism  
The concept of flexibility inherent in a cooperative federalism model is at variance 
with the notion of placing boundaries on the scope of SFG involvement in the 
international trade process. One of the criticisms made earlier is that cooperation is 
‘decidedly one sided because ‘states have autonomy only to the extent the federal 
government allows it.’  So if boundaries are put in place to ensure that SFGs toe the 
line of the central government’s overall foreign policy objectives, then the 
functionality of cooperative federalism as a flexible platform for joint participation 
between the central government and SFGs may be overestimated.  
The contradiction between flexibility and boundary setting is an issue which 
cooperative federalism faces in its theoretical validation in this new dispensation of 
international trade relations. There is an inevitability that the international trade 
system will continue to change and this could further increase the propensity for 
rebellious activities by SFGs. Thus, this thesis does not presume to explain away this 
deficiency in the theoretical strength of cooperative federalism concerning modern 
international trade relations. However, it can only be hoped that a balance can be 
struck between boundary setting and flexibility. According to Bader, cooperative 
federalism acknowledges the importance of central oversight but the ‘Cooperative 
models place measured emphasis on uniformity and finality.’  The key to finding the 
balance is in placing ‘measured emphasis’ on uniformity and finality. This way the 
quality of flexibility in cooperative federalism will not be sacrificed in a bid to check 
the excesses of SFGs on the international scene. 
 
5.4.6 Conclusion  
The arguments in this chapter are to the effect that flexibility is a core component of 
cooperative federalism while rigidity is found in the central exclusivity model. It was 
shown in the historical analysis of the American federalism that central exclusivity 
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has been very opposed to change in power allocation concerning matters of 
international trade relations.
239
 The insistence on a presumption in favour of central 
jurisdiction on matters of international trade is not consistent with the realities of 
international trade interactions in the 21
st
 century. Strict adherence to the 
conventional doctrine only creates a divergence between theory and reality. The 
practicability of cooperative federalism is that it is a sensible approach towards 
balancing constitutional tradition with functional realities in international trade 
relations in the 21
st
 century. Cooperative federalism may lack the concrete feel which 
comes from constitutional definition but its flexibility is an advantage which makes it 
a realistic model for managing international trade interaction in this new dispensation 
of international trade. Furthermore, considering the fact that there are uncertainties 
surrounding the emerging outlook of international trade in the coming years, 
adherence to a fixed structure seems inappropriate in the long run.  
Now that the existing and contending theories have been examined, the position of 
this thesis is that the attributes of cooperative federalism make it a practical method 
for balancing the external and internal process of Nigeria’s international trade 
mechanism. In the next chapter, the implementation of cooperative federalism in 
Nigeria will be examined.  
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Chapter Six: A Cooperative Approach for the Management of International 
Trade   Relations in Nigeria: A Case for Reforms. 
6.1 Introduction.  
In chapter three, it was argued that the international trade system has evolved to 
accommodate new actors (sub-national and non-state actors) in the international 
trade interaction of federal systems. With regard to Nigeria, the analysis carried out 
in chapter four identified that Nigeria’s foreign policy framework aligns with the 
conventional norm of central exclusivity; but in practice, the new dispensation of 
international trade relations permits SFGs in Nigeria to access the international 
scene.
1
  In chapter five, the conventional norm of central exclusivity in foreign 
relations was appraised and found to be deficient in view of the changing dynamics 
of international relations.
2
 In the context of international trade, it was argued that 
central exclusivity has become incompatible with the changing circumstances 
occurring globally.
3
 In that same chapter, cooperative federalism was appraised as an 
alternate model to central exclusivity for the management of international trade 
relations in federal systems.
4
 It was argued that cooperative federalism is better 
suited for effectively managing the new and existing stakeholders to the international 
trade process in federal systems under this new dispensation.
5
  
In this chapter, the normative characteristics of cooperative federalism will be 
applied to Nigeria’s international trade mechanism, so as to ascertain how feasible it 
is in practice. It will be argued in this chapter that for cooperative federalism to work 
in Nigeria’s international trade regime, the constitutional provisions and key 
institutions which were found to be deficient in chapter four must be re-structured.  
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6.1.1 Justifying the Need for Reforms 
Before proceeding to the suggestions for reform, it is pertinent at this point in the 
thesis to justify why it is necessary to depart from the conventional norm of central 
exclusivity in favour of cooperative federalism in Nigeria’s international trade 
framework. In view of the arguments which have been proffered in chapter four of 
the thesis, the justification for reforms in Nigeria is hinged on the proposition that the 
extant framework is deficient in view of the changing dynamics of international 
trade. It was argued that the configuration of the extant international trade framework 
in Nigeria hinders her ability to utilise international trade as a platform for achieving 
development under this dispensation of international trade.
6
 
To recap the key findings in chapter four, it was argued that Nigeria’s international 
trade regime is not flexible because the constitutional and institutional provisions for 
international trade interactions are rigidly concentrated in the central tier of 
government.
7
  
There is also no coherence/predictability in the extant framework because the inter-
governmental linkage between the central government and the SFGs lacks 
consistency especially in regard to the distribution of functions for Nigeria’s regional 
and multilateral trade engagements.
8
 It was argued that there is a lack of synergy 
between the policies of the FG and states in the FDI sector which has adversely 
affected the ease of doing business indicators in Nigeria.
9
 These inconsistencies in 
policy erode predictability in Nigeria’s trade regime because it is difficult to foretell 
how the actions of states which are unconstitutionally recognised will impact on the 
trade process. It was also argued that the constitutional exclusion of SFGs from the 
mainstream of Nigeria’s international trade interactions gives them the impetus to 
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capitalise on any gaps available to access the international scene and achieve their 
economic development agenda.
10
  
The existing framework also lacks transparency and accountability because in 
theory international trade is exclusively controlled by the central tier of government, 
but in practice SFGs are engaging in concurrent trade related activities which do not 
always align with the policy objectives of the FG. This creates confusion and lack of 
clarity for Nigeria’s foreign trade partners. The Nigerian international trade regime 
now consists of multiple actors (states and non-state actors alike) which are not 
aligned under an integrated framework due to their non-recognition under the 
existing constitutional framework. As a result, it becomes difficult to apportion 
responsibility for an action which is not constitutionally catered for and delineated.  
Finally, it is argued that the existing framework is not inclusive because it does not 
effectively combine the role of all the relevant stakeholders in Nigeria’s international 
trade process. Inclusive is used in the context of integration. In this sense, the 
framework required for international trade interactions in the current global 
economic order is inclusive of both market forces and institutional regulators. 
However in Nigeria, the extant framework sidelines SFGs and emphasises only the 
linkage between the FG and the Organised Private Sector (OPS).
11
  
In view of the deficiencies identified above, two major issues emerge. First, the 
empirical evidence indicates that the opportunities created under the current 
dispensation are increasingly being exploited by SFGs in Nigeria.
12
 Second, 
irrespective of the increased activities of SFGs on the international scene, they are 
still not recognised under the existing framework in Nigeria. As a consequence, it is 
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argued that the activities of SFGs have the potential to negatively affect Nigeria’s 
overall foreign policy objectives if not properly managed.
13
 
The activities of SFGs in Nigeria’s foreign interactions have already demonstrated 
the potential to create disguised restrictions and barriers to trade in the FDI sector. 
SFGs consider FDI a priority area because it is central to their development agenda.
14
 
However, SFGs are constitutionally excluded from foreign relations and the control 
of their economic resources. Thus, they devise ways to circumvent these restrictions 
by propagating policies within the limited scope of powers available to them. In the 
process, their policy actions are not always aligned with that of the FG. For example, 
the Nigerian Land tenure system is controlled by SFGs.
15
  SFGs also have powers to 
levy taxes.
16
 These two subject matters have been utilised by SFGs with varied 
outcomes. For example, the US in a report from its Trade Representative Office 
(USTR) has complained about ‘complex tax administration procedures, confusing 
land ownership laws…’ amongst other issues which hinder investment in Nigeria.17 
The activities of SFGs in Nigeria’s international trade interactions are not all 
potentially adverse to her foreign policy and economic development. It is also argued 
that mainstreaming the role of SFGs into the framework of Nigeria’s international 
trade process will be of immense benefit to Nigeria’s international trade interactions. 
This is because under the new dispensation, a coordinated effort of all stakeholders 
(within and external to the nation-state) is important for achieving coherence in a 
complicated labyrinth of international trade interactions.
18
 Furthermore, in the new 
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dispensation of international trade relations (especially with the new regionalism), 
opportunities have opened up for SFGs to access the international trade scene 
through the FDI platform. This can be beneficial to Nigeria if SFGs are empowered 
to explore these channels to maximise their economic potential. 
The caveat in these arguments is that mainstreaming SFGs into the framework for 
Nigeria’s international trade interactions must be carefully thought through.  This is 
because a departure from the conventional norm of central exclusivity in Nigeria’s 
international trade interactions will only be justified if the alternative option 
proffered is feasible, in view of the political and economic peculiarities of the 
Nigerian federal system.
19
 This is because the dynamic nature of federalism does not 
present any universally acceptable method for effectively managing relations among 
the component units of a federal system. Thus, situating international trade relations 
within the federalism debate in Nigeria is not a solution in itself. Rather, the 
emphasis should be on fashioning a system which fits the peculiarities of the 
Nigerian state so as to achieve a pragmatic outcome.
20
 Furthermore, the analysis in 
the previous chapter has shown that central exclusivity has some undeniable qualities 
which are crucial for the management of trade relations, irrespective of the current 
state of international trade. As such, it is only practical that any response to the 
changing dynamics of international trade must be tempered and realistic. This is the 
reason why a radical shift from central exclusivity to revisionist decentralisation is 
not advocated in this thesis. Certainty, accountability and uniformity which are 
crucial for the furtherance of international trade, cannot be sacrificed just because the 
system of international trade has evolved. Conversely, a rigid adherence to central 
exclusivity cannot be justified just because we have been used to doing things in a 
certain way. To find a balance, constitutionality must meet up with the expectations 
of present circumstances obtainable in the international trade system making 
cooperative federalism an attractive alternative. This is because it entails a nuanced 
rather than a radical shift in the constitutional parameters for the conduct of 
international trade in Nigeria.  
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6.2. Areas for Constitutional Reform. 
The constitutional issues which need to be addressed to achieve cooperative 
federalism in Nigeria’s international trade regime include: 
1.  The adoption of a cooperative approach to the interpretation of federal 
compliance clauses in international trade agreements; and  
2. The strengthening of constitutional provisions which relate to intergovernmental 
linkage between the federal government (FG) and SFGs for Nigeria’s 
international trade regime under the 1999 Constitution.  
In view of the changing dynamics of international trade interactions in this 
dispensation of international trade relations, it will be argued that federal compliance 
clauses in international trade agreements can be interpreted to give effect to 
intergovernmental cooperation between levels of government on international trade 
negotiations, implementation and compliance.   
In the context of Nigeria, it will be argued that the constitutional safeguard under s12 
of the 1999 Constitution should be given a broader interpretation which is more 
inclusive of the participation of the SFGs in Nigeria’s international trade output.21  It 
will also be argued that the scope of ‘treaty’ under s12 could be expanded to include 
‘all instruments’ relating to international trade. The use of ‘side door’and 
constitutional loopholes by SFGs should be discouraged by strengthening joint 
participation between levels of government. It will be suggested that this can be 
achieved by expanding the Concurrent Legislative List (CLL) of the 1999 
Constitution to encompass more issues relating to trade; especially areas where SFGs 
have a comparative advantage and/or have already become active in practice.  
6.2.1  The Need for a Re–Interpretation of Federal Compliance Clauses in 
International Trade Agreements.  
In chapter two, it was identified that federal systems occupy a peculiar position in the 
operation of international norms.
22
 This is because the distribution of powers in a 
                                                 
21
 See chapter four, section 4.7.1.  
22
 See chapter two, section 2.4 and 2.5. See also Shelly M Kiersteaad, ‘An International Bind: Article 
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federal system is dualised and the responsibility of overseeing foreign affairs is 
conventionally allocated to the central government.
23
 As such, the general position in 
international law is that the central government in a federal system has a 
responsibility to ensure compliance from its regions and states with international 
obligations.
24
 In chapter two, it was also identified that the GATT/WTO agreements 
and RTAs have federal compliance clauses. They stipulate that a contracting party to 
these international trade agreements is required to take necessary measures to ensure 
compliance by its regions with the international trade norms. Under the GATT/WTO 
system, this rule is established pursuant to art XXIV: 12.
25
 RTAs such as NAFTA 
have similar provisions.
26
 These clauses are also sometimes negotiated into 
international agreements by federal systems with the aim of limiting the scope of the 
central governments' responsibility for matters falling within the competence of the 
country's other levels of government.
27
 
In this section of the chapter, this issue of federal compliance clauses in federal 
systems will be revisited because the compliance mechanism for federal systems 
under the multilateral and regional trade systems determines the scope of the 
activities of Nigerian SFGs in this new dispensation of international trade relations.  
More importantly, in chapter three it was identified that the new dispensation of 
international trade creates a ‘contraction effect’ which has disaggregated the nation-
state and encourages the increased participation of SFGs in international trade.
28
 It 
was also identified that these opportunities now presented to SFGs have the potential 
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to create trade barriers.
29
 According to Hayes, ‘There is no question that non-
conforming regional and local measures can significantly diminish the welfare gains 
sought through greater integration and liberalization of the world trade system.’30 
The emergence of trade barriers due to the activities of SFGs is a noticeable trend in 
the foreign investment line of cases discussed in chapter two.
31
 The prominent case 
of Metaclad demonstrates that trade liberalization in a federal system is susceptible 
to the uncertainties of non-conforming policies by SFGs.
32
 Also, as regional and 
local governments increasingly participate in world trade under this new dispensation 
of international trade, it is necessary to redress the ambiguities in the relationship 
between federal systems and the evolving international trade system.
33
 In view of this 
reality, the implications of federal compliance clauses on the new dynamics of 
interactions in international trade necessitate an approach which will mitigate the 
potential fallouts and effectively ensure that the participation of SFGs is beneficial to 
the overall international trade process.  
In the context of the case study, it is imperative to address the issue of federal 
compliance clauses in international trade agreements so as to ensure that SFGs in 
Nigeria are not acting in a manner which is inimical to Nigeria’s overall international 
trade objectives. Furthermore, in view of the thesis hypotheses which support the 
adoption of a cooperative approach to international trade interaction in Nigeria, it is 
important to assess how the interpretation of federal compliance clauses in federal 
systems can be aligned with a cooperative federalism model.   
The analysis in chapter two ended with a description of the ambiguities which have 
characterised the interpretation of the federal compliance clause under international 
trade agreements.
34
 The issue of sub-national compliance with GATT/WTO 
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obligations remains unclear despite the efforts at clarification made by the 
GATT/WTO Panels and the enactment of the Understanding on the Interpretation of 
art XXIV in the Uruguay Round.
35
 
The view in this thesis is that the federal compliance clause in international trade 
norms can be given an interpretation which is compatible with a cooperative 
federalism model. A cooperative federalism perspective is applicable to the 
interpretation of federal compliance clauses in international trade agreements if we 
proceed on a premise that the requirement for compliance with international trade 
norms in federal systems is not exhaustive on ‘how’ compliance should be achieved. 
For example, during the GATT years of the multilateral trade system, there were 
interpretations which suggested that the effect and scope of ‘reasonable measures’ 
under art XXIV: 12 was not intended to be compelling or mandatory for the 
contracting parties to the GATT.
36
 One interpretation suggested by Jackson was that 
art XXIV: 12 did not apply to measures of SFGs which are constitutionally beyond 
the powers of the central government. As such, the central government was not in 
breach of its international obligations if an SFG in the exercise of such powers 
contravened an international obligation, as long as the central government did 
everything within its power to ensure local observance of GATT.
37
 Another 
interpretation suggested by Jackson was to the effect that the provision of art XXIV: 
12: 
 [W]as not intended to apply as a matter of law against local subdivisions 
at all, and even when the central government has legal power to require 
local observance of GATT it is not obligated under GATT to do so, but 
merely to take reasonable measures.
38
 
The panel decisions during the GATT years which centred on the interpretation of art 
XXIV: 12 did not fare better in clarifying the meaning of ‘reasonable measures’. The 
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decisions reached focused on a logical evaluation of the steps taken by the central 
government to secure compliance of its SFGs in each of the cases.
 39
  Hayes is of the 
view that there is no clear indication from this approach adopted by the GATT panels 
of the exact scope of reasonable measures. According to him, ‘Other than the 
reference in Canada-Import to ‘serious, persistent, and convincing effort’ no GATT 
Panel has discussed what constitutes a ‘reasonable measures’ under art XXIV: 12.’40 
This thesis aligns with the view above because it demonstrates that ‘reasonable 
measures’ is open to any interpretation which promotes compliance, but the manner 
in which this compliance is achieved is debatable. For example, in the Canada-
Import case, the Panel specified:  
[T]hat in determining whether the actions of a country constituted 
reasonable measures, one should look to whether that country had made 
"serious, persistent, and convincing efforts" to ensure observance of the 
provisions of the General Agreement.
41
 
It is argued that cooperation as a means of ensuring compliance with 
international trade norms fulfills these requirements stipulated in the decision 
above. This is because cooperation is a proactive measure which ensures that 
SFGs are mainstreamed into the formulation and negotiation of trade policy at 
the outset, rather than a reactive system which responds only when SFGs have 
acted contrary to policies negotiated without their input.  
The introduction of the Understanding on the Interpretation of art XXIV of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 has brought more clarity to 
the scope of the section. However, Hayes is of the view that while it (the Uruguay 
Understanding) may have ‘clarified the responsibility of all GATT/WTO federal 
nation/states for the non-conforming behaviour of their component units under the 
GATT/WTO,’42 ‘it leaves open the question of what constitutes "reasonable 
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measures" to seek compliance.’43 Furthermore, Hayes points out that ‘There is no 
customary international law rule regarding what measure(s), if any, central 
governments must take to seek compliance at the local level.’44 As such, the 
requirement of ‘taking necessary measures’ which from the GATT/WTO 
jurisprudence considered in chapter two is not definitive can be interpreted as a 
requirement that contracting parties should strengthen the participation and linkage 
between all the relevant stakeholders, including their SFGs, so as to ensure 
compliance with the international trade agreements.  
In view of the broad scope of international economic relations in this current 
dispensation, it is argued that there is no legal basis for interpreting the ‘reasonable 
measures’ in the context of central governments being expected to compel their 
regions; neither should it be taken as a basis for the central government to approach 
non-compliance by their regions in a lax manner. Instead, the emphasis should shift 
from an interpretation which focuses on ‘must comply’ to an interpretation which 
focuses on ‘how to effectively comply.’ As such, a cooperative interpretation 
promotes compliance by emphasising the need for integration, flexibility and 
accountability among all stakeholders (old and new) to the process of international 
economic relations.
45
 
The next question to be addressed is how would a cooperation mechanism for federal 
compliance with international trade norms be achieved? There is a suggestion by 
Hayes that federal systems may have become resolved to adopting an ‘efficient 
breach’ approach for resolving the issue of compliance of their SFGs. This is a: 
[s]ituation where the federal state is forced to accept the penalties 
associated with violation of its international agreement because it has no 
legitimate reasonable or necessary measures available (emphasis added) 
to ensure observance of the agreement at the local level.
46
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Hayes is also not optimistic about the effectiveness of this approach in the broader 
context of its impact on the greater purpose of trade liberalization. He argues that this 
approach is sensible for some federal systems, but it leads to a situation where 
‘negatively affected Members are forced to devote resources to addressing non-
conforming measures in the WTO dispute settlement process.’47  
The ‘efficient breach’ approach represents a ‘defeatist attitude’ whereby a federal 
system seeks to use monetary compensation to offset its inability or unwillingness to 
obtain compliance amongst its component units. More so considering that 
compensation is just a temporal remedy under the GATT/WTO law; it is absurd that 
a federal state would be looking to use an efficient breach approach to discourage 
nonconformist policies by its SFGs.
48
 It is argued in this thesis that cooperation falls 
within the parameters of ‘legitimate reasonable or necessary measures available’ to 
a federal system to achieve compliance of its SFGs with international trade norms. 
Integrating all stakeholders into the trade process is a legitimate action which can 
minimize nonconformist actions of SFGs. The advantages of a vibrant 
intergovernmental linkage in the current dispensation of international economic 
relations include an increased sense of belonging from SFGs by being active 
participants in the federal system’s international trade policy output. Also, active 
participation from the SFGs can yield better commitment to implementation of 
policies.
49
  
Hayes also suggests an ‘inside-out’ approach to interpreting federal compliance 
clauses in international trade agreements. This approach maintains the current 
language of art XXIV: 12 while re-engaging and re-energizing regional and local 
governments in the trade process at the domestic level.
50
 According to him, ‘The 
main goal of this approach is to decrease the potential for regional and local 
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nonconforming measures through greater domestic education, participation and 
administration in the international trade system.’51 This represents a cooperative 
approach to managing the issue of compliance with international agreements within a 
federal system. Based on this approach, Hayes identifies areas where there could be 
direct and indirect involvement between central governments and SFGs in regard to 
the international trade process.
52
 This includes ‘(1) increased input into trade 
negotiations, (2) increased involvement in the development of implementing 
legislation; and (3) a larger role in the administration of trade disciplines implicating 
regional and local measures.’53 There are examples of these cooperative mechanisms 
in federal systems such as the US (to a limited extent), Canada, India and Belgium 
which fit the description of the ‘inside-out’ approach analysed by Hayes.  
For example, Hayes categorises the US model under the ‘inside out’ approach albeit 
a very informal model.
54
 Traditionally, the nature of US constitutional law makes the 
application of GATT law in the US automatic; dependent upon a proclamation by the 
President acting on his constitutional powers in this regard or pursuant to 
Congressional authorisation to negotiate, enter into and accept an international 
agreement on behalf of the US.
55
 As a consequence, GATT law is superior to state 
law in the US.
56
 Interestingly, even though there are no major constitutional 
impediments against the enforceability of GATT law in the US, there is growing 
emphasis on a ‘how to effectively comply’ rather than a ‘must comply’ attitude 
towards federal compliance clauses. This is noticeable in the evolving domestic 
regulatory framework for state education and participation in international trade. One 
such regulatory mechanism is the Intergovernmental Policy Advisory Committee 
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(IGPAC).
57
 In addition to the IGPAC, there is the National Conference of State 
Legislatures (NCSL) which represents the collective interests of all fifty states.
58
 
Also, legislation such as the Statement of Administrative Action for the Uruguay 
Round Trade Agreements (SAA) establishes a procedure for federal/state 
consultations.
 59
 However, this framework in the US is relatively weak when 
compared to the Canadian and Belgian examples discussed in chapter five.
60
 
Although the US model is solely advisory without any force of law, it is arguable 
that since the emergence of these cooperative linkages is not due to difficulties faced 
by the US FG in achieving compliance of state law with international trade norms, 
therefore these mechanisms have been encouraged in the US because it has become 
imperative to accommodate the growing importance of SFGs in the international 
trade process.
61
  
In Canada, the existence of a similar cooperative mechanism is found in the network 
of C-Trade Committees which have evolved in provincial/central government 
interactions on international trade negotiations since the Kennedy Rounds of GATT 
negotiations.
62
 The Canadian experience is different from that of the US because of 
the uncertainties surrounding the delineation of the powers of the central government 
and the provinces in relation to foreign affairs.
63
 As a consequence, the evolution of a 
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cooperative mechanism to accommodate competing views of SFGs in Canada has 
been inevitable. Canada has been at the centre of all the disputes which have arisen 
in the GATT/WTO jurisprudence over the interpretation of art XXIV: 12. This is 
because the nature of the federal system in Canada makes it most prone to 
nonconforming policies by its provinces. The usefulness of the Canadian experience 
in this thesis is that it demonstrates the practicability of cooperative federalism as a 
framework for ensuring the effective compliance of SFGs with international trade 
norms. Although the GATT/WTO cases show the acrimonious side of this process, 
there are a good number of success stories which have emerged from the Canadian 
model of cooperation in international trade relations.  
In India, there has been a limited expression of such direct deliberate consultative 
linkage mechanisms which provide for cooperation to ensure compliance with 
international trade norms. The interesting fact about the Indian experience is that 
intergovernmental linkage on international trade has emerged indirectly due to the 
evolving process of federalism in India.
64
 Intergovernmental linkage on international 
trade compliance in India has been characterized by the regions exerting political 
pressure on the central government to force cooperation on issues of international 
trade.
65
 The Indian experience is useful to the issue of federal compliance clauses 
because it demonstrates that in the absence of affirmative action, cooperation can still 
emerge in a federal system due to the indirect political pressure exerted by SFGs as a 
consequence of their growing influence on the international trade process. It 
demonstrates that when preemptive steps are not taken to engage the cooperation of 
SFGs, the dynamics of the current dispensation of international relations will 
inevitably force the issue.
66
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Belgium represents the most advanced (in terms of formality) and inventive solution 
to the issue of compliance with international trade norms. Compliance with 
international trade norms in Belgium is a product of joint participation by the central 
government and regional governments. The regions have the role of co-decision and 
intergovernmental mechanisms are highly institutionalized.
67
 Under this formally 
institutionalized linkage mechanism, Belgium’s compliance with international trade 
agreements is negotiated by all stakeholders and any decision reached is deemed to 
be the common position of the Belgian state.
68
 The usefulness of the Belgian 
experience to this thesis is that it demonstrates the possibility of sustaining a formal 
framework for cooperation between the central and SFGs in regard to international 
trade.
69
 Although there is no guarantee that this system can be replicated in other 
federal systems, it supports the thesis argument that a cooperative approach to 
achieving compliance from SFGs with international trade norms is feasible. 
A cooperative perspective on the interpretation of the federal compliance clause in 
international trade agreements is not without its challenges. For example in the US, 
federal-state trade policy consultations have been criticized for being ‘really nothing 
more than window dressing, with serious consultations rarely occurring.’70 Hayes 
commenting on the US experience points out that during the negotiations for the US-
Australia Free Trade Agreement, the IGPAC submitted a report in 2004 which 
expressed amongst other things its dissatisfaction with the method of obtaining state 
support in areas within their constitutional authority. According to the report, 
‘Statutes and regulations that states and local governments have validly adopted, that 
are constitutional, and that reflect locally appropriate responses to the needs of our 
residents, should not be overridden by provisions in trade agreements.’71  
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In response to the concerns raised by the IGPAC, Congress included a ‘no greater 
rights’ language when renewing the Trade Promotion Authority legislation of 2002.72 
The effect of the ‘no greater rights’ provision was to ensure that trade agreements 
signed by the FG do not give foreign investors more rights and protection than those 
granted to US citizens.
73
   
‘The IGPAC has called for a fully funded, regularly scheduled mechanism for US 
federal-state trade policy consultations in light of the increasing state role in trade 
policy formulation, negotiation and dispute resolution.’74 By accommodating the 
influence of SFGs on the process which informs the position of the nation-state in 
international trade negotiation, these actors are privy to the agreements reached. As a 
consequence, they are less likely to resort to nonconformist action.
75
 This is as 
against a position of exclusion, where the nation-state seeks to force a position 
negotiated in isolation of the input of the SFGs.  
In Canada, the challenges which have confronted the intergovernmental linkage for 
international trade are similar to that of the US. For example, the contribution of the 
provinces in Canada is also informal, flexible and limited in its scope.
76
 Fafard and 
Leblond point out that during the negotiations for the Canada–United States Free 
Trade Agreement (CUFTA) and NAFTA, provincial governments were never 
formally part of the negotiations and their contribution was restricted to provision of 
information and analyses of the impact of various possible elements of the 
agreements.
77
 According to Fafard and Leblond: 
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Even when the NAFTA negotiations moved more squarely into areas of 
provincial jurisdiction, because of the labour and environment side deals, 
provinces were consulted but there was no requirement for all them to 
agree. In fact, only three provinces (Quebec, Alberta, and Manitoba) 
formally signed onto both of them. Moreover, the significance of their 
formally adhering to the side agreements is unclear and may amount to 
nothing more than a political commitment (emphasis added) to be bound 
by the terms of the agreement, a commitment that may or may not be 
used by the Government of Canada at some future date (Kukucha 
2008).
78
 
This view above focuses on the weight which is attached to the contribution of SFGs 
as a basis for discountenancing their importance. It was argued in chapter five that 
the contribution of the provinces in Canada’s international trade interaction under the 
Canadian intergovernmental linkage is couched in the form of a flexible soft law 
mechanism.
79
 In view of the federal compliance clause, it is argued that this 
perceived weakness by Fafard and Leblond is actually beneficial for achieving 
certainty and finality in the international trade process. If the central government is 
not obligated to implement the views of the provinces, then it will not be encumbered 
with an unending process of prolonged trade negotiations and contradictions which 
hinder its ability to negotiate and comply with international trade agreements. In 
essence, flexibility in the process preserves a key component of central exclusivity 
which is the ability of the nation-state to act decisively. At the same time, the 
competing interests from the provinces are still taken into consideration and are of 
invaluable benefit where necessary. Farfard and Leblond’s view underestimates the 
power of a ‘political commitment’ which is achieved through these 
intergovernmental linkages. This view is supported in this thesis because it 
demonstrates a practical reality of the federal process. The fact that ‘political 
commitments’ are now required to achieve compliance with international trade 
agreements in Canada shows that cooperation is necessary and has been elevated in 
priority under the new dispensation of international trade relations.  
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In India, the challenges facing the intergovernmental linkage between the regions 
and the central government stem from a tense relationship between the two levels of 
government. In the US, Canada and Belgium there is a relatively cordial 
relationship between both levels of government. In India, the situation is more 
confrontational with the regions increasingly exerting pressure on the central 
government. The resultant intergovernmental linkages which have emerged are 
presumably a response to the pressure being exerted by the regional governments.
80
 
Irrespective of the circumstances which have given birth to cooperation in India, it is 
clear that cooperation is now an indispensable requirement of international 
interactions. It is an outcome which cannot be escaped even if the central 
government is averse to it.  
In Belgium where the process is very formal, the main challenge facing the 
intergovernmental mechanism for cooperation is the language and cultural 
fragmentation of the Belgian state. This makes decision-making factional and highly 
politicised.
81
 This is however not surprising as federalism is premised on a pragmatic 
process of balancing component units which are inherently diverse.  
The crucial points which can be gleaned from the country examples mentioned above 
include:  
1. Intergovernmental linkage for international trade interactions is an option 
which could take the form of direct deliberate action which is a response to 
the necessity for closer links between all stakeholders in the trade process. 
This describes the Canadian experience and to some extent the US 
experience. 
2. It could also arise as an indirect consequence of the political pressure exerted 
by the expanding influence of SFGs in the international trade process. This 
fits the description of the Indian experience.  
3. Intergovernmental linkage could be informal and flexible as is the case in the 
US and Canada; or 
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4. It could be formalised as is the case in Belgium.  
From the examples discussed above it can also be argued that a cooperative response 
to the issue of compliance with international trade agreements in federal systems can 
take the form of: 
1. A legislative response to a constitutional deficiency (e.g., Section 102(b) of 
the Statement of Administrative Action for the Uruguay Round Trade 
Agreements (SAA) in the US or the Special Act of 5 May 1993 in Belgium);  
2. An institutional response to a constitutional deficiency (e.g., the IGPAC and 
NCSL in the US, C-Trade Committees in Canada, and the intergovernmental 
cooperation Committees in Belgium); or 
3. A political response to a constitutional deficiency (e.g., the use of political 
pressure by the regions in India). 
Nigeria is the least developed of all the federal systems cited above. From a 
constitutional perspective, intergovernmental linkage in Nigeria as a response to 
federal compliance clauses in international trade agreements is underdeveloped 
because of the divergence between constitutional theory and reality in Nigeria’s 
international trade regime. The position in Nigeria is dictated by the ‘centralised 
stance’ of the federal system in place. The constitutional provisions on international 
trade relations provide for a limited role of SFGs in international trade interactions, 
hence intergovernmental linkage in the international trade process is minimal.  
It was identified in chapter four that the Nigerian 1999 Constitution is dualised in 
nature, with foreign relations situated in the Exclusive Legislative List (ELL) as the 
exclusive domain of the Federal Government (FG). To achieve an effective 
intergovernmental linkage between the different levels of government in Nigeria on 
international trade, the 1999 Constitution must be revised to reflect the changing role 
of states in Nigeria’s international trade interactions. 
More specifically, it is argued that an amendment in the area of international trade 
relations which is vital to the economic development aspirations of all stakeholders 
to the Nigerian federalism will be appropriate. This is because it can achieve 
concurrent objectives of bringing consistency to Nigeria’s international trade regime 
and in the same vein, stem the tide of violent self-determination claims from sections 
of the country.  
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It was argued in chapter four that the international trade framework in Nigeria is not 
coherent because there are inconsistencies in the constitutional provisions for the 
distribution of powers between the FG and SFGs.
82
 These inconsistencies will now 
be re-visited with the aim of suggesting solutions (from a cooperative federalism 
perspective) to ensure effective compliance with international trade agreements by 
SFGs in Nigeria.  
6.2.3 Correction of the Mirage of ‘Safeguards’ for SFGs under s12 of the 1999 
Constitution.  
The reliance on ‘safeguard mechanisms’ in federal constitutions is a disadvantage of 
the conventional norm of central exclusivity which was identified in chapter five. It 
was argued that relying on built-in constitutional safeguards as a basis for justifying 
centralisation of international trade relations is no longer safe in this era of 
interconnected transnational issues affecting trade.
83
   
In chapter four, the existence of a safeguard in the Nigerian 1999 constitution was 
established.
84
 The safeguard is found in s12, which provides that: 
(1) No treaty between the Federation and any other country shall have 
the force of law to the extent to which any such treaty has been enacted 
into law by the National Assembly.  
(2) The National Assembly may make laws for the Federation or any part 
thereof with respect to matters not included in the Exclusive Legislative 
List for the purpose of implementing a treaty.  
 (3) A bill for an Act of the National Assembly passed pursuant to the 
provisions of subsection (2) of this section shall not be presented to the 
President for assent, and shall not be enacted unless it is ratified by a 
majority of all the House of Assembly in the Federation.
85
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A key issue arising from the interpretation of s 12 is whether a treaty which relates to 
a matter under s 12 (1) and by inference the ELL is also subject to ratification by a 
majority of the state house of assemblies under s 12 (3).  Based on the presumption 
in favour of plenary powers for the FG in foreign relations and the combined effect 
of s.12 (1), (2) and Item 31 of the ELL, a logical interpretation is that only matters 
which do not fall under the ELL come under the purview of s12 (3). In effect, SFGs 
in Nigeria only have an input in the ratification of international treaties which fall 
outside the ELL. Also, because the National Assembly (NA) is made up of state 
representatives, so presumably their interests are considered to be catered for under 
s12 (1) through the NA.
86
 The provisions of s12 (2) support this argument by 
providing that ‘The National Assembly may make laws for the Federation or any part 
thereof…’  This means the NA is empowered to act on behalf of SFGs by passing 
legislation to ratify a treaty falling under both the ELL and CLL. With such sweeping 
powers it can only be assumed that the additional provision in s12 (3) is meant to act 
as an added layer of protection for SFGs. However, this layer of protection in s12 (3) 
is very restrictive and it is not surprising that this provision has not been utilised by 
SFGs in Nigeria till now.  
It was also pointed out that this narrow scope of the safeguard provision in s12 does 
not help in achieving compliance with international trade norms in Nigeria. The 
reason is that although in theory the interpretation of these sections creates a 
presumption in favour of sweeping pre-emptive powers for the FG, in practice the 
narrow scope of s12 does not take cognisance of the emergence of jurisdictional grey 
areas due to the ever expanding scope of international trade. As a consequence, when 
SFGs are faced with issues which do not fall under their jurisdiction but are relevant 
to their development objectives, they fashion ingenious ways to circumvent the 
constitutional provisions. When SFGs are forced to take this course, the chances of 
nonconformist policies will emerge and it will be more difficult for the FG to achieve 
compliance with international trade norms.  
It is suggested that the reference to ‘treaty’ under s 12 should be given a broader 
interpretation which encompasses a wider scope of instruments now utilised in 
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international trade interactions, whether they are conventionally recognised under 
international law or not.  The need for a broader interpretation of ‘treaty’ under s 12 
is borne out of the belief that the scope of what constitutes a treaty in international 
law has evolved significantly from the conventional interpretations which focus on 
nation-state centred practice in international law. For example, under the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, a ‘treaty’ for the purposes of the Convention 
‘means an international agreement concluded between states in written form and 
governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or 
more related instruments and whatever its particular designation’.87 Whereas, under 
the Belgian federal system of shared competence in foreign relations, the Flemish 
Department of Foreign Affairs defines a treaty as ‘Every written agreement, 
concluded between two or more entities or persons who have international legal 
personality, in order to bring about legal effects, and that is governed by 
international law or international public law.’88 The latter definition of a treaty is 
reflective of the broader scope of what should be taken into consideration in the 
current dispensation of international relations. Rather than focus on just 
‘international agreements concluded between states’, the scope of the Flemish 
definition of treaty covers ‘every written agreement’ entered into by ‘entities.’ As 
such, the latter definition captures changing forms of agreements which have legal 
effect in international law or public international law, even though they may not 
necessarily meet the narrow stipulation under the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties.  
As was pointed out in chapter five, an argument against adhering to central 
exclusivity as a basis for the conduct of international trade relations is that central 
exclusivity does not give enough opportunity for variations in the conceptualisation 
of foreign relations.
89
 It was argued that the conventional mechanism of international 
law seeks to protect the continuation of nation-state practice by denying recognition 
to arrangements entered into by an SFG, even though these arrangements are trans-
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boundary in nature. This does not reflect the reality that these arrangements have a 
bearing on international relations irrespective of the perceived illegitimacy of the 
actors involved or the form utilised. This is applicable in Nigeria because s12 only 
relates to treaties in a limited sense envisaged under the Vienna Convention and 
considers other instruments as irrelevant under international law.  
In this thesis, two potential reforms are suggested which could make s12 of the 1999 
Constitution more accommodating of the input of Nigeria’s SFGs.  
First, a broader interpretation of ‘treaty’ can be given under s12. The potential 
benefits would include a wider scope for cooperation between the FG and SFGs on 
international trade. It would also provide a better chance of achieving compliance 
with international trade agreements. Relying on Haye’s typology,90 a broader 
interpretation of s12 would open up an avenue for SFGs to:  
1. Increase their input into trade negotiations:- this is because a broad scope of s12 
which covers the implementation of ‘all trade instruments’ would mean that 
SFGs are factored into the negotiation process of all trade instruments signed or 
initiated either by the FG or themselves.  
2. Increase their involvement in the development of implementing legislation: - if 
SFGs play a more active role in the development process of legislation for 
ratifying treaties in Nigeria they will be less likely to resort to nonconformist 
policies. 
3. Play a larger role in the administration of the trade disciplines affecting regional 
and local measures: - if SFGs are given greater responsibilities under the 
enabling laws to administer trade disciplines which touch on areas that relate to 
their areas of comparative advantage or development interest, the chances of 
effective implementation will be higher. A good example of this is found in the 
port concessioning in the coastal states such as Lagos, Delta and Akwa Ibom. 
Lagos and Akwa Ibom have already demonstrated their ability to drive the port 
concessioning process over and above the federal government, even though port 
concessioning is under the ELL.  
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The second approach recommended in this thesis to ensure effective compliance with 
international economic norms in Nigeria, is to infuse a cooperative federalism 
perspective into the restrictive provision of s12 of the 1999 constitution. Relying on 
parallels from the country examples which were discussed in previous section of the 
chapter, s12 of the 1999 Constitution can be repositioned through constituional 
reforms to promote joint participation between the FG and SFGs. This can be 
achieved by adopting a legislative reform which aligns with the ‘inside-out approach’ 
advocated by Hayes.   
Drawing on parallels from the models of intergovernmental linkage which have 
developed in federal systems such as Canada and Belgium as a response to the 
changing nature of international economic relations, a proposed alternate wording for 
s12 is: 
12. (1) No treaty
91
 between the Federation and any other country shall 
have the force of law to the extent to which any such treaty has been 
enacted into law by the National Assembly.  
(2)There shall be consultations between the National Assembly and any 
State(s) affected by a treaty for the purpose of achieving conformity of 
State laws and practices with said treaty before it enters into force in 
the Federation pursuant to (1)
92
 
(3) The National Assembly may make laws for the Federation or any part 
thereof with respect to matters not included in the Exclusive Legislative 
List for the purpose of implementing a treaty.  
(4)  A bill for an Act of the National Assembly passed pursuant to the 
provisions of subsection (3) of this section shall not come into force 
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unless reasonable opportunity has been made for any interested and/or 
affected State(s) to contribute to the content of the bill.
93
  
These proposed amendments suggested above would be ineffectual in the absence of 
attendant institutional changes being made in Nigeria’s international economic  
relations regime. The institutional changes required to breathe life into this 
alternative wording for s 12 of the 1999 Constitution will be considered subsequently 
in section 6.3 of this chapter. Before moving on to institutional issues, the 
constitutional issue of ‘side-doors’ used by SFGs will be addressed in the next 
section of the chapter. 
6.2.4 Discouraging the Use of ‘Side–Doors’ being exploited by SFGs to 
Circumvent the Constraints of the 1999 Constitution. 
Another point which was identified in chapter four is the jurisdictional grey areas of 
the constitution which have been exposed under this dispensation of international 
economic relations.  
It was argued that the 1999 Constitution constitutes a problem because it is unable to 
restrain SFGs from expressing themselves on the international scene. While the key 
provisions of the constitution as pointed out earlier give the FG total dominance in 
international economic interactions, the exigencies of the current dispensation of 
international economic relations has exposed cracks and loopholes which are 
progressively being exploited by SFGs. The introduction of Mandarin into the 
educational curriculum for Lagos state is a case in point which was addressed in 
chapter four. The origin of this issue was traced to the constitutional provision of - 
Item 18 and 30 of the CLL. It was identified that these side doors are a reoccurring 
reminder of previous constitutional eras in Nigeria.
94
  
The position in this thesis is that the use of side-doors should be discouraged by the 
FG because it has the potential to breed nonconformist policies which affect 
Nigeria’s compliance with international economic agreements. Although the 
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empirical evidence of Nigeria’s SFGs on the international scene are yet to cause any 
major upheaval, it is wise to nip such possibilities in the bud by utilising deliberate 
policies which integrate these activities into the mainstream of Nigeria’s 
international economic policy framework.  
In order to attain coherence and cooperation between the FG and SFGs on matters of 
international economic relations, the CLL should encompass more matters relating to 
trade and investment which are of interest to SFGs. This would not erode the FG’s 
advantage stemming from the constitutional supremacy clause to pre-empt the 
policies of SFGs when necessary. With a stronger CLL on matters pertaining to 
international economic relations, SFGs would be able to express themselves 
legitimately as co-participants with the FG and as a consequence would not need to 
resort to side-doors.  
It is argued that a combination of the proposals suggested above i.e. giving a broader 
interpretation to ‘treaty’ under s12 of the 1999 Constitution and/or reforming the 
constitutional provision and strengthening the CLL can discourage the use of side-
doors because the constitutional provisions would be repositioned to foster direct and 
indirect cooperation between levels of government on matters of international 
economic relations. This argument is supported by the useful parallels which were 
gleaned from the constitutional reforms made to facilitate the functioning of 
cooperative federalism in federal systems such as Belgium, Argentina and Austria.
95
  
To consolidate these reforms, the institutional provisions of Nigeria’s international 
economic relations must also be addressed in line with a cooperative federalism 
model. The institutional provisions which need to be restructured will be considered 
in the next section.  
6.3 Areas for Institutional Reform. 
In this section the role of SFGs in the trade –development nexus will be discussed.  
Suggested reforms to specific political institutions such as the National Assembly 
(NA), the National Council on Commerce (NCC) and the Nigerian Governor’s 
Forum (NGF) will be examined.  
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6.3.1 Linking Trade and Development: The Need for SFGs for institutional 
Coherence. 
International trade is important in the economic growth and development of countries 
in the international system. Briggs, supports this view stating that ‘The empirical 
evidence of the economic prosperity of many successful economies today has been 
mainly driven by the volume of trade, interpreted as the volume of exports traded and 
the level of export competitiveness.’96 However, there are arguments for and against 
the best means of actualising development through international trade. For example, 
trade liberalisation has been the centre piece of international economic relations in 
the past 50 years, however, it is not settled amongst scholars that trade liberalisation 
is actually beneficial for development.
97
 Dollar and Kraay argue that there is a 
certain consensus about the belief that openness to international trade accelerates 
development.
98
 However, there is a contrary view that in practice trade liberalisation 
does not necessarily stimulate development because rich countries and large 
corporations dominate the global marketplace and create very unequal relations of 
power and information.
99
 The UNCTAD Report of 2005 presents a pragmatic 
perspective to the debate stating that: 
In the context of growing interdependence among nations in today’s 
globalizing world economy, trade and development are becoming 
increasingly interrelated. The contribution of trade to development 
depends greatly on the context in which it works and the ends it serves. 
To act as a genuine engine of development, trade must lead to steady 
                                                 
96
 Inye Nathan Briggs, Nigeria: Mainstreaming Trade Policy into National Development’ (2007) 
African Trade Policy Centre (ATPC) Work in Progress No 52 3 
<http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/publications/52.pdf>    accessed 10 September 2010. See 
also The World Bank, Trade Liberalization: Why So Much Controversy?’ in Economic Growth in the 
1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform (World Bank Publications 2005).  
97
 Briggs (n 96) 2. 
98
 See David Dollar and Aart Kraay, ‘Trade, Growth and Poverty’ (2004) 114(2) Econ J 22, 47. 
99
 See Global Policy Forum (GPF), <http://www.globalpolicy.org/social-and-economic-
policy/international-trade-and-development-1-57.html>   accessed 10 October 2013.  
 243 
 
improvements in human conditions by expanding the range of people’s 
choices.
100
 
Irrespective of these uncertainties surrounding the value of international trade in 
development, it is evident from the views discussed above that linking international 
trade to a development strategy is a sensible course to take for developing countries 
like Nigeria. More importantly, linking international trade to a development strategy 
is especially important to Nigeria in a globalised era of international economic 
relations where the welfare gains of trade are more accessible for her economic 
growth and development objectives.  
In view of the expanding nature of the international economic system, utilising trade 
as a platform for development requires institutional coherence. Mashayekhi and 
others support this view stating that ‘effectively managing the interface between 
regional and multilateral initiatives requires greater synergy between national 
development objectives and external commitments.’101 In effect, every trading nation 
must align its external commitments in an ever evolving international economic 
system with its internal development strategy. However, this is not an easy task. For 
example, Nigeria has been faced with competing considerations in the crude oil 
sector – her major foreign exchange earner - which has negatively influenced her 
trade and development strategy. The competing considerations in this sector include, 
Nigeria’s desire to maximise her leverage in the world crude oil production by 
joining the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) cartel, while 
attempting to balance her commitments to liberalise trade under the multilateral 
framework of the GATT/WTO and bilateral Joint Venture Agreements with 
Multinational Oil Corporations (MOCs).
102
 The FG in a bid to keep these external 
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stakeholders satisfied has ignored an important internal stakeholder – the oil 
producing states – required to achieve institutional synergy as envisaged by 
Mashayekhi and others.  Specifically, the oil producing states are constitutionally 
excluded from ownership and control of oil production in Nigeria, while the MOCs 
enjoy immense privileges under their Joint Venture Agreements with the FG.
103
 This 
exclusion of the oil producing states creates an imbalance (i.e. lack of synergy) 
between the competing interests (internal and external) in Nigeria’s oil industry 
which in turn that has hindered her ability to achieve economic development through 
her oil wealth.
 104
 
It is further argued that in light of the emergence of new regulatory considerations 
under the new dispensation of international economic relations, it is necessary to 
recognize the importance of institutional forms in the international trade-
development nexus. Irrespective of the market orientation of international economic  
relations in the 21
st
 century, there is need for integration and flexibility in the 
regulatory framework to achieve development through trade. Brenner and Glick 
support this view, stating that ‘…institutional forms and more generally political 
action have shaped the evolution of the capitalist economies.’105 This view cannot be 
discountenanced especially in light of the obvious changes in fortunes which have 
characterised the growth and decline of most world economies in the past century 
due to switches made in their political and institutional structures. For example, the 
exponential growth of the Chinese economy in the past 20 years is significantly 
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attributable to the fact that China revolutionised her political and economic 
institutions to effectively maximise her areas of comparative advantage. According 
to Yong-Nian Zheng
106
  
…in post- Mao China, the central party-state is no longer monolithic in 
all aspects of China's foreign affairs. Instead, provincial governments 
have become increasingly paradiplomatic actors in China's foreign trade. 
An increasingly important role of provincial governments is to promote 
rapid growth of foreign trade on the one hand, and constrain the central 
state's foreign policymaking on the other.
107
  
These factors are also particularly relevant to the Nigerian scenario because it 
represents an explanation for the manifestation of anomalies in Nigeria’s 
international economic interactions which cannot be attributed to economic theory 
alone. It is argued that the constitutional configuration of the institutional forms 
which drive the economic development of Nigeria via her international economic 
participation plays a more than negligible role in determining the attainment or 
otherwise of positive welfare outcomes in Nigeria’s international economic forays 
and therefore needs to be given serious consideration. 
In the context of Nigeria, from the NTPD 2002, it is clear that Nigeria is in favour of 
a trade liberalisation strategy in a bid to actualise its development objectives.
108
 It 
was however argued in chapter four that irrespective of these aspirations to pursue 
trade liberalisation, there is still a significant disconnect between the institutional 
provisions of Nigeria’s extant trade framework and its development strategy. 
Afekhena has linked this disconnect between trade policy and development strategy 
in Nigeria to the exclusion of the Organised Private Sector (OPS) from the 
process.
109
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The view in this thesis is that the exclusion of SFGs from the mainstream of 
international economic interaction is also a reason for the disconnection between the 
international trade framework and development strategy in Nigeria. For example, it 
was identified in chapter four, that there is a disconnection between the development 
strategies of the Federal and State governments under their respective development 
plans (NEEDS and SEEDS).
110
 NEEDS and SEEDS were meant to be 
complementary but were developed within the ambits of a defective constitutional 
arrangement which does not capture the essence of the changing global economic 
order. For example, in Anambra state’s SEED, it was stated that: 
Like most states in the country, Anambra state is heavily dependent on 
the allocation from the federation account for its revenue. This is slightly 
augmented by internally generated revenue from taxes, fines and fees, 
licenses earnings and sales etc. The continued dependence on the federal 
allocation in Nigeria is structurally inevitable given that the federal 
government presides over most of the revenue sources in the states.
111
 
It is argued that if SFGs remain heavily dependent on revenue allocation from the 
FG, a majority will not be eager to pursue their potentials considering their Strengths, 
Opportunities, Weaknesses and Threats (SWOT).
112
 The situation is compounded by 
the constitutional exclusion of SFGs from the management of key resources in which 
they possess comparative advantage in the global economy. This is a handicap to the 
ability of SFGs to effectively implement their SEED objectives. Conversely, SFGs 
which have genuinely been committed to their SEED objectives have been faced 
with the challenges of constitutional barriers while trying to access potential 
investors and partners.  
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Another example is the exclusion of SFGs from the core policy process pertaining to 
the diversification of the Nigerian economy. Considering that diversification of the 
Nigerian economy has been a central strategy of all Nigeria’s development plans 
since independence, it is surprising that SFGs where the potential non-oil export 
avenues are located are not central to this strategy.
 113
  
To achieve export diversification, the NTPD identifies the agencies of the FG as the 
key stakeholder required to actualise this particular objective.
114
 As was pointed out 
in chapter four, this is an area which necessitates the contribution of the OPS and 
SFGs.
115
 This is due to the fact that development is fundamental to the economic 
strategy of SFGs.
116
 As such, it is argued that SFGs in Nigeria are becoming active in 
the international arena mainly because they seek to achieve development objectives 
for their constituencies. Coupled with the fact that the current dispensation of 
international economic relations encourages them to access the international scene, it 
is necessary to formally incorporate them into the mainstream of the international 
trade-development strategy in Nigeria.  
In order to achieve cooperation in this regard, the development strategies of all levels 
of government must be integrated under a framework which empowers each level of 
government based on comparative advantage. In essence, the distribution of powers 
on matters of foreign economic policy should not be static but relative to the strength 
of each level of government to handle a specific matter. Clearly, there are issues 
which cannot and should not be handled by the lower levels of government such as 
defence or matters of national security. However, the FG should not hang on to 
power in areas which can be effectively developed by a particular state. The 
argument here is not for the creation of exclusive tracks for each level of government 
on a specific matter. Instead, the default position of central control should be varied 
in instances where it is appropriate for SFGs to take the lead and the FG acts as the 
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check and balance. For example, port concessioning in Nigeria is a priority to the 
littoral states yet shipping, ports and cabotage fall under the ELL. As such, SFGs 
which are interested in this sector and have demonstrated a commitment to 
developing this sector by facilitating investment and trade in this regard should be 
allowed to take the lead while the FG acts as the balancing authority. Hocking 
describes this phenomenon as ‘relocation’. This happens when the opportunities 
created by externally expanding regionalism coincides with internal regionalism 
which is driven by comparative advantage.
117
 Thus, when SFGs are specially 
equipped to thrive in a particular sector, they should be encouraged to take the lead 
in the external sphere.
118
 This will be discussed in more detail in section 6.3.4 which 
addresses cooperative federalism in the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) regime in 
Nigeria.  
In summary, the arguments in this section are not focused on the efficacy or 
otherwise of international trade as a platform for achieving development. The aim in 
this section has been to establish how SFGs are a missing link in the international 
trade-development nexus and why they (SFGs) should be incorporated into this 
relationship. The arguments and suggestions proffered in this section while not 
presumed to be a solution to all Nigeria’s development problems are a reflection of 
the importance of the incorporation of SFGs as an important stakeholder in the 
development process. The government is already moving in the right direction with 
the development plans in place at each level of government, but there must be 
synergy and dynamism in the interplay of the development strategies to achieve 
coherence in this current dispensation of international economic relations. In the next 
section the implementation of a cooperative federalism model in specific institutions 
relating to international economic relations will be discussed and analysed. 
6.3.2 The National Assembly (NA). 
In chapter four, law making was identified as the primary role of the National 
Assembly (NA) in Nigeria’s international economic framework. In the context of 
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international trade, the NA is responsible for passing legislation which regulates 
Nigeria’s international trade and commerce.119 In addition to its law-making 
responsibility, it was also identified that the NA through the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs (CFA) has oversight functions concerning the Executive’s foreign policy 
powers. The issues covered by the committee include: measures relating to 
international economic policy, trading with friendly nations, measures to foster 
commercial intercourse with foreign nations and economic/geographical groupings 
to safeguard Nigeria's business abroad and international commodity agreements for 
co-operation.
120
The NA is a representation of the 36 states and as such is considered 
as a platform for serving state interests in foreign policy.
121
 Gambari supports this 
position in his examination of the activities of SFGs under the 1979 Constitution 
(which has similar provisions to the 1999 Constitution on matters of foreign policy). 
According to him, ‘because the Senate [under the 1979 Constitution] was a distinctly 
federal body with equal representation of each state, the states and their various 
interests could influence the making and implementation of treaties.’122 This is 
similar to the position expressed by Smiley (1971)
 123
 and Cairns (1978)
124
 about the 
experience in Germany, Australia and the US. These authors were of the view that 
federations where the interests of the SFGs are formally incorporated into national 
policy making by being represented in the upper house of the legislature amounts to 
‘intrastate federalism’ which caters for the participation of SFGs in foreign policy.125  
Smiley and Cairns argue that the idea of SFGs having an input into national policy - 
including foreign policy - is given expression under the structure of the legislative 
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body.
126
 Fafard and Leblond, commenting on the views of Smiley and Cairns, point 
out that their arguments imply that the representation of SFGs in the national 
legislative body precludes ‘the need to give them a direct role in negotiation, 
ratification and implementation of trade and economic treaties because their interests 
are represented and protected by other means.’127 In the context of Nigeria, Gambari 
(commenting on the then proposed third republic in 1991) held a similar view to the 
effect that in Nigeria there is no need for a direct role for SFGs in trade negotiation; 
the federal character principle enshrined in the then 1979, the 1989 (and now in the 
1999) Constitutions provided an adequate representation of SFGs in the senate and as 
a consequence indirect input of SFGs into Nigeria’s foreign policy.128  
This position expressed by the authors above is debatable, because there are 
circumstances when there is lack of direct state representation in the legislative 
house. For example, pursuant to the Seventeenth Amendment to the US Constitution, 
state governments are no longer directly represented in Congress and this increases 
the chances that in Congress partisan considerations may trump state or regional 
concerns.
 129
 Even when there is direct state representation in the legislative assembly 
as is the case in Nigeria, there is still a chance of partisan considerations diluting 
their interests. For example, Akindele and Oyediran are of the view that an analysis 
of the participation of the NA in foreign affairs during the second democratic 
republic in Nigeria (1979 – 1983) ‘shows clearly the existence of a bipartisan 
approach to major issues of foreign policy among political parties…’130  
This thesis supports the views of Akindele and Oyediran that the NA in Nigeria is 
not an adequate representation of SFGs in Nigeria’s foreign policy interactions. 
There is no indication that the NA during the second republic which they (Akindele 
and Oyediran) commented on, and even the current fourth democratic republic (since 
1999), has reflected a concrete interest of SFGs in Nigeria’s foreign policy 
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interactions. To support this argument, the terms of reference under which this CFA 
acts in regard to the interest of SFGs in the international economic process will be 
examined. This is an issue because the new dispensation of international economic 
relations has expanded the participation of SFGs beyond the scope of a nationalised 
legislative approach to international trade and investment interactions.  
When the CFA acts in regard to international economic policy, it is not clear whether 
their representation is premised on their commitment to the SFGs or adherence to the 
constitutional status quo which does not recognise state participation in foreign 
relations. If the NA is indeed acting in the interests of their state constituencies, then 
the NA is an appropriate forum for representing and protecting the interests of SFGs 
as advocated by Smiley, Cairns, Gambari, Farfard and Leblond. However, from the 
structure of trade policy formulation in Nigeria, the powers of the NA and its CFA in 
the trade process is exercised during the passing of legislation and in the form of 
oversight functions. An oversight function refers to the committees’ surveillance 
responsibilities on the activities of the executive and its federal agencies which are 
constitutionally empowered to regulate Nigeria’s international economic relations. It 
is arguable that when these powers are exercised by the NA and the CFA, they are 
done from the perspective of the NA as a part of the FG, rather than as protectors of 
state interest. If the NA was truly reflective of SFGs interests in the international 
economic process, part of its terms of reference should reflect that the exercise of its 
functions is done in view of the need to ensure that the central government’s foreign 
economic policy is conducted in conformity with the interests of SFGs in Nigeria.  
An examination of the objectives of the CFA shows that the committee only takes 
into consideration the protection of Nigerian interests abroad but not the interests at 
home. For example, Order XVII Rule B 28 (2) (i) of the House Standing Orders, 
2007 states that one of the jurisdictions of the committee is to deal with ‘measures to 
foster commercial inter-course with foreign nations and to safeguard Nigerian 
business interests abroad.’131  It does not talk about a corresponding mandate to 
safeguard the interests of Nigerian businesses at home. This is surprising because the 
committee’s jurisdiction takes cognisance of globalisation by providing in 28 (2) (q) 
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that the committee has jurisdiction on matters that aim ‘To sustain the commitment 
of member states to the broad themes of globalisation, knowledge, technology and 
North-South relationship.’132 It will be recalled from the discussions in section 6.2.1 
that one of the developments which has occurred in federal systems such as the US 
and Canada is that states in these jurisdictions have recognised the dangers which 
globalisation poses to their interests if adequate protection is not given to them and 
businesses operating within their constituencies during international trade 
negotiations. In the US, protection measures for local businesses such as the ‘no 
greater rights’ concept has been championed by the states through the 
intergovernmental linkage for cooperation under the IGPAC, the NCSL and the 
SAA. This level of consciousness about the impact of globalisation is not deducible 
from the terms of reference of the NA’s CFA. The objectives of the committee do 
not show a commitment to protecting the interests of SFGs on matters of 
international economic interaction in this dispensation of international economic 
relations.  
Compared with the Committee on Foreign Affairs (CFA) mandate in Nigeria, the 
emphasis of their terms explicitly states that they are focused on protecting the 
interests of Nigerian businesses abroad. It is questionable why this category is 
omitted. Based on this premise, it is argued that the NA and CFA need to strengthen 
their objectives to reflect the interests of SFGs in Nigeria’s international economic 
interactions.  
The vibrancy of cooperation measures between both levels of government in Nigeria 
can be achieved if there is added input from SFGs in addition to the NA. The 
provisions of s12 (3) of the 1999 Constitution provide a blue print for such a 
scenario. As was identified in section 6.2.3, the NA’s broad powers are tempered by 
a very narrow s12 (3) which is meant to act as an added layer of protection for SFGs 
in regard to treaty ratification. In addition to the recommendations which were made 
earlier about this point, it is also possible to draw parallels from the US example in 
this regard. In the US, the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) 
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133
provides a platform for the states to influence the international economic process 
under the current dispensation of international economic relations. The state Houses 
of Assembly in Nigeria can follow this trend and consequently improve the level of 
cooperation and the quality of their SFGs input to Nigeria’s international economic 
interaction. The avenue for SFGs to contribute to the ratification of a treaty under s12 
(3) should be done in tandem with stronger interaction with the Executive Governors 
of the constituencies they represent.   
6.3.3 Debt Management in Nigeria. 
Debt management is one area which has already shown signs of an emerging 
cooperative linkage between levels of government in Nigeria. Cooperation has been 
necessitated in this area because sourcing funds from international financiers has 
become a prominent aspect of SFG engagement in the international arena. SFGs have 
actively been involved in external borrowing via the domestic capital market and 
multilateral sources.
134
 In response to this growing trend, the Nigerian Debt 
Management Office (DMO) was established on the 4th October, 2000 ‘To centrally 
coordinate the management of Nigeria’s debt, which was hitherto being done by a 
myriad of establishments in an uncoordinated fashion.’135   
Some cooperative measures put in place since the establishment of the DMO include 
the establishment of Debt Management Departments (DMDs) in all the 36 states of 
the Federation in 2008.
136
 The primary function of the DMDs is to assist the DMO in 
keeping tabs on the debt profile of public bodies at all levels of government. To carry 
out its functions, the DMDs are integrated into the mainstream of government 
business at the state level so that they can keep up-to-date records of debt incurred by 
each state and ensure that borrowing is in line with the guidelines issued by the 
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DMO.
137
 Under the cooperation mechanism, SFGs have been encouraged to 
participate in the debt management process by passing state legislation which 
complements the FG’s initiative. As at 2009, it was reported that: 
In pursuance with [of] the objectives of the development of sub-national 
debt management, a total number of four states (Bauchi, Bayelsa, Lagos 
and Nassarawa) have enacted their Public Debt Management Acts, while 
the rest of the states are in the process of doing same, with the exception 
of five states (Borno, Jigawa, Kano, Sokoto and Adamawa) which are yet 
to do so.
138
 
To further cooperation efforts amongst the FG and SFGs on debt management, the 
DMO has since its introduction engaged and collaborated with donor agencies such 
as the Department for International Development (DFID) to provide assistance to 
SFGs in the area of sub-national debt management. The FG through the DMO has 
also been actively engaged with SFGs in the area of the development of sub-national 
bonds. These bonds are required by SFGs to fund critical economic and social 
programmes.
139
 The significance of these cooperative measures highlighted above is 
that they are occurring in a vital sector of the Nigerian economy which plays a 
crucial role in the trade process under this dispensation of international economic 
relations.  
An improvement on these efforts will be to integrate the DMO initiatives into the 
trade-development strategy of all the levels of government in Nigeria. This is 
necessary in view of the fact that the main reason SFGs seek funding is to promote 
their development agenda.
140
 If federal funding and revenue sharing remains the 
primary focus of Nigerian federalism, SFGs will continually seek external funding to 
augment the shortfall in finances needed to meet their development objectives.
141
 
However, if the debt management strategy is mainstreamed into the 
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development/international trade agenda, it is argued that the focus on external 
borrowing will be better tailored towards increasing of their external competitiveness 
in the world economy.  
6.3.4 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Regime.  
Nigeria’s FDI regime is another area of Nigeria’s international economic relations 
mechanism which has shown remarkable signs of an emerging cooperative 
framework. Under the current dispensation of democratic governance which started 
in 1999, FDI has been designated a priority area for Nigeria’s economic development 
strategy.
142
 The Nigerian government since 2010 has refocused Nigeria’s trade policy 
strategy by emphasising the importance of FDI to Nigeria’s economy. Among the 
steps taken to achieve this aim is the re-branding of the Federal Ministry for Trade 
and Commerce (FMTC); as the ministry is now called the Federal Ministry of Trade 
and Investment (FMTI). Also, the FG in July, 2013, introduced a 30 -year master 
plan called the National Integrated Infrastructural Master Plan (NIIMP) which is 
meant to attract investors into Nigeria.
143
  
Irrespective of this evidence of cooperation between the central government and 
SFGs already existing in the FDI sector, there are still some shortcomings which 
need to be corrected to strengthen the linkage. For example in March, 2012, the 
Presidency in a bid to boost FDI revived two previously existing committees to 
facilitate trade and investment in the country. The Doing Business and 
Competitiveness Committee and the Committee on Investor-Care were introduced to 
replace the previously existing Doing Business and Report Monitoring Review 
Committee and the Committee on Problems of Investors. Both committees had for 
years gone been in institutional limbo.
144
 ‘The membership of the two committees is 
drawn from ministries, extra- ministerial departments and agencies which have 
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critical roles to play in meeting the objectives for which these committees are 
reconstituted to achieve.’145 The mandates of the two committees include monitoring, 
review and recommendations on how existing policies and legislation governing the 
act of doing business in Nigeria can be improved.
146
 The constitution of the 
committees is a reflection of the deficiency of the existing linkage between the 
central and SFGs on international economic policy formulation in Nigeria. This is 
because the committee’s members are drawn only from agencies of the FG. The 
exclusion of SFGs from these committees is a clear indication of the lack of 
consideration being given to the role of SFGs in improving Nigeria’s ease of doing 
business profile. It is argued that by excluding SFGs from these committees their 
objectives cannot be realistically achieved. This is because SFGs are now active in 
shaping the FDI process in Nigeria so it is naïve to expect that any reform to the FDI 
regime can be done without their input in the process. SFGs are the closest level of 
regulation to the grassroots where the implementation of any policy and the 
consequential impact of such implementation will be felt. In November, 2011, the 
researcher was involved in a Stakeholders’ Meeting organised by the FMTI to 
brainstorm on a reformation strategy for the FDI regulatory regime in Nigeria. A 
personal observation made by the researcher was the conspicuous absence of SFG 
representation at the meeting.
147
  It is ironic that the FG does not take cognisance of 
the importance of SFGs in the reformation process of its FDI regulatory regime, 
considering that SFGs are the key components of the FDI drive in Nigeria. The 
importance of SFGs in this regard is an issue which has been recognised by the 
World Bank. Two reports have been prepared by the World Bank in 2008 and 2010, 
on the role and ranking of Nigerian SFGs on the ease of doing business. The 2010 
Report identified that the FG is not alone in the reformation of regulations to 
improve the ease of doing business in Nigeria.
148
 Thus, if SFGs are involved in 
reforms, it is important to enhance the synergy between both levels of government to 
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ensure that the reforms from both levels of government are in tandem. An example of 
the divergence in policy reforms which could arise due to separate efforts for reform 
is seen in one of the recommendations made by the Doing Business and 
Competitiveness Committee a year after its inauguration. The Committee identified 
that the signage fee currently imposed on all businesses by Lagos State Signage and 
Advertising Agency was one of the constraints affecting the ease of starting a 
business in Nigeria.
149
 It is argued that the existence of such constraints is because 
there is no policy coordination between the FG and SFGs in the FDI sector.  
The exclusion of SFGs from these committees identified above and from the overall 
FDI process in Nigeria is also an indication of the divergence between theory and 
reality in Nigeria’s overall international economic  relations framework. For example 
in chapter three, it was identified that a new protocol is emerging with regard to how 
international actors are accessing Nigeria’s FDI framework.150 It is argued that this 
changing protocol can be conceptualised as a pattern of the central/state cooperative 
model becoming a reality in Nigeria’s international economic relations framework; 
albeit within the constraints of the extant framework. SFGs are now acting as ‘gate 
keepers’ to the Nigerian FDI framework. Hocking calls this ‘relocation' and 
describes it thus: 
The phenomenon of relocation is clearly demonstrated as international 
regionalism and coincides with internal regionalism to produce 
increasingly complex patterns of relationships and activity. The new 
geopolitics with its emphasis on access, has come to focus on this in 
terms of the creation of what Cohen terms ‘gateway states’ and Ohmae 
‘region-states’. In fact, these are not necessarily territorial entities with 
separatist ambitions, but may be regions within nation-states whose 
characteristics equip them particularly well for, in Cohen’s words, 
‘specialised manufacturing, trade, tourism and financial services 
functions.
151
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Hocking’s conceptualisation of the process is useful in the context of this thesis 
because he recognises that the phenomenon of ‘relocation’ occurs due to a link 
between ‘international regionalism’ and ‘internal regionalism’ which produces 
‘increasingly complex patterns of relationships and activity.’152 This view reiterates 
the importance of the link between the new dispensation of international economic 
relations and the internal configuration within Nigeria as a federal system. His view 
is also useful to the thesis because he argues that SFGs (‘region-state’) can act as 
‘gate-way’ states without necessarily having separatist intentions. More importantly, 
it shows that in this current dispensation of international economic relations 
emphasis is placed on ‘access’ and ‘special characteristics’ (comparative advantage) 
as the determinants for participation in international interactions rather than on 
formalist and conventional conceptualisations of sovereignty.
153
 This method can be 
effectively utilised to frame a cooperative model in Nigeria’s FDI regime where 
‘gate-way’ states are given a recognised role as facilitators for Nigeria’s FDI drive.  
This argument above is supported by Hocking’s recommendation for cooperation as 
a means of effectively managing the complications arising from the new dynamics of 
international relations. He is of the view that managing the pressures and tensions 
arising from the dynamics of interactions under a new dispensation of international 
relations ‘requires the establishment of linkage mechanisms capable of providing for 
each level of government access to resources over which the other has a relative, if 
not absolute, advantage.’154 He is realistic in his views that the efficacy of any 
linkage does not mean the absence of conflicts in relations between national 
governments and SFGs, but he is of the opinion that ‘they are but one point on a 
spectrum of relationships equally characterized by the need for cooperation.’155 
In summary, the FDI mechanism in Nigeria has shown promise as a potential area of 
central/state cooperation in Nigeria’s international economic framework. The 
evidence of an emerging trend in this regard has been considered in this section and 
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the practicality of a building on this cooperative model has also been explored. 
Considering the importance of FDI to the Nigerian economic objectives, it is 
imperative that the dynamics of the relationship between SFGs and the central 
government is given adequate legislative attention. This will ensure that this 
emerging framework of cooperation in the FDI sector can be nurtured to fully 
maximize the potentials which FDI provides for Nigeria’s economic development 
objectives, while stemming any abnormities in its development.  
6.3.5  The National Council on Commerce (NCC). 
The NCC is a key institution which must be restructured for cooperative federalism 
to work in Nigeria. In section 6.2.3 of this chapter, an alternate wording for s 12 of 
the 1999 Constitution was introduced. It was pointed out that for the alternate s 12 to 
work there must be an accompanying institutional platform to facilitate the proposed 
cooperation mechanism between stakeholders to Nigeria’s international economic 
process. This is where the NCC comes in. 
In chapter four, the key functions of this institution were identified.
156
 Specifically, it 
was identified that at present the NCC is the foremost institution which provides a 
platform for cooperation between the central government and SFGs on matters of 
international economic relations. It was also argued in chapter four that the level of 
priority given the NCC in the international economic process of Nigeria is 
inadequate. This is because the NCC does not have multilateral and regional trade 
matters as part of its terms of reference.
157
 This view that SFGs contribution to 
international economic policy formulation under the NCC is of low constitutional 
priority is also gleaned from the fact that the Enlarged National Focal Point (ENFP) 
Committee on Multilateralism and Regional Trade Matters; which handles matters 
relating to multilateral and regional trade matters, is not open to the contribution of 
SFGs and it is superior in constitutional ranking to the NCC within the Nigerian 
trade policy formulation hierarchy. The points identified above raise concern and the 
need to question whether in light of the objectives of the NCC; it is an effective 
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forum for actualising the contribution of SFGs to the international economic policy 
formulation in Nigeria.  
In Abuja, the 1st and 2nd participants informed the researcher that the NCC is a 
consultative forum which does not create any binding obligations on the participants. 
The decisions emanating from the forum are not strictly enforced but members 
(including SFGs) are encouraged to implement them. In relation to the frequency of 
the NCC meeting, the 1st participant in the Abuja interviews admitted that the 
frequency of the meetings is not satisfactory prima facie; as regular dialogue is 
needed to properly integrate SFGs into the trade policy formulation process. 
However, he is of the view that the meeting can only be held annually because of the 
vast number of states in Nigeria (36) which makes it logistically difficult to meet 
more frequently. He added that during the yearly intervals in-between meetings, 
SFGs are encouraged to meet with stakeholders within their constituencies to gather 
information and prepare to properly articulate their position at the annual NCC 
meetings. The 2nd participant also added that the Minister from time to time calls for 
emergency meetings with stakeholders (including SFGs) during the interval between 
NCC meetings when there are pressing issues concerning Nigeria’s trade policy. The 
participants at the state levels also reiterated the fact that there are ad hoc meetings 
which are called if the need arises; although the participant in Lagos stated that it is 
only the ‘high profile’ states which are called upon if there are further issues arising 
after the annual NCC meetings. The interviews provided contradictory evidence as to 
whether the NCC forum does enable effective participation by SFGs in the Nigerian 
trade policy formulation process. For example, the policy makers (participants) at the 
federal level in Abuja claimed that while the system is not perfect, it is representative 
of a forum which carries all stakeholders (including SFGs) along.  
It is argued that the terms of reference for the NCC and the resultant quality of the 
contributions emanating therefrom are limited showing that it is an informative and 
reactive process rather than a proactive one.  
It is understandable from the description of the status of the NCC that this is what 
can be expected of such a forum given the circumstances. It is argued that this is not 
satisfactory in view of the demands of international economic interactions in this 
current dispensation. The insufficiency of the contribution by SFGs under the NCC 
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forum to Nigeria’s international economic interactions was highlighted by an 
academic expert interviewed in Edo state. The participant who headed the committee 
which drafted the NTPD of 2002 was asked by the researcher about the level of 
participation by SFGs during the preparation of the NTPD in particular and his views 
about the level of SFGs involvement in trade policy formulation in general. He 
responded thus: ‘…there was no contribution from SFGs at the preparatory stage. 
The NCC only went through the finished draft of the policy.’158 He added that this is 
obviously due to the fact that constitutionally SFGs are not responsible for trade 
policy formulation in Nigeria. He was of the view that this ought not to be so because 
if Nigeria was practicing true federalism then SFGs would be involved in the 
formative stage of the drafting of trade policy in Nigeria even if the issue of trade 
policy is under the ELL. He added that this is important because states are already 
making forays into the international market to borrow, sign MoU’s and partake in 
other trade investment agreements with sovereign countries; making them important 
stakeholders in Nigeria’s international economic interaction. However as we have 
seen, participation of SFGs in the formative stage of trade policy is far from 
guaranteed. 
To achieve cooperation in Nigeria’s international economic relations framework, the 
NCC can be restructured to reflect a higher constitutional priority level in Nigeria’s 
international economic relations framework. Although the emphasis of Nigeria’s 
international economic  relations strategy is on empowering the OPS, it is imperative 
that SFGs are constitutionally empowered as well. The reason being that in this 
dispensation of international economic relations, the facilitation of international 
economic  activities by regulatory bodies at the local level is an important element 
needed for the OPS to function optimally. For example, a participant in the Edo state 
interview pointed out that some of the regional interactions which Nigeria is 
involved in have far reaching implications on trade actors located within SFGs. Thus, 
if they are involved in the deliberation stages of Nigeria’s regional interaction they 
will be better placed to detect problems at the grassroots, facilitate the proper 
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dissemination of information, advice potential exporters and those involved in the 
export chain.
159
 
An increase in the frequency of the meetings may be necessary in line with the US, 
Canada and Belgian examples. It was pointed out in the US experience that the 
IGPAC has called for more regularly scheduled mechanism for federal-state trade 
policy consultations in light of the increasing role of states in the US’s trade policy 
interactions.
160
 This is also true in the Nigerian context. There is a need to recognize 
the importance of this forum in Nigeria’s international economic relations framework 
by increasing the frequency of the meetings to keep up with Nigeria’s increasing 
participation in regional and multilateral arrangements and the accompanying 
activities of her SFGs. The logistical challenges expressed by the participants 
interviewed should be factored into any review of the meeting frequency.  
A suggested solution is that the regular NCC general meeting which encompasses all 
SFGs and non-state actors should still be held annually. In addition, a rotational 
committee of states and non-state actors should convene as often as is necessary 
during the negotiation and implementation process of any agreement initiated by the 
central government or any SFGs. In this regard, a useful parallel can be drawn from 
the accession protocol of the WTO for new members. To become a member (“accede 
to”) of the WTO, all WTO members must agree on terms. This is done through the 
establishment of a working party of WTO members and through a process of 
negotiations.
161
 Each accession Working Party takes decisions by consensus. All 
interested WTO Members must be in agreement that their individual concerns have 
been met and that outstanding issues have been resolved in the course of their 
bilateral and multilateral negotiations.
162
 In regard to the concept of reaching 
agreement by consensus, a similar model is found in the Belgian cooperative 
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 See WTO, ‘How to become a Member of the WTO’ 
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/acces_e.htm> accessed 03 June 2014. 
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framework.
163
 The Inter-ministerial Committee on Foreign Policy (ICFP), which is 
comprised of representatives of different authorities at the highest political and 
administrative levels, is responsible for ensuring dialogue and avoiding conflicts 
between the stakeholders.
164
 It maintains the linkage (the exchange of information 
and dialogue) between all parties involved in the decision making process.
165
 
Decisions are taken by consensus and if consensus is not achieved, Belgium abstains 
from taking a position on that matter.
166
  
In the case of the proposed rotational committee of the NCC, the process of 
negotiations between the stakeholders to the Nigerian international economic process 
(state and non-state) will be premised on the objective of ensuring that an 
international economic agreement entered into by the FG aligns with the interests of 
any stakeholder affected by such an agreement. The rotational committees of the 
NCC should include all relevant stakeholders (state and non-state) which are affected 
by a specific treaty. SFGs which are interested in signing agreements with a 
sovereign nation should also have powers to request the convening of a rotational 
committee meeting where the FG and any other interested stakeholders (including 
SFGs) can negotiate the terms of such an agreement.  
The requirement for consensus on agreements as is the case with WTO ascension 
protocol and in Belgium should be optional pursuant to the alternate s12 discussed 
earlier.
167
 The reason why reaching consensus should be optional is because the aim 
of the proposed rotational committee is not to burden all the interested parties with 
the details of an agreement or to subject the details of such an agreement to 
unnecessary bureaucratic red tape. The lead SFG and/or FMTI should be saddled 
with the responsibility of coordination between all stakeholders. However, the fixing 
of a reasonable timeframe for entertaining views and objections to a proposed 
agreement should be the responsibility of the FMTI. 
                                                 
163
 Paquin (n 80) 187. 
164
 ibid. 
165
 ibid. 
166
 ibid.  
167
 See section 6.2.3. 
 264 
 
With regards to content of the contribution to be made by stakeholders under the 
proposed cooperative framework, it is important to avoid the Belgian experience 
where the need for consensus by all stakeholders can often lead to policy stalemates. 
More so, there is no guarantee that a deeply divided country like Nigeria would not 
experience the same fate as Belgium. An alternative approach would be to make the 
contribution to content discretionary. As was stated in the alternate wording of s 12, 
the emphasis is on creating a legitimate forum where SFGs have an opportunity to 
contribute to the policy making process. The intention is to dissuade these actors 
from adopting conflicting policies when they consider themselves to be outside the 
system.   
The format of the contributions to content of a bill could be in the form of opinions, 
reservations or objections. There is also no guarantee that these contributions would 
be taken seriously, but the opportunity to be heard has the potential to deepen the 
democratic process in Nigeria’s international economic policy formulation process. 
This could also strengthen the parliamentary process in Nigeria because contribution 
to content of a bill rather than waiting for ratification before objection or approval (as 
it is in the current s 12) would give greater opportunity for SFGs to ensure that their 
views are adequately reflected in any international agreement that affects their 
economic development.  
In addition to increasing the frequency of the meetings, the terms of reference of the 
NCC should also be elevated to reflect the Hayes typology identified in section 6.2.1. 
This should include:  
(1) increased input by SFGs in the negotiations of international economic 
agreements by the central government, especially under the proposed 
rotational committees of the NCC; 
(2) Increased involvement of SFGs in the implementation of international 
economic agreements; and  
(3) A larger role for SFGs in the administration of the trade disciplines 
implicating regional and local measures.
168
 
                                                 
168
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With reference to the alternate s 12 introduced earlier, these enlarged terms of 
reference for the NCC can be incorporated into the workings of that section. This can 
be achieved by building on the debt management and the FDI examples treated 
previously. From these two examples, it was identified that these sectors of Nigeria’s 
international treconomic interaction have already been subjected to some degree of 
intergovernmental cooperation. These examples demonstrate that cooperation is 
feasible within Nigeria’s international economic relations framework. Flowing from 
this, it is argued that the NCC has the potential to serve as a unifying platform for 
integrating the cooperation efforts in the various sectors under a central forum for 
federal/state deliberations. This will serve a similar purpose like the Canadian C-
trade Committees, the Inter-ministerial Committee on Foreign Policy (ICFP) in 
Belgium and the Intergovernmental Policy Advisory Committee (IGPAC) in the US. 
The NCC can serve as a platform for SFGs to contribute in the area of 
implementation of trade norms under s12; subject to the broader interpretation given 
to ‘treaty’ in the revised section. The NCC can also serve as a platform for SFGs to 
play a larger role in the administration of the trade disciplines. This can be achieved 
if the NCC is used as a forum for regular information sharing between the SFGs and 
the FG about trade negotiations and obligations which affect SFGs.  
On the issue of trade negotiation under the extant framework, the Enlarged National 
Focal Point (ENFP) plays a key role. The ENFP is primarily responsible for policy 
relating to negotiation on multilateral and regional trade agreements in Nigeria. 
However, it was pointed out in chapter four that this forum excludes SFGs and is of 
higher constitutional priority than the NCC. A cooperative perspective to the 
workings of the ENFP will be addressed in the next section to consider the 
possibility of an improved collaborative role between the NCC and ENFP. 
6.3.6 The Enlarged National Focal Point (ENFP) on Multilateral and Regional 
Matters 
It was identified in chapter four that the exclusion of SFGs from the Enlarged 
National Focal Point (ENFP) Committees on Multilateralism and Regional Trade 
Matters is an indication of their low constitutional priority in Nigeria’s extant 
international trade framework. Furthermore, the objectives of the NCC discussed in 
the previous section iterates the fact that SFGs only contribute to issues relating to 
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multilateral or regional trade interactions in an advisory capacity. This view is 
supported by an opinion expressed by the 3
rd
 participant in the Abuja interview who 
stated that there are two perspectives to be considered in relation to the contribution 
of SFGs to the trade policy process in Nigeria –formulation and implementation 
stages. He said that states are restricted to domestic trade issues in the formulation 
stage while the central government handles the formulation of policies relating to 
international trade interactions of the country. On the Implementation side, he said 
that ‘states play a more prominent role at the implementation stage of international 
trade related issues.’169 On the latter view, a reading of the NTPD, 2002 presents a 
contrary position to the opinion expressed by the participant. Under the NTPD, SFGs 
are excluded from the implementation plan on almost every point relating to 
international trade negotiation and implementation.
170
  
It is argued that this position is unacceptable under the current dispensation of 
international economic relations. This is because SFGs are vital to the negotiation 
and implementation process of international trade agreements in this current 
dispensation. In view of this, it is argued that the recommended solution for lack of 
cooperation between agencies in Nigeria’s international trade interactions cannot be 
achieved if one of the important stakeholder groups (SFGs) is excluded as an 
implementation agency. This position is also supported by parallels which were 
identified in the US, Canada, Belgium and India examples. The patterns from these 
federal systems show that international trade negotiation in this dispensation of 
international economic relations cannot be done in isolation of SFGs which are 
directly or indirectly affected by the shrinking parameters of globalised international 
interactions. Thus, direct participation in actual negotiation of international economic 
agreements may be farfetched in Nigeria at this point in time but contribution from 
SFGs at the deliberation stage is not out of place.  
This is a pragmatic approach in view of the fact that SFGs already have access to the 
international scene which can lead to a disruption of any international economic 
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obligation to which Nigeria is bound to adhere. Considering that SFGs in Nigeria 
already have access to the international scene, it is only logical that they should be 
part of the negotiation process in some capacity so as to ensure that the regulatory 
regime for international trade in Nigeria achieves the policy objectives outlined in 
the action plan of the NTPD 2002.  
To this end, the recommendations about strengthening the frequency and terms of 
reference of the NCC have been suggested in the previous section of this chapter. To 
prevent duplication and overlap of functions, it is suggested that the ENFP should 
retain its functions as a policy hub for multilateral and regional issues in Nigeria. 
Based on the ENFP’s composition of government officials from the central 
government as well as private sector stakeholders (including researchers and 
academics), the committee is a good technocratic forum for ironing out the technical 
details of Nigeria’s international economic interactions. The findings and 
recommendations of the ENFP should be used to strengthen the negotiation process 
under the NCC. Instead of requiring the contribution of SFGs under this forum, it 
(ENFP) should serve as the policy research and development hub of Nigeria’s 
international economic framework. The deliberations of the ENFP would help to 
strengthen the participation of SFGs in Nigeria’s international economic interactions 
under the auspices of the NCC. The expertise of the ENFP should also be open to 
SFGs at the initial stages of any proposed international trade negotiation process they 
wish to set up. This should be done before convening any rotational NCC committee 
meeting.  
6.3.7 The Nigerian Governors Forum (NGF). 
The last but not the least important institution which will be considered in this 
chapter is the NGF. The NGF is a coalition of the elected Governors of the 36 states 
in Nigeria. It is a non-partisan association which seeks to promote unity, good 
governance, better understanding and co-operation among SFGs as well as ensuring 
a healthy and beneficial relationship between SFGs and other tiers of government.
171
 
It was established in 1999 in conformity with the right to freedom of association 
under s 40 of the 1999 Constitution. It also has legal personality pursuant to its 
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registration under Part C of the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA), 
1990.
172
 
The NGF has made significant strides as a platform for actualising true fiscal 
federalism in Nigeria. Among other things, the NGF since its inception in 1999 has 
been responsible for fostering cooperation measures between SFGs, the federal 
government and international entities. Specifically, in regard to cooperation measures 
which directly or indirectly affect trade, the NGF is responsible for the following 
cooperative initiatives: 
1. The NGF was instrumental in facilitating the release of excess crude funds 
(from Paris Club debts) to SFGs in 2008. The funds have been distributed 
several times since then to augment the income accruable to SFGs for 
development purposes. 
2. Another achievement of the NGF is that in collaboration with the Forum of 
Federations (an international agency which promotes federalism) and the 
Federal Ministry of Finance, seminars were organised on fiscal federalism in 
Nigeria. The first one took place in 2008 and the second in 2009. The 
seminars sought to place more emphasis on the economic relationship 
between SFGs and federal levels of government with special emphasis on 
fiscal federalism. 
From these two achievements, the impact of the NGF in this regard is a significant 
effort in the development of a cooperation mechanism for international economic 
relations in Nigeria. These actions facilitated by the NGF fall under the category of 
political pressure similar to the experience in India. This kind of collective political 
will can be utilised to influence the international economic process in Nigeria. 
However, there is no evidence that the NGF has acted directly in the area of 
negotiations for international economic agreements. This is presumably due to the 
existing mindset which makes revenue sharing a priority over revenue generation in 
Nigeria.
173
 The NGF has been focused on achieving true fiscal federalism rather than 
pressing for measures which are beneficial to their ability to maximize their 
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economic potential within the current dispensation of international economic 
relations.  
When compared with the US’s equivalent of the NGF – the National Governors 
Association (NGA), it is noticeable that their priorities are different. While the NGF 
is focused on issues relating to fiscal federalism, the NGA has focused its political 
attention on obtaining favourable terms for the states in the US’s international 
economic interactions. The NGA adopts measures geared at influencing the 
international economic direction of the US. Measures such as the Governors’ 
Principles on International Trade Policy have broadly set forth the views of the NGA 
on the trade agenda in the US in this dispensation of international economic 
relations.
174
 Also, in US-China economic relations, the NGA has established long 
term relationships with their sub-national counterparts in China.
175
 This forum runs 
alongside the existing relationship between the central governments of both 
countries. This kind of approach is currently missing under the NGF and it is 
advocated that such is required and achievable in Nigeria under the auspices of the 
NGF.  
Some other achievements of the NGF in the area of cooperation include:  
1. The NGF Secretariat (NGFS) based on the mandate given to it by the National 
Economic Council (NEC) to develop a State Peer Review Mechanism 
(SPRM), embarked on an assessment of developed projects in SFGs in early 
2009 and 2010. This provided an opportunity for SFGs to showcase their 
achievements as well as the areas facing challenges. Consequently, the NGFS 
in collaboration with the UK Department for International Development 
(DFID) through its State Partnership for Accountability, Responsiveness and 
Capability (SPARC) programme developed a comprehensive set of 
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benchmarks and indicators and adopted a systematic and robust Peer Review 
process.
176
 
2. The Secretariat opened up relationships with a number of stakeholders 
including Development Partners such as the World Bank and the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 
3.  Following the passage of the Fiscal Responsibility and Public Procurement 
Acts in 2007, the NGF constituted a committee of Attorneys-General of states 
to examine the bills as a prelude to passing their state equivalent. As a result 
of the interest of development partners and other stakeholders in the 
implementation of this bill, a multilateral MoU was signed between the NGFS 
and Africa Development Bank (AFDB), EU, Canadian International 
Development Agency (CIDA), Japanese International Corporation (JICA), 
DFID, United State Agency for International Development (USID), World 
Bank in collaboration with Federal Ministry of Finance and the Debt 
Management Office (DMO) to facilitate cooperation with SFGs in the 
implementation of the bill. 
4. The NGF in collaboration with the German Agency for International 
Cooperation organised a working tour of six Governors to Germany in August 
2012 to understudy the economic development policies and best practices in 
the German federation for the purpose of replicating such commendable 
practices in their various states.
177
 
The achievements mentioned above demonstrate the NGF’s capacity to promote 
linkage between SFGs, the central government, the OPS and international 
organizations. This is a significant development because it demonstrates that the 
political will of the NGF is potent enough to integrate key stakeholders (nationally 
and internationally) in the international economic process.  
                                                 
176
 See Chuks Okocha, ‘NGF Partners World Bank, DFID on Peer Review Mechanism’ Thisday 
Newspaper (Lagos, 03 November 2011) <http://allafrica.com/stories/201111030694.html>   accessed 
11 November 2013.   
177
 Nigeria Governors Forum <http://nggovernorsforum.com/page_strip/achievements/> accessed 11 
November 2013. 
 271 
 
Based on this antecedent, the NGF has the potential to promote horizontal best 
practices among SGFs through its SPRM.
178
 This can be used to maintain quality, 
standard, control as well as checks and balances among SFGs in their involvement in 
the international economic process. The capacity of the NGF to promote the interests 
of SFGs in Nigeria’s international economic interactions can be further strengthened 
if they receive support from the ENFP. This is suggested in view of the 
recommendations for reforms which have been made in section 6.3.6.  
6.4  Conclusion.  
The constitutional and institutional provisions which have been treated in this chapter 
are not exhaustive of all the sectors and issues which directly or indirectly affect 
Nigeria’s interactions in a globalised era of international economic relations.179 
However, the issues which have been discussed constitute an important segment of 
the multifaceted dimension of international economic interactions in this 
dispensation. The issues which have been addressed represent a convenient point to 
start the implementation of a cooperative framework in Nigeria’s international 
economic relations regime.   
A summary of the arguments in this chapter include the proposition that a 
cooperative approach to the interpretation of federal compliance clauses in 
international trade agreements is necessary and feasible in light of the changing 
dynamics of international economic relations. The examples of cooperative measures 
from other federal systems which were identified in this chapter demonstrate the 
feasibility of actualising a cooperative model to the interpretation of this thorny issue 
of federal compliance clauses in international economic agreements. More 
importantly, the approach adopted in these country examples show a strong 
correlation between the new patterns of international economic relations and the need 
for stronger cooperation measures between levels of government in a federal system. 
It also shows how the conventional norm of central exclusivity in international 
economic relations has been revised in these federal systems; either through 
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deliberate affirmative action or as a consequence of political pressure and inevitable 
changes due to exigencies of international economic interactions in this dispensation. 
The emerging patterns of cooperation from these federal systems have been utilised 
in this chapter as a basis for justifying the need for a cooperative re-interpretation of 
federal compliance clauses in the specific context of Nigeria’s framework  for 
international economic relations. To this end, this chapter has proposed alternative 
constitutional and institutional patterns which can be infused into the extant 
framework for Nigeria’s international economic interactions in this dispensation. The 
proposals have emphasised a need to correct the mirage of ‘safeguards’ for SFGs 
under s 12 of the 1999 Constitution. The proposals have also proposed a greater role 
for Nigerian SFGs in international trade negotiation and implementation under 
restructured constitutional and institutional provisions such as s12 of the 1999 
Constitution and the NCC. This chapter has also highlighted the evidence of 
cooperative patterns in the areas of debt management and FDI to illustrate the 
practicality of the recommendations made. It has been argued that the emerging 
cooperative framework in these two sectors still needs strengthening in order to fully 
maximise the potential for central/state cooperation in these sectors.    
Overall, the discussions in this chapter demonstrate that there is need for adopting a 
new strategy in Nigeria’s international economic interactions.  It also shows that the 
means of achieving this new strategy entails a reformation of the existing 
constitutional and institutional provisions which focus on international economic 
relations. 
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Chapter Seven: Findings, Recommendations and Conclusion.   
7.1 Introduction. 
This thesis set out to investigate the changing patterns of interaction between federal 
systems and international economic norms. Specifically, this thesis aimed to investigate 
whether central exclusivity has outlived its usefulness as a viable theory underpinning 
the international economic interaction of Nigeria in a globalised dispensation of 
international economic relations. This thesis also sought to appraise the viability of 
cooperative federalism as a suitable alternative for managing Nigeria’s international 
economic interactions in a globalised era of international economic relations. 
In view of these aims above, 7 broad research questions were outlined at the onset of the 
investigation, these are:  
1. What is the nature of the relationship between international economic norms and 
federal systems? 
2. What is the evidence that the international economic system has evolved to 
accommodate new actors? 
3.  How are the changing dynamics of international economic norms impacting on 
the internal configuration (constitutional and institutional) of federal systems?  
4. What are the implications of the changing constitutional and institutional 
competence of federal systems on the theory underpinning their participation in 
the new dispensation of international economic relations?  
5. What factors have shaped the configuration of Nigeria’s federal system? 
6. How have the peculiarities of Nigeria’s federal system impacted on her 
international economic interactions?  
7. How effective is Nigeria’s trade regime in view of the changing patterns of 
international economic interactions?  
Nigeria presented an interesting scenario because preliminary observations indicated 
that, since the start of the 4
th
 democratic republic in 1999 there have been increased 
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levels of participation by Nigeria’s SFGs in the international economic system.1 This 
runs contrary to the theory underpinning the extant constitutional and institutional 
framework in Nigeria, which excludes the participation of SFGs in international 
relations. More importantly, it was identified in chapter one of this thesis that this 
emerging trend in the international participation of Nigeria’s SFGs is yet to receive 
adequate coverage in the literature on federalism and international economic relations in 
Nigeria.
2
 While studies have been conducted about this emerging trend in a number of 
federal systems in the international system, there is yet to be any substantive 
investigation which focuses on the Nigerian experience.
3
 Thus, the choice of Nigeria as 
a case study was imperative because there is a gap to be filled in the existing federalism 
and international economic relations literature as it pertains to the changing institutional 
dynamics of Nigeria’s international economic interactions.  
At the beginning of the investigation into the Nigerian case study, hypotheses were 
generated in line with the broader research questions outlined earlier. It was predicted 
that the thesis would demonstrate: 
1. That there is a new dispensation of international economic relations which is 
characterised by an expansion of international economic norms into areas which 
were hitherto within the exclusive competence of nation-states.  
2. That the expanding scope of international economic norms has both an ‘outward’ 
and ‘inward’ effect on international and domestic regimes.  
3. That, on the domestic front, there is a link between evolving international 
economic norms and the internal constitutional configuration of Nigeria (a 
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practicing federal state). This link is predicated on the proposition that the 
‘inward’ effect of expanding international economic norms has: 
a. blurred the rigid lines of sovereign demarcation between Nigeria and her 
international trading partners; 
b. Fragmented the domestic policy arena for international economic 
participation in Nigeria by opening up opportunities for her SFGs to 
access the international scene. 
4. That these ‘outward’ and ‘inward’ impacts have led to a divergence between 
theory and functional reality of Nigeria’s international economic relations 
regime.  
5. That cooperative federalism is a more appropriate alternative to central 
exclusivity for Nigeria’s international economic interactions under the current 
dispensation of expanding international economic norms. 
The aim of this final chapter is to discuss the findings of the thesis in relation to the 
hypotheses outlined above. The discussions will also reinforce the contributions and 
significance of the thesis to the selected case study in particular and the discourse on the 
relationship between federal systems and international economic norms in general.  
7.2 The Findings. 
To test the hypotheses, the themes of the thesis have been developed sequentially over 
the course of six chapters.  
In chapter one, it was established as a foundational premise that the relationship between 
federal systems and international norms is characterised by compatibility issues due to 
the divergent values associated with both regimes. It was identified that foreign relations 
in general are conventionally regarded as an area which necessitates singleness of 
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purpose, while federalism as a system of government is premised on the concept of 
shared and/or divided competences among multiple levels of government.
4
  
Flowing from this premise, it was argued in chapters two and three that the response of 
federal systems to these compatibility issues is ‘dispensationally sensitive’ because of 
the dynamic nature of the federal process.
5.
Building on this argument, it was argued in 
chapter three that the traditional position in international law which favours plenary 
powers for central governments in matters of foreign relations is characteristic of a 
dispensation of international law where nation-state based sovereignty was the primary 
determinant of international relations.
6
 State sovereignty-based values associated with 
international economic relations were shown to be present in international trade 
interactions; as evidenced by the federal compliance clauses found in multilateral and 
regional trade agreements discussed in chapter two.
7
 
It was then argued that the dynamics of the international economic system have deviated 
from the traditional values associated with the relationship between international law 
and federal systems. The arguments of this thesis, indicated the significance of 
geopolitical changes in international relations to the emerging trend of SFGs 
participating in the international economic system.
8
 It was argued in chapter three of this 
thesis that in the specific context of international trade norms, globalisation has 
facilitated the expansion of international economic norms beyond the exclusive domain 
of central governments in federal systems.
9
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In this thesis, the arguments make neither strong claims about the crystallisation of a 
constitutional order in the international trade process, nor a reversal of the traditionally 
accepted norms of international law practice, especially as it relates to recognised actors 
in international law.
10
 However, the evidence considered in chapter three was substantial 
enough to support a hypothesis that the dynamics of the international trade system in 
contemporary times has led to a shift in emphasis from the WTO to RTAs.
11
 It was 
argued that this shift in importance has a significant impact on the institutional 
participation of federal systems in international economic relations. This is due to 
changing dynamics between the WTO and RTAs which now encourages the 
participation of SFGs in aspects of international economic relations which they are 
excluded from under the WTO.
12
  
Also in chapter three, the impact of the expanding scope of international economic 
regimes on the constitutional/institutional framework of international and domestic 
regimes was considered. Evidence of outward expansion and inward contraction effects 
brought about by the impact of a new dispensation of international economic systems on 
the patterns of interactions internationally and domestically were considered.
13
  
On the international front, the transfer of sovereignty from nation-states to international 
organisations such as the WTO were analysed in chapter two and three as evidence of a 
shifting emphasis from a nation-state centred practice in the international economic 
process to a multi-level global one.
14
 On the domestic front and in the specific context of 
federal systems, the thesis relied on previous country studies which have analysed the 
scope of this contraction effect on the foreign relation activities of SFGs in federal 
                                                 
10
 See chapter three, section 3.3.2. 
11
 See chapter three, sections 3.3.1 – 3.3.2. 
12
 See chapter three, section 3.4.3 and section 3.4.4. 
13
 See chapter three, section 3.2 and 3.4. 
14
 See chapter two, section 2.3.2 and chapter three, section 3.2.1.  
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systems.
15
 The thesis utilised scholarship of academics such as Spiro, Goldsmith and 
Schütze on the experience of the US federal system;
16
 the arguments of Paquin, and 
Bursens and Massart-Pierad about the Belgian federal system;
17
 the arguments of Mattoo 
and Jacob, Sridharan and Jenkins about the Indian federal system;
18
 the arguments of 
Zheng about the experience in China;
19
 and also the arguments of Cornago about the 
Russian scenario.
20
 These country examples were relied on with varying degrees of 
emphasis. A common thread running through the discussions about these country 
experiences is that the participation of SFGs in international economic relations is 
progressively being factored into the constitutional and/or institutional framework of 
these countries.  
To establish a link between the dynamics of a changing international economic system 
and Nigeria’s constitutional/institutional interactions with this system, the evolution of 
Nigeria’s patterns of interaction with international economic regimes was considered in 
chapter four.
21
 It was identified that the existing constitutional and institutional 
framework for international economic relations in Nigeria conforms to the traditional 
international law norm of ‘central exclusivity’ in favour of central governments.22 It was 
demonstrated that Nigeria experienced a shift from shared competence in international 
economic interactions between the central and SFGs (under the 1960/63 Constitution) to 
central exclusivity in favour of the federal government under the current dispensation of 
the 1999 Constitution. It was also argued that the progressive centralisation of Nigeria’s 
                                                 
15
 This thesis considered the extensive study on foreign relations in 12 federal systems conducted by the 
Forum of Federations in 2007. See Michelmann (ed) (n 3). 
16
 See chapter five, section 5.3.1; chapter six, section 6.2.1. 
17
 See chapter five, section 5.4.2; chapter six, section 6.2.1. 
18
 See chapter five, section 5.3.3 – 5.3.4; chapter six, sections 6.2.1, 6.2.4 and 6.3.7. 
19
 See chapter five, section 5.3.3. 
20
 See chapter five, section 5.3.3. 
21
 See chapter four, section 4.2. 
22
 See chapter four, section 4.2-4.5. 
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federal system, especially under years of intermittent military rule, contributed to the 
constitutional exclusion of the SFGs from participating in Nigeria’s international 
economic interactions. This birthed the extant framework under the 1999 Constitution 
and the NTPD 2002 which do not support the activities of SFG.
23
 
To critique the extant framework in Nigeria, working criteria were adopted in chapter 
four. These were based on recommendations developed by international specialist 
organisations such as the UNDP, OECD and the WTO from which a minimum standard 
of an ideal international trade and develoment framework can be inferred.
24
 The findings 
of these organisations, which are based on extensive country studies, emphasised the 
importance of SFGs as stakeholders in an ideal international trade and development 
policy cycle. Notably, their importance was found to be crucial in the context of 
developing countries which seek to use international economic engagements as a 
fulcrum for achieving development objectives. Applying these standards to Nigeria, the 
extant constitutional and institutional framework in Nigeria was argued to be deficient 
due to its exclusion of SFGs from the international economic process.
25
 
Based on these deficiencies identified in chapter four, it was argued that the prevailing 
relationship between the FG and SFGs in Nigeria on matters of international economic 
relations is not best suited for the current dispensation of globalised trade relations. This 
is because the centralised framework does not mirror the emerging reality which the new 
dispensation of international economic relations creates for SFGs to express themselves 
on the international scene. To substantiate this argument, chapter five was dedicated to 
appraising central exclusivity and cooperative federalism. The findings in chapter three 
were used as a spring board to objectively assess the strengths and weaknesses of using 
either viewpoint as the underpinning theory of international economic relations in 
federal systems.
 26
 It was concluded in this chapter that central exclusivity is no longer 
                                                 
23
 See chapter four, section 4.7. 
24
 See chapter four, section 4.6. 
25
 See chapter four, section 4.7. 
26
 See chapter five, section 5.4.1 – 5.4.3; see also chapter six, section 6.2.1. 
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adequate for effectively mainstream the participation of SFGs into the international 
economic process in federal systems. A summary of the shortcoming of central 
exclusivity identified in chapter five is that it lacks the necessary flexibility required to 
fully integrate emerging actors into the evolving international economic process.
27
 In the 
context of Nigeria it was argued that central exclusivity’s lack of flexibility encourages 
SFGs in Nigeria to utilise back channels and loopholes in the 1999 Constitution to 
propagate their international activities. It was argued that this has the potential for 
breeding subversive and divisive policy actions by SFGs. 
From the analysis in chapter five, it was argued that the dynamics of a new dispensation 
of international relations necessitates an adoption of a cooperative federalism model in 
Nigeria. Based on the appraisal carried out, it was argued that a cooperative approach to 
international economic interactions is more appropriate than central exclusivity because 
it represents a flexible and pragmatic option for mainstreaming the participation of SFGs 
as institutional participants in Nigeria’s international economic relations framework. It 
was argued that Nigeria’s international economic regime needs to incline towards a 
model of cooperative federalism, where emphasis is on building a vibrant 
intergovernmental cooperation incorporating the interests of all the stakeholders to the 
international economic process.
28
 
Cumulatively, the lines of argument can be compressed into a central thesis that the 
constitutional and institutional framework for Nigeria’s international economic 
participation requires a shift from the conventional norm of central exclusivity to 
cooperative federalism so as to  accommodate SFGs as relevant stakeholders in the new 
globalised dispensation of international economic relations.  
                                                 
27
 See chapter five, section 5.3.4. 
28
 See chapter five, section 5.4 and chapter six, section 6.2 – 6.4. 
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7.3 Value of the Findings and Significance of the Research. 
Based on the findings discussed above, the contributions of this thesis in the specific 
context of Nigeria’s international economic interactions and the general context of the 
federalism-international economic relations discourse can be put in proper perspective.  
7.3.1 Emphasising the Importance of SFGs in Nigeria’s International Economic 
Interactions.   
In chapter four, it was identified that Nigeria’s institutional framework for international 
trade under the Nigerian Trade Policy Document (NTPD) 2002 does not take cognisance 
of the changing patterns in governance structures which are a distinct characteristic of 
the current multi-level global economic system.
29
 Under the current dispensation of 
international economic relations, governance structures within the nation-state have been 
fragmented by an expansion in scope of international economic norms. As a 
consequence, the ability of SFGs to affect foreign economic affairs is on the increase.
30
 
In Nigeria, the NTPD does not support these activities but rather relegates SFGs to the 
background in most aspects of Nigeria’s international trade interaction. 
In the context of Nigeria, the arguments in this thesis challenged the extant institutional 
and constitutional framework which has underpinned Nigeria’s economic reformation 
agenda since 1999. It was identified from an analysis of the relevant laws for 
international economic relations in Nigeria, that the FG has focused on shifting control 
of the trade process to the OPS while excluding SFGs.
31
 It was argued in this thesis that 
this is contrary to the recommendations for an ideal trade framework extrapolated from 
the studies by international specialist organisations as considered in chapter four. The 
heavy reliance placed on market forces by the Nigerian government to the detriment of 
                                                 
29
 See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘The Real New World Order’ (1997) 76 (5) Foreign Affairs 183; 
Jessica Matthews, ‘Power Shift’ (1997) 76 (1) Foreign Affairs 50.  
30
 Emily Chiang, ‘Think Locally, Act Globally? Dormant Federal Common Law Pre-emption of State and 
Local Activities Affecting Foreign Affairs’ (2003)53 Syracuse L Rev 923, 667-71.  
31
 It is on this point that the arguments in this thesis depart from the views of Afeikhena because his focus 
is on the exclusion of the OPS but also neglects the significance of SFGs as stakeholders in the 
actualisation of sound international economic policy in Nigeria.  
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SFGs as stakeholders in the international economic process has been challenged.
32
 It was 
argued that this approach by the Nigerian government is not in line with practical 
realities of the current dispensation of international economic relations. This is because 
the changing structure of the global economy is not totally market driven, but now 
encompasses a combination of both private market forces and institutional regulators 
(state and non-state alike).
33
 From this perspective, it was argued in chapter four that the 
extant framework for trade policy in Nigeria is deficient.
34
 In summary, it was argued 
that the international economic relations framework in Nigeria lacks flexibility, 
coherence, predictability, transparency, accountability and integration.
35
  
Based on these findings above, the arguments of this thesis have sought primarily to fill 
a gap in the federalism literature which focuses on the interaction between federalism 
and Nigeria’s international economic relations. The consideration of Nigeria’s 
experience is a unique contribution of this thesis because as was identified in chapter 
one, there is currently a paucity of literature which considers the emerging role of 
Nigeria’s SFGs as stakeholders in Nigeria’s international economic interactions.36 It was 
identified that existing scholarship mainly focuses on the reduction of government 
regulation in favour of the OPS in the trade process. The arguments in this thesis do not 
discountenance the importance of the OPS in Nigeria’s international economic process, 
but emphasise the need for understanding the significance of the emerging role of SFGs 
and the influence of globalisation on the participation of federal systems in international 
economic relations. The arguments in this thesis build on the views of Briggs and 
Afeikhena (which advocate stronger contribution of the OPS as stakeholders to Nigeria’s 
international economic process) by recognising that SFGs  are important stakeholders, 
                                                 
32
 See chapter four, section 4.6-4.7. 
33
 In chapter four, it was argued that in an ideal foreign economic policy framework, the role of the 
institutional regulators (central/ SFGs and non-state actors) is to act as facilitators and stablisers of the 
process. See chapter three, section 3.2 and chapter four, section 4.6.  
34
 See chapter four, section 4.7. 
35
 ibid.   
36
 See chapter one, section 1.2.2. 
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which like the OPS are currently marginalised under the extant framework for Nigeria’s 
international economic interactions.  
It has been argued in this thesis that the policy thrust of the Nigerian government (which 
focuses on control of the international economic process by the OPS) is not in line with 
the strategies adopted by other federal systems faced with similar circumstances.
37
  
Furthermore, emphasis has been placed on the significance of trade as a fulcrum for 
development in Nigeria.
38
 This thesis makes a contribution to the literature on 
development by identifying the deficiency of the trade and development framework in 
Nigeria. Relying on the framework developed by the OECD and the UNDP, it was 
identified that SFGs are important actors for actualising development through trade. This 
is not the position in Nigeria, where SFGs are empowered under the development 
agenda but excluded from the trade agenda. However, empowerment under both agendas 
is fundamental for achieving coherence in the trade and development process. 
7.3.2 Suggestions on how to restructure the System to Integrate SFGs as 
Stakeholders in Nigeria’s International Economic Process. 
This thesis makes a contribution to the policy reforms on Nigeria’s international 
economic interactions by making suggestions on how enhanced cooperation between the 
FG and SFGs can be achieved. The recommendations outlining a theoretical 
restructuring of Nigeria’s international economic relations framework are timely because 
of the growing clamour for economic and political self - determination from most 
quarters of the country. This demonstrates that there is an emerging political opportunity 
structure which necessitates a rethink of the Nigerian sovereignty on a subject matter – 
economic development – which is common ground for all stakeholders in the Nigerian 
federal process.  
The reforms advocated in this thesis already have a basis for manifestation in Nigeria 
through existing soft law mechanisms such as the National Council on Commerce 
                                                 
37
 See chapter one, section 1.6.  
38
 See chapter four, section 4.6; see chapter five, section 5.4.2 ‘n 181’. 
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(NCC), the Nigeria Governor’s Forum (NGF) and the Debt Management regime. 
However, the arguments in this thesis are in support of elevated constitutional priority 
for these existing institutions for cooperation so that the terms of reference of these fora 
would give the SFGs more opportunities to co-determine Nigeria’s policy direction on 
matters of international economic relations.  
It is advocated that attention should also be given to the role of institutions such as the 
NGF which can promote best practices and ensure that standards are maintained 
horizontally amongst SFGs and vertically between SFGs and the FG.
39
 It has been 
argued that SFGs participation in Nigeria’s international economic interaction should be 
encouraged in relation to regional involvements, especially within the ECOWAS sub-
region. It is envisaged that this will stimulate the economic integration drive in the sub-
region. With an improved international economic policy capacity for the Nigerian SFGs, 
there is vast potential in resources (goods and services) which would be better 
maximised and would invariably flow into the immediate external markets within the 
ECOWAS sub-region, aiding a deeper integration.
40
 This suggestion builds on the views 
of Elaigwu who suggested that regional initiatives such as ECOWAS have become 
essential political tools for coping with the impact of globalisation. As such, he 
recommended that a ‘federally-derived compromise needs to be established in order to 
manage the tensions between supranational self-determination and national self-
determination, which takes cognisance of sub-national demands for self-
determination.’41 This thesis has given expression to this recommendation by advocating 
for cooperative federalism as a framework for fostering productivity of Nigeria’s SFGs 
in the ECOWAS sub-region while at the same time ensuring that coherence in Nigeria’s 
overall trade strategy is not compromised.  
                                                 
39
 See chapter six, section 6.3.7. 
40
 See chapter six, section 6.1. 
41
 J Isawa Elaigwu, ‘Federalism, Regionalisation and Globalisation Africa’ (1998) 1 The Federalist 72 
<http://www.thefederalist.eu/site/index.php?option=com_content&view=art&id=219&lang=en&Itemid=2
7> accessed 26 May 2014. 
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7.3.3 Significance of the Research to the Discourse on Foreign Affairs Federalism. 
The thesis contributes to the literature on foreign affairs federalism by critically 
appraising the merits and demerits of central exclusivity and cooperative federalism in 
the conduct of international economic relations.
42
 For example, the importance of 
uniformity/certainty in international relations as a justification for central exclusivity in 
foreign economic relations is challenged in this thesis. It was argued that a reliance on 
this rationale by pro-central exclusivity scholars such as Schafer
43
 suffers from a 
deficiency which is that central exclusivity does not give room for variation in the 
conceptualisation of international economic relations.
44
   
This thesis also considered the strengths and weaknesses of cooperative federalism in 
relation to central exclusivity and other dynamic models of federalism. Relying on the 
views of Bader
45
 and Schütze,
46
 it was argued that the flexibility inherent in a 
cooperative model makes it a suitably malleable theory to cater for the changing 
circumstances of international economic relations in general and international trade in 
particular.
47
 This thesis also challenged the views of Paquin who from his comparison of 
cooperative federalism in Canada and Belgium concluded that the model in Belgium 
was more effective because the SFGs are more formally incorporated in the international 
economic process.
48
 After a consideration of both models (Canada and Belgium), the 
                                                 
42
 See chapter five, particularly sections 5.3.3 and 5.4.5.  
43
 Matthew Schafer ‘Federal States in the Broader World’ (2001)27 CAN-US LJ 35. 
44
 See chapter five, section 5.3.3. 
45
 CK Bader, ‘A Dynamic Defense of Cooperative Federalism’ (2014) 35 Whittier L Rev (Forthcoming) 4 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2189920> accessed 31 July 2013. 
46
 Robert Schütze, From Dual to Cooperative Federalism: The Changing Structure of European Law 
(OUP 2009). 
47
 See chapter five, section 5.4. 
48
 Stéphane Paquin, ‘Federalism and Compliance with International Agreements: Belgium and Canada 
Compared’ (2010) 5 Hague J Dip 173. Fafard and Leblond also questioned the effectiveness of the 
Canadian model. See Patrick Fafard and Patrick Leblond, ‘Twenty-First Century Trade Agreements: 
Challenges for Canadian Federalism’ (2012) The Federal Idea 
<http://ideefederale.ca/documents/challenges.pdf>    accessed 4 April 2014.  
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view in this thesis is that the effectiveness of a cooperative mechanism is not solely 
reliant on how formalised the system is (as is the case in Belgium) but rather on how 
committed the stakeholders are to the consultation process.
49
 This argument is supported 
by the views of Massart-Pierad and Bursens who pointed out that despite the existence 
of detailed constitutional and institutional provisions for cooperation in Belgium; it is a 
flexible, pragmatic and informal approach which has become the hallmark of Belgian 
cooperative federalism framework for foreign policy.
50
 
7.3.4 Contribution to the Theoretical Understanding of the Linkage between 
Development and Trade in Federal Systems.  
The thesis further contributes to the literature linking development and trade by 
considering the strategic position which SFGs occupy in federal countries seeking to 
mainstream trade into their development plans.  
Development was identified as a significant factor which influences the international 
economic interactions of SFGs in Nigeria.
51
 From the empirical evidence analysed in 
this thesis it was argued that forward thinking SFGs in Nigeria engage in international 
economic activities primarily in a bid to develop their constituencies rather than to 
project an independent political or cultural persona on the international scene. This is a 
useful contribution to the federalism and foreign relations discourse, because it supports 
the position espoused by scholars such as Hocking that the participation of SFGs in 
foreign relations is not always motivated by separatist objectives.
52
 The examination of 
the Nigerian experience highlights the relevance of a development agenda as a 
                                                 
49
 See chapter six, section 6.2.1. 
50
 Francoise Massart-Pierad and Peter Bursens, ‘Belgian Federalism and Foreign Relations: Between 
Cooperation and Pragmatisim’ in Michelmann (ed) (n 16) 20. The thesis also drew on the views of 
Akindele and Oyediran (n 4) 602. 
51
 Ibrahim A Gambari, ‘Federalism and the Management of External Relations in Nigeria: Lessons from 
the Past and Challenges for the Future’ (1990) 21(4) Publius 113, 120. 
52
 Brian Hocking, ‘Bridging Boundaries: Creating Linkages: Non-Central Governments and Multilayered 
Policy Environments’ (1996) 11 WeltTrends Nr 36, 43. 
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motivating factor behind the foreign interactions of SFGs in a federal system, rather than 
secession tendencies.  
The value placed on the current role of SFGs in Nigeria’s international economic 
process stems from an appreciation that Nigeria’s development aspirations, especially 
via the instrumentality of FDI, is dependent on an integrated policy framework which 
mainstreams trade into the development agenda.
53
 It has been argued in this thesis that 
the exclusion of SFGs from Nigeria’s international economic process is inimical to 
Nigeria’s development objectives. Having considered the views from the OECD, UNDP 
and the WTO, it was demonstrated that Nigeria’s current development-trade framework 
is not in alignment with the recommendations of these institutions which emphasise the 
importance of integrating all relevant stakeholders into the trade policy cycle.
54
  
7.3.5 Contribution to the Theoretical Understanding on the Link between 
Globalisation and Fragmentation of Governance Structures in Federal 
Systems. 
This thesis examines the significance of globalisation as a facilitator of change in the 
dynamics of the international economic system.This thesis contributes to the existing 
literature on globalisation by exploring the extent to which globalisation has reshaped 
the endogenous constitutional configuration of federal systems in the area of trade. 
Drawing on the views of authors such as Cass,
55
 Slaughter,
56
 Matthews,
57
 Hayes,
58
 
Elaigwu,
59
 Kresl,
60
 Lachapelle and Paquin
61
 and Abebe and Huq,
62
 this thesis analysed 
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 See chapter six, section 6.3.1. 
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 See chapter six, section 6.3.1. 
55
 Deborah Z Cass, The Constitutionalisation of the World trade Organisation: Legitimacy, Democracy, 
and Community in the International Trading System (OUP 2005).  
56
 Slaughter (n 30).  
57
 Matthews (n 30). 
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 Hayes (n 6).  
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 Elaigwu (n 42). See chapter one, section 1.2.2 for the arguments of Elaigwu on the impact of 
globalisation on the participation of federal countries in international trade.  
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the proposition that globalisation has led to a disaggregation of the nation-state and 
facilitated the emergence of new actors in international relations. This thesis focused 
specifically on SFGs as one of these new actors. Within the context of Nigeria, this 
thesis has presented arguments from the Nigerian perspective to support the prior views 
of these authors mentioned above, that nation-states are no longer the only relevant 
stakeholders in international economic relations. A significant contribution to the 
existing literature on globalisation is the argument in this thesis that the Nigerian 
experience shows how globalisation has aided SFGs in circumventing the constitutional 
obstacles militating against their participation in international activities. Although the 
primary focus was on Nigeria’s experience in this regard, broader generalisations can be 
made about the significance of globalisation in the redefinition of the relationship 
between federal systems and international norms. For example, evidence from Nigeria 
was used to reinforce the arguments of Hockings that SFGs located in strategic coastal 
areas have, due to the impact of globalisation, become facilitators of vibrant policies 
pursued by federal systems in the FDI sphere. It was argued that SFGs have become 
‘gate-keepers’ in the FDI process, by driving the flow of FDI.63 This argument of the 
thesis has potential for broader application to a federal country like Malaysia which 
operates a highly centralised federal system like Nigeria and as such SFGs are 
constitutionally excluded from the foreign policy sphere.
64
 The Nigerian experience 
demonstrates that in the absence of constitutional inclusion, globalisation is acting as a 
bridge upon which SFGs can still access the international scene. The implications of this 
finding is that globalisation has the potential to eventually force constitutional change in 
centralised federal systems such as Nigeria and Malaysia. 
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7.3.6 Contributions to the Debate on the Constitutionalisation of the International 
Trade Order.  
The findings of this thesis contribute to the existing international trade literature which 
focuses on arguments for and against the existence of a constitutional order in the 
international trade system. The findings align with the position that the evidence is not 
strong enough to suggest the crystallisation of a constitutional order in international 
trade. However, the existing evidence was used in this thesis to proffer a mid-way 
position; that the circumstances of international economic relations have changed to 
accommodate new actors which where erstwhile not recognised in international law.
65
  
7.4 Limitations of Findings in the Thesis. 
Due to the multidimensional nature of the issues relating to the interaction of 
international economic norms and federal systems, this thesis is not an exhaustive study 
of all considerations arising.  
A holistic appraisal of the changing dynamics of international economic interactions 
entails an examination of a broad range of perspectives (international and domestic) and 
actors (traditional and non – traditional; state and non – state actors; institutionalised and 
sectorial) which have emerged and are actively contributing to the changing dynamics of 
the international economic process.  
Due to the constraint of time and space, the difficulties in acquiring the relevant required 
data on the case study Nigeria and word limit restrictions of this thesis; it has not been 
possible to consider all the relevant perspectives and actors mentioned above. The scope 
has been restricted to a consideration of the inter-relationship between the international 
economic regulatory regimes (multilateralism and regionalism in international trade, 
foreign investment, international finance and competition law etc.) and the constitutional 
domestic regimes for international economic interactions in federal systems.  
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Also, in relation to Nigeria, and with specific regards to the topic under investigation, 
this thesis was only able to draw on the analysis of commentators who have published 
articles in journals which are available online. There is the possibility that there are 
commentaries from authors in Nigeria which are available only in hardcopy which was 
not accessible for this research.  
7.5 A Future Research Agenda. 
The research area covered by this thesis has considerable potential for further detailed 
investigations into the other interconnected strands of the relationship between 
international economic norms and federal systems. For example, the disaggregation of 
nation-states (particularly federal systems) in a globalised system of international 
relations presents a huge potential for comparative discourse because there are over 25 
federal and ‘regionalised’ unitary nation-states in the international system.  
It was also identified in the course of this investigation that the literature on federalism 
and international economic relations cuts across a number of disciplines including 
political economy and law. This thesis primarily adopted a constitutional approach but 
took cognisance of the other multidisciplinary perspectives.
66
 However, the research can 
be expanded to consider these other theoretical perspectives on the relationship between 
international economic norms and federal systems.  
Specifically, it was identified in this thesis that in international economic law, there is an 
overlap between international trade and international investment. Examples from the 
FDI regime in Nigeria were utilised to demonstrate the changing dynamics of 
international economic interactions in Nigeria. This is an aspect of international 
economic relations which demands a more detailed investigation because FDI is at the 
heart of current reforms being carried out in Nigeria. Subsequently, the researcher plans 
to investigate the impact of international investment regimes on the federal process. 
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Also, the suggestions for cooperative federalism in Nigeria can be further tested in 
subsequent investigations if specific sectors of the Nigerian economy are selected for 
detailed analysis.  
7.6 Current Trends in the Nigerian Federal Process. 
The empirical evidence presented in the statement of the problem section of chapter one, 
indicated that a growing trend of Nigerian SFGs accessing the international scene is 
indicative of the onset of a change in Nigeria’s federal process. Three years down the 
line, this thesis has tracked the unfolding situation in Nigeria through reports and 
commentaries about the increased activities of SFGs on the international scene.  
In 2013, the FG called for a National Conference which commenced in March, 2014. At 
the time of writing the final chapter of this thesis, the process of political negotiations 
taking place within the different geo-political regions is strongly hinged on a clamour for 
a return to the constitutional position of regionalism under the 1963 Constitution. The 
demands of the major ethnic groups include: ‘fiscal federalism, regional autonomy, 
devolution of powers, resource control…’ 67 
This is a significant development which demonstrates the relevance of the findings of 
this thesis. It is an interesting development that SFGs are now seeking to use the 
political process to achieve constitutional change and actualise the practice of true 
federalism in Nigeria. This signifies the growing level of political consciousness within 
the polity about the need for sub-national autonomy in the federal process and 
demonstrates the relevance of this study.  
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In view of this trend, it is argued that it is only a question of time before the need for 
reforms in the area of international economicinteractions becomes priority on the agenda 
of the stakeholders to the Nigerian federal process. This prediction is premised on a 
finding in this thesis that there is a strong correlation between the development agenda 
of SFGs and their propensity to foray into the international scene. As the experiences of 
Canada and the US demonstrate, SFGs may not seek radical alterations of international 
law which still frowns on their involvement in international economic relations, but they 
will continue to exert pressure and capitalise on opportunities created in this 
dispensation of the international economic relations. In Canada, Belgium and the US, 
SFGs have in recent years been able to demand more involvement in the international 
economic relations. As such, it is believed that if the current democratic dispensation in 
Nigeria is allowed to evolve organically, the democratic values which are becoming 
entrenched in the federal process will crystallise in a return to shared competence 
between the FG and SFGs on matters of international economic relations, as was the 
case under the 1963 constitution.  
In the event that the federal government ignores the need for reform which focuses on 
stronger cooperative linkages between the centre and SFGs, there is a possibility that the 
experience in India where the regions are increasingly vocal in resisting and challenging 
the foreign policy direction of the central government may be replicated in Nigeria. 
The recommendations of this thesis can be factored into the reform process which is 
currently building momentum in Nigeria. This is because the desire for economic 
autonomy and/or secession coming from some quarters within the Nigerian federation is 
arguably due to a realisation that they have been constitutionally excluded from 
determining the policies which affect the utilisation of their resources and the exercise of 
their right to economic self-determination.  
It is argued that if a desire for economic development is at the heart of agitations for 
constitutional reforms, then cooperative federalism is an option which can prevent the 
break up of the country. Recent events in the UK demonstrate this point. It is arguable 
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that the Scottish referendum
68
 was arguably tilted in favour of the ‘Yes Campaign’ 
because promises where made by Westminister in London to cede more powers on 
economic and social issues to Scotland.
69
 This demonstrates that economic reasons are 
increasingly central to political self determination claims in both federal and unitary 
systems alike. However, this is a slippery slope because in the case of the UK, the 
Scottish referendum has spurred more economic self determination claims within the 
union.
70
 This raises questions as to the extent of devolution which can be accommodated 
without leading to an eventual breakup.   
In the context of Nigeria, it is arguable that the prescriptions for cooperative federalism 
in international economic relations of the country cannot guarantee the continued 
existence of Nigeria, but it is an approach which is necessary to accommodate the 
agitations which are building momentum. In essence, it is wiser for a workable 
constitutional formula to be engineered to reflect a compromise which can lead to the 
attainment of the common goal of economic development for all stakeholders involved 
through the instrumentality of international economic relations. 
Refering back to the UK example, it is arguable that the Scottish referendum has opened 
up more clamours for devolution and as such cooperative federalism may have the same 
effect in Nigeria. This is true to an extent because there are other deep seated issues 
aside from economic development which are threatening the continued existence of 
Nigeria. As such, it is possible that cooperative federalism may open up more clamours 
for self determination. However, the Nigerian union is only sustainable if the system is 
allowed to develop organically. Thus, if cooperative federalism opens up a ‘can of 
worms’ relating to other foundational issues (aside from economic development) upon 
                                                 
68
 The Scottish independence referendum took place on the 18th of September, 2014 . The ‘Yes 
Campaign’ won by a 10.6-point margin against ending the 307-year-old union with England and Wales. 
 
69
 See ‘Scotland Votes No: PM Promises New Powers’ (Sky News) < 
http://news.sky.com/story/1338424/scotland-votes-no-pm-promises-new-powers> accessed 5 November 
2014. 
 
70
 See Tim Donavan, ‘Devolution battle beckons between London and Manchester’ (BBC News) < 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-29884237> accessed 5 November 2014. 
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which Nigeria exists as a state, then this would be a welcome develoment which is long 
overdue.   
Also, a move in the direction of cooperation can spur on development for SFGs in 
Nigeria in areas of great economic potential which have been ignored, underutilised or 
have stagnated. These SFGs have for a long time settled into a constitutional 
arrangement where receiving revenue to which they have not contributed was the order 
of the day.  
It is the view in this thesis that this type of reform is realisable in Nigeria now, not just 
because the polity is ripe for a redefinition of her constitutional and institutional 
framework for international economic relations but also because the evolution in the 
world economy (exampliefied by the evolving relationship between multilateralism and 
regionalism in international trade) has created a complex but conducive stage whereby 
the international economic relations favour any country which can strategically place 
itself (through its policy choices), to exploit the opportunities for economic growth in a 
globalised world.  
Other federal systems have embraced cooperative federalism with varying degrees of 
success at achieving the right balance to accommodate centripetal and centrifugal forces. 
That Nigeria is lagging behind was clearly evident in the attitude of the policy makers 
interviewed during the field trip to Nigeria in June 2012. They were clearly amused by 
suggestions that there is a role to be played by SFGs in Nigeria’s international trade 
process. 
7.7 Conclusion. 
The thesis has engaged with the perennial issues relating to the interaction between 
federal systems and international economic norms. However, the emphasis in this 
investigation has been on the need for reform to the theoretical underpinnings of this 
relationship due to the changing dynamics of international economic relations. This 
thesis has focused on Nigeria as a case study to demonstrate how the continued reliance 
on central exclusivity in favour of central governments in federal systems is no longer 
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viable because it creates a divergence between theory and the functional reality of the 
current dispensation of international economic interactions. Schütze captures these 
changing dynamics and the necessity for a shift thus:  
The relationship between a society and its constitutional law may, then, at 
times follow the relation between ‘existence’ and ‘essence’: the former 
precedes the latter. Social changes precede constitutional ones. These are 
moments when constitutionalism… …fails to explain or justify the existing 
social order...
71
 
A crucial point is that the emergence of SFGs and other non-state actors as stakeholders 
in Nigeria’s international economic process is a political-economic change which has 
preceded a constitutional one. It should not be resisted because of a dogmatic insistence 
on values of state-centred sovereignty which are impracticable to reconcile in 
contemporary international relations.  Rather cooperative federalism, which is a more 
pragmatic framework attuned to the demands of a new dispensation of expanding 
international economic norms, because of its flexibility should be embraced in Nigeria. 
Cooperative federalism is flexible and dynamic enough to integrate the contributions of 
SFGs either within a hard law framework as is the case in Belgium, or a soft law 
framework as is the case in countries like the US and Canada.  
As such Nigeria’s international economic relations framework (constitutional and 
institutional) can be re-configured to accommodate the input of its SFGs within a 
cooperative framework which is situated half way between a hard and soft law setup. 
                                                 
71
 Schütze (n 50) 1. 
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APPENDIX 
 Sample of Interview Questions  
 
1. Under what forums do states contribute to trade policy formulation in Nigeria? 
 
The National Council on Commerce (NCC) 
 
2. What is the legal status of this forum (NCC) and the decisions which emanate 
from this forum? Is it binding or advisory?  
 
3. Considering the fact that the NCC meets only once a year, do you think this is a 
sufficient reflection of the participation of states in the trade policy formulation 
process in Nigeria?  
The Enlarged National Focal Point (ENFP) Committees on Multilateralism and 
Regional Trade Matters 
 
4. Do states participate under this forum?  
 
5. If they do, what is the scope of their contribution?   
 
6. What is the legal status of the forum and the decisions which emanate from the 
forum? 
 
7. In the Trade Policy document of 2002, under the section: ‘the responsibilities of 
the public and private sectors’ The role of the states is stated as: the 
maintenance of trade extension services, the promotion of primary production of 
all items of export oriented products, the training of manpower for trade growth 
and development, the investment in infrastructure to facilitate trade etc. 
However, the implementation strategy/action plan of the Nigerian Trade 
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Policy Document does not provide for any designated role for state governments 
to play in the trade policy implementation process. Why is this so? 
 
8. Considering the insistent clamours for a rethink of the Nigerian federalism due to 
the perceived anomalies and lopsided tilt of powers in favour of the central 
government, do you think that a call for more constitutionally guaranteed powers 
for states is workable in the trade policy formulation process of Nigeria?  
 
9. To what extent have states contributed in practice? 
 
10. Considering the present focus on re – organising the Nigerian trade policy 
agenda, with a keen emphasis on the growth of her FDI profile as a means of 
achieving economic development, do you think a centralised policy formulation 
system or a decentralised policy formulation system is best suited for Nigeria to 
improve her Foreign Direct Investment profile?  
 
11. Considering the growing complexity within the international trade regulatory 
environment – with the current tussle for prominence between multilateralism 
and regionalism, do you think that a centralised or a decentralised policy 
formulation structure is best suited to help Nigeria effectively achieve improved 
and meaningful participation in international trade?  
 
12. Which route do you think best favours Nigeria in her bid to improve her 
economic fortunes through international trade participation, multilateralism or 
regionalism?  
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